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Abstract 
This thesis includes three integrated articles in empirical finance and corporate governance.  
The first article studies the effects of sell-side financial analysts’ innate ability on corporate 
insider trading prior to annual earnings announcements from the perspective of information 
asymmetry. The empirical results show that analysts with higher innate ability are associated 
with lower level of net buys when insiders have “good” inside information about earnings, 
but this relation does not hold for net sells when insiders have “bad” inside information. The 
effects of analysts’ innate ability mostly reside in opportunistic trading rather than routine 
trading. The tests of analysts’ initial coverage provide stronger effects of analysts’ ability. 
This article suggests higher analyst ability can restrict insider trading. 
The second article explores a broad picture about how different measures of firm size (total 
assets, total sales, and market capitalization) affect the empirical analysis in 20 prominent 
areas in corporate finance. This article documents empirical evidence for “measurement 
effect” in “size effect”. The results show that in most areas of corporate finance, the 
coefficients of firm size measures are robust in sign and statistical significance. However, the 
coefficients of regressors other than firm size often change sign and significance when 
different size measures are employed. In addition, the goodness of fit measured by R-squared 
also varies with different size measures. As different proxies capture different aspects of 
“firm size”, the choice of size measures needs both theoretical and empirical justification.  
The third article further studies the impact drivers of dissemination of financial research. The 
empirical results show that the universalist perspective (quality and domain), the social 
constructivist perspective (visibility and personal promotion), and the presentation 
perspective (first-page attention and expositional clarity) all provide explanatory power for 
the impact of papers in the top three finance journals. Specifically, paper quality, research 
methods, journal placement, and paper age are the most important drivers for the number of 
citations. In addition, different drivers play different roles for the papers in JF, JFE, and RFS. 
This article provides evidence for finance scholars, university administrators, and finance 
journal management who care about research impact. 
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Chapter 1  
1 Introduction 
This thesis includes three articles (from Chapter 2 to Chapter 4) in empirical 
finance and corporate governance.  
Chapter 2 explores the effects of analysts’ innate ability on corporate insider 
trading. Although some firms impose restrictions on insider trading, insiders continue to 
take advantage of positive inside information to obtain profits, but insiders are more 
cautious in benefiting from negative inside information (Lee, Lemmon, and Sequeira, 
2014). Thus, it is important to think about any alternative channel that can play a role in 
restraining insider trading. Financial analysts may be a possible candidate because 
analysts provide information through forecasts of future earnings and returns, and can 
thus affect a firm’s information environment (Mikhail et al., 2003; Piotroski and 
Roulstone, 2004; Loh and Mian, 2006): an improved information environment leaves 
little room for insiders to trade profitably and thus discourages insider trading (Frankel 
and Li, 2004; Huddart and Ke, 2007; Wu, 2014). However, analysts’ heterogeneity is 
ignored in the existing literature. We postulate that analysts with higher ability, defined 
as analysts’ fixed effects in Coles et al. (2013), can better mitigate insider trading 
intensity.  
The empirical results in Chapter 2 show significantly less net buys by insiders 
prior to “good” earnings announcements (measured by positive earnings surprise) when 
firms are followed by analysts with higher ability, and we do not observe the same effect 
prior to “bad” earnings announcements. These asymmetric results are largely consistent 
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with the findings of Cheng and Lo (2006), Agrawal and Nasser (2012), and Agrawal and 
Cooper (2015) that insiders tend to avoid trading right before negative corporate events 
because of litigation risk. When we further divide insiders into opportunistic traders and 
routine traders, following Cohen et al. (2012), we find that the results are primarily 
present for opportunistic insiders but largely disappear for routine insiders. We also 
document stronger effects of analysts’ ability on insider trading for initial coverage. 
Chapter 2 suggests that high-ability analysts may serve in restricting excessive 
corporate insider trading. Chapter 2 also sheds light on the nature of analyst information. 
On the one hand, analysts are believed to specialize in providing industry-level 
information (Clement, 1999; Jacob et al., 1999; Gilson et al., 2001; Piotroski and 
Roulstone, 2004). On the other hand, many studies argue that analyst forecasts actually 
contain firm-specific information (Mikhail et al., 2003; Park and Stice, 2000; Liu 2011). 
This chapter suggests that the degree of firm-specific information an analyst can provide 
(e.g. earnings forecasts in this paper) may be determined by her innate ability. Firm-
specific information is more difficult to collect and analyze; thus, analysts with low 
ability may not be able to include firm-specific information in their forecasts.  
In Chapter 3, we study firm size, which is commonly used as an important, 
fundamental firm characteristic in both academic and practical financial analysis. In 
many situations, corporate finance researchers observe the “size effect” - firm size 
matters in determining the dependent variables. For example, in capital structure, Frank 
and Goyal (2003) show that pecking order is only found in large firms; Rajan and 
Zingales (1995) discover that leverage increases with firm size. In mergers and 
acquisitions, Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004) find that small ﬁrms have larger 
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abnormal announcement returns; Vijh and Yang (2013) document that for cash offers, 
targetiveness (probability of being targeted) decreases with firm size, but for stock offers 
they find an inverted-U relation. In executive compensation, Jensen and Murphy (1990) 
and Core et al. (1999) find that top-management compensation level increases with firm 
size. 
Although firm size matters in empirical corporate finance, no paper provides a 
comprehensive assessment of the sensitivity of empirical results in corporate finance to 
different measures of firm size. We use 20 representative specifications in 9 benchmark 
papers in top finance journals (Coles and Li, 2012), and study the influences (sign 
sensitivity, significance sensitivity, and R-squared sensitivity) of employing different 
measures of firm size (total assets, total sales, and market value of equity).  
The results in Chapter 3 confirm the “measurement effect” in “size effect” in 
empirical corporate finance. The coefficients on regressors other than firm size often 
change sign and significance when we use difference firm size measures. Unfortunately, 
this suggests that, when using different firm size proxies, some previous studies are not 
robust. Researchers should either use all the important proxies as robustness checks, or 
provide rationale of using any specific proxy. Additionally, the goodness of fit measured 
by R-squared varies significantly with different firm size measures. Some size measures 
appear more “relevant” than others in different areas, implying that they are better control 
variables to reduce omitted variable bias and improve the estimation of the main 
coefficients of interest. Different size proxies capture different aspects of “firm size”, and 
thus have different implications. The choice of these firm size measures can be a 
theoretical and empirical question. 
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The empirical results in Chapter 3 not only provides guidance for researchers who 
must use firm size proxies in empirical corporate finance research, but also sheds light on 
future research that might incorporate measurement effect into other research fields, such 
as empirical asset pricing and empirical accounting. 
In Chapter 4, we explore a broad picture by studying which factors affect the 
impact of financial research. It is known that the top 1% (10%) papers in the leading 
finance journals have received 1/3 (3/4) of the total number of citations (Chung, Cox, and 
Mitchell, 2001).  This phenomenon indicates the value of a paper depends on both journal 
placement and research impact. To our knowledge, the literature has not fully answered 
the questions of how paper characteristics change over time, how paper characteristics 
differ between more influential papers and less influential papers, and what are the 
impact drivers of the published papers in top finance journals. We aim to fill these holes 
in the literature in Chapter 4. 
In addition, all of previous studies in citations in finance literature only cover a 
few independent variables, with the lack of a comprehensive construction of impact 
drivers of financial research. Following the framework of Stremersch, Verniers, and 
Verhoef (2007), we use the most extensive set of paper characteristics as determinants of 
citations to explore the roles of three theoretical perspectives: the universalist perspective 
(what is said), the social constructivist perspective (who says it), and the presentation 
perspective (how it is said).  
We have several empirical findings. First, we find that most of the measures of 
paper characteristics in the social constructivist perspective (visibility and personal 
promotion) and the presentation perspective (first-page attention and expositional clarity) 
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increase over time, while most of the paper characteristics in the universalist perspective 
(quality and domain) remain constant. Second, most of the paper characteristics are 
significantly different between the top 10% and the bottom 10% groups based on the 
number of citations per year. Third, the regression results by negative binomial models 
show that the universalist perspective, the social constructivist perspective, and the 
presentation perspective all provide impact drivers of published papers in the top three 
finance journals. Specifically, paper quality, research methods, journal placement, and 
paper age are the most important (in economic significance) drivers for the number of 
citations. Furthermore, the results of average marginal results document exact evidence in 
how many additional citations are increased with one more unit of a certain paper 
characteristics. Last, different drivers play different roles for the papers in Journal of 
Finance, Journal of Financial Economics, and Review of Financial Studies.  
Chapter 4 provides useful empirical evidence for finance scholars, university 
administrators, and finance journal management who care about research impact.  
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Chapter 2  
2 Do Not Cover Me: Financial Analysts’ Innate Ability and 
Insider Trading 
2.1 Introduction 
Corporate insider trading is important in several aspects such as asset prices, 
corporate investment policies, and corporate governance. First, it is well documented in 
the literature that insider trading is informative in predicting stock returns (Seyhun, 1986; 
Seyhun, 1992; Lakonishok and Lee, 2001; Agrawal and Nasser, 2012; Agrawal and 
Cooper, 2015). Second, insider trading leads insiders to choose riskier investment 
projects (Bebchuk and Fershtman, 1994) and insider trading restrictions can reduce 
corporate risk-taking (Kusnadi, 2015). Third, insider trading restrictions are associated 
with higher total pay and more use of equity incentives (Roulstone, 2003; Denis and Xu, 
2013), implying insider trading serves as a tool in rewarding executives. 
Although some firms impose restrictions on insider trading, insiders continue to 
take advantage of positive inside information to obtain profits, but insiders are more 
cautious in benefiting from negative inside information (Lee, Lemmon, and Sequeira, 
2014). Thus, it is important to think about any alternative channels that can play a role in 
restraining insider trading
1
. Financial analysts may be a possible candidate for two 
reasons. First, analysts provide information through forecasts of future earnings and 
returns, and can thus affect a firm’s information environment (Mikhail et al., 2003; 
                                                 
1
 Restrictions of corporate insider trading are in the spirit of better corporate governance as corporate inside 
information can crowd out investors, but we are aware about the debate that inside information can improve 
market efficiency.    
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Piotroski and Roulstone, 2004; Loh and Mian, 2006): an improved information 
environment leaves little room for insiders to trade profitably and thus discourages 
insider trading (Frankel and Li, 2004; Huddart and Ke, 2007). Second, analysts also 
matter in corporate governance by mitigating corporate insiders’ expropriation of outside 
shareholders (Chen et al., 2015), and better internal governance may also help restrict 
insider trading (Jagolinzer et al., 2011; Dai et al., 2015). Empirical findings are largely 
consistent with analysts restraining insider trading. For example, Frankel and Li (2004) 
show that the number of analysts following is negatively associated with insider trading 
intensity and profitability, and Wu (2014) documents higher insider trading profitability 
following decreases in analyst coverage caused by exogenous brokerage closures. 
Alternatively, some studies cast doubt on the association between analysts and insiders 
because they may have  different information sets. For example, Piotroski and Roulstone 
(2004) show that analysts are better at providing industry-specific information, while 
insiders primarily trade on firm-specific information. Hsieh et al (2005) find that insider 
trades and analyst recommendations usually contradict each other.  
In this article, we aim to further extend the question by studying whether financial 
analysts with higher ability contribute more in restricting corporate insider trading. We 
argue that the inconsistency in empirical studies is a result of ignoring analyst 
heterogeneity. Sell-side financial analysts form heterogeneous earnings forecasts and 
stock recommendations: Sinha et al. (1997) find that some analysts are able to provide 
more accurate annual earnings per share (EPS) forecasts than other analysts, and Loh and 
Mian (2006) find that analysts who provide more accurate forecasts also provide more 
profitable stock recommendations. Although some previous studies of financial analysts 
10 
 
find that experience
2
 may sometimes be a good proxy for analyst ability (Mikhail et al. 
1997; Akyol et al. 2015), Coles et al. (2013) show that an analyst’s innate ability can be 
well measured by her fixed effect on forecasting accuracy, and that ability measure 
perform better than other ability measures, such as experience. We postulate that analysts 
with higher ability, defined as in Coles et al. (2013), can better influence a firm’s 
information environment by providing more accurate forecasts. Also, analysts with 
higher ability are more likely to effectively monitor insiders because of their superior 
abilities in information collection and firm evaluation. Thus, we expect that analysts with 
higher ability can better restrain insider trading profitability and mitigate insider trading 
intensity. Since corporate insiders are sophisticated investors with inside firm-specific 
information, and their trades are on average very profitable (Seyhun, 1986; Lakonishok 
and Lee, 2001), it is natural to imagine how difficult it is for an average analyst to crowd 
out inside information. However, it is plausible that only a small percentage of high-
ability insiders can compete with insiders in information, which explains why insiders 
and analysts may appear to have different information sets but the existence of analysts 
(or rather, of high-ability analysts) mitigates insider trading activities.  
                                                 
2
 Other alternative ability proxies suggested in the existing literature include industry specialization (Jacob 
et al., 1999), reputation (Stickel, 1995) and job complexity (Clement, 1999). Analyst reputation usually 
refers to the rankings of all-star analyst (Clarke et al., 2007), but this proxy only provides annual lists of top 
analysts and the rankings are mainly based on returns an investor would have achieved following stock 
recommendations. However, in this chapter we quantify analysts’ innate ability for all analysts in I/B/E/S, 
and for our research purposes, the estimations are based on analysts’ forecast accuracy of earnings rather 
than stock recommendations due to the fact that earnings are more relevant to inside information prior to 
disclosure but stock prices are more complicatedly determined by market behavior. In addition, Emery and 
Li (2009) use data from 1993 to 2005 based on analyst rankings of Institutional Investor (I/I) and The Wall 
Street Journal (WSI) and find that earnings forecasts of stars are not significantly different from those of 
non-stars and they conclude that analyst rankings are “popularity contests” to a large degree. Thus it is 
necessary to investigate in the effects of alternative measure of analysts’ ability, as what we do in this 
chapter.  
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Using a sample of US firms from 1986 to 2008, we find that analyst ability indeed 
matters for insider trading. Specifically, we show significantly less net buys by insiders 
prior to good earnings announcements (measured by positive earnings surprise) when 
firms are followed by analysts with higher ability, and we do not observe the same effect 
prior to bad earnings announcements. These asymmetric results are largely consistent 
with the findings of Cheng and Lo (2006), Agrawal and Nasser (2012), and Agrawal and 
Cooper (2015) that insiders tend to avoid trading right before negative corporate events 
because of litigation risk. When we further divide insiders into opportunistic traders and 
routine traders, following Cohen et al. (2012), we find that the results are primarily 
present for opportunistic insiders but largely disappear for routine insiders. We also 
document reduced insider trading profitability when firms are covered by high-ability 
analysts.  
We note that there might be a problem of reverse causality in the results described 
above. We try to mitigate this problem by keeping all insider trading data in our sample 
in the 30-day window
3
 prior to annual earnings announcement by firms, and all forecasts 
of annual earnings by analysts in our sample are restricted to at least one month before 
earnings announcements, thus all forecasts precede insider trading. It is unlikely that 
insider trading attracts analyst coverage in the same fiscal year and further changes 
analysts’ innate ability. However, we are aware that this setting cannot completely rule 
out the possibility of endogeneity. Analyst forecasting accuracy has been documented to 
                                                 
3
 Other window length (14-day event window) is also examined.  The window length should be neither too 
long (noisy information) nor too short (blackout restrictions). We believe one-month window is an 
appropriate choice.  
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be higher in firms with relatively higher transparency (see for instance, Brown et al., 
1987, Lang and Lundhold, 1996). If an analyst always picks high-transparency firms to 
follow, she may constantly have more accurate forecasts and be deemed a high-ability 
analyst in our test, even if she is no better than other analysts. Suppose there is a life 
cycle of transparency that corporate insiders would naturally trade less when the 
transparency level is high, thus the negative relation between analyst ability and insider 
trading may be due to endogeneity, even if we use the setting of initial coverage.  
Some researchers view insider trading as a channel to incorporate information 
into prices, and thus believe insider trading should be allowed because it promotes market 
efficiency (Manne, 1966; Leland, 1992). On the other hand, more and more people view 
insider trading as a problem because it may discourage outsiders (Ausubel, 1990), and 
many public firms in the US have adopted firm-level insider trading restrictions (Bettis et 
al., 2000; Roulstone, 2003). While we do not take a stand in this debate, our study does 
suggest high-ability analysts may serve in restricting excessive corporate insider trading.  
This study also sheds light on the nature of analyst information. Unlike other 
information providers, such as corporate insiders and institutional investors, analysts are 
believed to specialize in providing industry-level information (Clement, 1999; Jacob et 
al., 1999; Gilson et al., 2001). Piotroski and Roulstone (2004) found that stock return 
synchronicity is positively associated with analyst forecast activities, suggesting that 
information from analysts is more industry-specific and less firm-specific. Contrarily, 
many studies argue that analyst forecasts actually contain firm-specific information 
(Mikhail et al., 2003; Park and Stice., 2000). Liu (2011) brings a new perspective, 
suggesting that whether information from analysts is more industry-specific or firm-
13 
 
specific depends on the beta and idiosyncratic return volatility of the firm. In this study, 
we add a new angle to the debate. Our results suggest that the degree of firm-specific 
information an analyst can provide (e.g. earnings forecasts in this paper) may be 
determined by her innate ability. Firm-specific information is more difficult to collect and 
analyze; thus, analysts with low or average ability may not be able to include firm-
specific information in their forecasts. Difference in analyst ability reconciles the 
seemingly contradictory findings that analyst forecasts on average increase stock return 
synchronicity and that the presence of analysts affects insider trading activities: though 
the number of analysts or the number of analyst forecasts may not be directly associated 
with firm-specific information, it increases the likelihood of including high-ability 
analysts who provide firm-specific information and affect insider trading.  
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes the data, 
Section 2.3 presents empirical design and results for the effects of analysts’ innate ability 
on the insider trading intensity, Section 2.4 provides the analysis for the effects of 
analysts’ innate ability on insider trading informativeness, Section 2.5 discusses the 
endogeneity problem, and Section 2.6 concludes. 
2.2 The Data 
Insider trading data in this paper are from Thomson Reuters Insider Filing Data 
Feed (IFDF). The SEC defines corporate insiders as those who have access to non-public, 
material, and inside information, and those people include board directors, corporate 
executives, and beneficiary owners with more than 10% ownership of shares outstanding.  
The Section 16a of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 requires that insider trading 
should be reported to the SEC within 10 days after the trades are executed, and the 
14 
 
deadline was later changed to two days in 2002 due to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The 
reported insider trades are mostly legal, and our sample includes the open-market trades 
only from 1986 to 2008.  
If an insider trades multiple times on the same trading day, then a single daily buy 
or sell trade is cumulated for her because trades on the same day are probably on the 
same information and separate observations can harm the accurate relationship between 
explanatory variables and insider trading measures. Furthermore, we restrict insider 
trading to the 30-day window prior to earnings announcements by firms for two reasons. 
First, if the window is too long, noise can become a problem as information asymmetry 
may be at a low level and other major corporate events might twist the results. Second, 
the window being too short can also be a problem as many firms have different blackout 
windows that restrict insider trading, and thus the number of observations is not 
sufficient. Alternatively, we also use the 14-day window for robustness checks. As for the 
insider trading measures, we use net buys and net sells (the opposite numbers of net buys) 
for all insiders at firm-year level in multivariate regressions because some sophisticated 
insiders can trade in different directions in our event window. For example, an insider 
might sell stock first for liquidity and buy stock some days later at lower prices according 
to her inside information.  In addition, one insider might trade stocks for many other 
reasons rather than establishing a long or short position according to inside information, 
so insider trading based on all insiders in a firm can be more representative and thus 
convey more accurate information than trading by a single insider. As for the 
construction of insider trading measures, we provide the formula for the number of 
trades, trading volumes, adjusted trading volumes, and trading value in section 2.3.  
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Again, insider trading might not be informative about firms’ futures, although 
corporate insiders have favored access to private information about firm events.  
Specifically, for insider buys, an insider might purchase stock of her firm due to discount 
plans after receiving a bonus; for insider sells, an insider might sell stock of his firm for 
liquidity and portfolio rebalancing purposes. To differentiate between informative trades 
and non-informative trades, we follow Cohen, Malloy, and Pomorski (2012) who 
distinguish opportunistic insider trading and routine trading.  They define a routine trader 
as an insider who traded in the same calendar month for at least three consecutive years 
in the past and define an opportunistic trader as everyone else
4
. Then all trades are 
classified into two categories: routine trades by routine traders and opportunistic trades 
by opportunistic traders.  We follow this method but we are aware that this method has 
the limitation that an insider might change his conventional trading timing in different 
years so we only apply this method as comparison with the main empirical results. 
 For the data of analysts’ innate ability or natural talent, we use the data from 
1984 to 2008
5
 in Coles, Li and Mola (2013) who isolate the analyst fixed effects
6
 from 
the three-way fixed effects (analyst fixed effects, broker fixed effects, and year fixed 
                                                 
4
 Cohen, Malloy, and Pomorski (2012) conduct a variety of robustness checks to support their conclusions 
that are based on their novel measures of “opportunistic” traders and “routine” traders. 
5
 This implies the estimated innate ability exhibits a look-ahead bias given that fact that the data of forecast 
accuracy are from 1984 to 2008.  
6
 Equation (1) of Coles, Li, and Mola (2013):  ?̂?𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝐴𝑖𝑡?̂? + 𝐶𝑖𝑗𝑡𝛾 + ?̂?𝑖 + ?̂?𝑗 + ?̂?𝑡 + 𝜀?̂?𝑗𝑡, with ?̂?𝑖𝑡 as the 
forecast accuracy for analyst i and brokerage house j at fiscal year t. 𝐴𝑖𝑡?̂? refers to analyst characteristics, 
𝐶𝑖𝑗𝑡𝛾 refers to control variables, ?̂?𝑖 refers to analyst fixed effects, ?̂?𝑗 refers to broker fixed effects, ?̂?𝑡 refers 
to year fixed effects, and 𝜀?̂?𝑗𝑡 refers to residuals or “pure luck”.  
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effects) in the regressions on forecast accuracy
7
 and we employ the analyst fixed effects 
as a measure of innate ability or natural talent. They find innate ability (4% in 
explanatory power) serves as a more significant role than experience (less than 1.4% in 
explanatory power) and affiliation (1% in explanatory power). Following the connected-
group method in Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999), Coles, Li, and Mola (2013) first 
apply it in the analysis of analyst accuracy
8
. And this method is also well documented in 
the studies of managerial compensation (Graham, Li and Qiu, 2012), managerial 
incentives (Coles and Li, 2013), mutual fund (Huang and Wang, 2014), and insider 
trading (Hillier et al. 2015). We denote the measure as innate ability or natural talent 
rather than general analyst heterogeneity because it stems from the regression on forecast 
accuracy which mostly depends on ability, although we cannot identify what traits the 
“innate ability” comprises
9
. We assume ability measured by analyst fixed effect is static 
for each analyst based on our testing periods. For the data that generate the ability 
measure, we report the summary statistics for analyst data in Table 2.1, Panel A and the 
regression on forecast accuracy and explanatory power decomposition in Table 2.1, Panel 
B, both of which are adapted from Coles, Li, and Simona (2013). Specifically, Table 2.1, 
Panel A provides the definitions, means, and demeans of forecast accuracy and analysts’ 
observable time-variant characteristics and control variables; Table 2.1, Panel B shows 
                                                 
7
 Forecast accuracy by financial analysts is based on annual earnings per share (EPS). The exact definition 
of forecast accuracy is provided in Table 1. Earnings releases are more related to inside information, while 
stock prices are complicatedly determined by market behavior. Thus analysts’ earnings forecasts rather 
than analysts’ target prices matter for the research purpose of this paper. 
8
 A summary of the econometrics of this method is in the Appendix 2 (page 179-page 184) in Graham, Li 
and Qiu (2012). In order to save space for this complicated method, we do not summarize again.  
9
 Since the “innate ability” measure is “comprehensive”, it may incorporate efforts. However, it is hard to 
separate efforts from ability as part of efforts is associated with ability, such as in time management. 
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the comparison of empirical results among the specifications with or without analyst 
fixed effects - the estimated analyst fixed effects increase the goodness of fit by 2% (0.18 
in Column 1 vs. 0.20 in Column 3, and 0.19 in Column 2 vs. 0.21 in Column 4). Also, the 
percent explanatory power (calculated as the ratio of covariance between forecast 
accuracy and analyst fixed effects to the variance of forecast accuracy) is about 4.01%, 
implying a relatively more important role than broker fixed effects and year fixed effects. 
We also show the distribution of estimated analysts’ innate ability in Figure 2.1 and this 
measure is a “quasi” normal distribution. 
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Table 2.1: The Measure of Analysts’ Innate Ability from Coles et al. (2013) 10 
Table 2.1, Panel A: Summary Statistics for Analyst Earnings: 1984-2008 
  Mean Median 
 
Mean Median 
Sample size at the year level 
 
  Analysts’ observable time-variant  
  Number of forecasts  25,706.24 26,338.00 characteristics and control variables 
  Number of covered firms  2,907.00 2,989.00    
Number of analysts  2,644.36 2,652.00 General experience (GEXPit) 8.12 6.72 
Number of brokers  225.28 237 Firm experience (FEXPijt) 2.82 1.61 
Number of analysts per broker 12.06 11.64 Number of companies (NCOSit) 13.06 9.00 
Forecast accuracy 
 
  Number of two-digit SIC (NSIC2it) 3.98 3.00 
Absolute forecast error (AFEijt) 0.29 0.06 Top-ten largest broker dummy (TOP10it) 0.49 0.00 
Forecast accuracy (PMAFEijt) 0 0.16 Forecast age (AGEijt) 88.46 45.00 
      
Table 2.1 Panel A shows summary statistics for 642,656 analyst earnings estimates in I/B/E/S Detail during 1984-2008. AFEijt is the absolute forecast error of actual EPS for 
analyst i on firm j in year t11. Forecast accuracy (PMAFEijt) is defined as ( AFE̅̅ ̅̅ ̅jt − AFEijt)/ AFE̅̅ ̅̅ ̅jt , where AFE̅̅ ̅̅ ̅jt is the mean AFEijt  on firm j in year t
12
. General experience 
(GEXPit) is the number of years since the first estimate of analyst i. Firm experience (FEXPijt) is the numer of year since the first estimate of analyst i on firm j. The number of 
forecasts per firm (FREQijt) is the total number of earnings forecasts by analyst i on firm j in year t. Number of companies (NCOSit) is the number of firms covered by analyst i in 
year t. Number of two-digit SIC (NSIC2it) is the number of two-digit SIC industries covered by analyst i in year t. Top-ten largest broker dummy (TOP10it) equals one if analyst i 
works for the brokers in the top size decile (measured by the number of analysts) in year t, and zero otherwise. Forecast age (AGEijt) is the number of days from the forecast 
announcement date to the fiscal year end date. 
                                                 
10
 This table is adapted from Coles, Li and Simona (2013), Table 1 and Table 2. We use the same data of analyst fixed effect as a measure of innate ability 
11
 The forecast on annual EPS is based on the most recent one if there are multiple forecasts (including revisions) by the same analyst. 
12
 For other measures of forecast accuracy and some independent variables refer to Clement and Tse (2003, 2005). 
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Table 2.1, Panel B: Regression on Forecast Accuracy and Explanation Power 
Decomposition 
 1 2 3 4 Variation 
Decomposition13 
General experience  
(GEXPit) 
0.001*** 
(6.32) 
0.000** 
(2.05) 
-0.002*** 
(-4.90) 
-0.006*** 
(-12.35) 
16.78% 
Firm experience 
 (FEXPijt) 
0.001*** 
(3.16) 
-0.000 
(-0.45) 
-0.002*** 
(-3.91) 
-0.002*** 
(-3.80) 
 
Number of forecasts 
per firm (FREQijt) 
0.001*** 
(3.16) 
0.031*** 
(47.50) 
0.032*** 
(45.55) 
0.030*** 
(41.76) 
 
Top-ten largest broker 
dummy (TOP10it) 
0.039*** 
(16.73) 
0.018*** 
(5.54) 
0.020*** 
(6.29) 
0.021*** 
(5.67) 
 
Number of companies 
(NCOSit) 
-0.000 
(-0.98) 
-0.000 
(-0.35) 
0.000 
(0.33) 
-0.000 
(-0.20) 
 
Number of two-digit 
SIC (NSIC2it) 
-0.003*** 
(-5.83) 
0.000 
(0.58) 
0.002*** 
(3.08) 
0.003*** 
(3.34) 
 
Forecast age  
(AGEijt) 
-0.005*** 
(-233.30) 
-0.005*** 
(-306.90) 
-0.005*** 
(-298.61) 
-0.005*** 
(-290.37) 
 
Analyst fixed 
effects 
No No Yes Yes 4.01% 
Broker fixed effects No Yes No Yes 0.97% 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 0.61% 
Number of 
observations 
642,186 642,186 642,186 642,186  
Adjusted R2 0.18 0.19 0.20 0.21  
Table 2.1 Panel B shows the results of OLS regressions for the testing period 1984-2008. The dependent variable is 
analyst forecast accuracy (PMAFEijt), which is defined as (AFE̅̅ ̅̅ ̅jt − AFEijt)/ AFE̅̅ ̅̅ ̅jt  , Where AFEijt is the absolute 
forecast error of actual EPS for analyst i on firm j in year t, and AFE̅̅ ̅̅ ̅jt is the mean AFEijt on firm j in year t. General 
experience (GEXPit) is the number of years since the first estimate of analyst i. Firm experience (FEXPijt) is the numer 
of year since the first estimate of analyst i on firm j. The number of forecasts per firm (FREQijt) is the total number of 
earnings forecasts by analyst i on firm j in year t. Number of companies (NCOSit) is the number of firms covered by 
analyst i in year t. Number of two-digit SIC (NSIC2it) is the number of two-digit SIC industries covered by analyst i in 
year t. Top-ten largest broker dummy (TOP10it) equals one if analyst i works for the brokers in the top size decile 
(measured by the number of analysts) in year t, and zero otherwise. Forecast age (AGEijt) is the number of days from 
the forecast announcement date to the fiscal year end date. All variables are demeaned in fiscal year t. Robust standard 
errors are clustered at the firm level and provided in parenthesis. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% level respectively. The explanation power of the independent variables, analyst fixed effects, broker fixed 
effect, and year fixed effects are presented in the last column. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
13
 The relative explanatory power of an explanatory variable is calculated as the ratio of the covariance 
between the dependent variable and the explanatory variable to the variance of the dependent variable. The 
residual has 77.65% explanation power, which can be explained by “luck”.  
20 
 
Figure 2.1:  The Distribution of Estimated Analysts’ Innate Ability 
Figure 2.1A: Distribution of Estimated Analysts’ Innate Ability 
 
 
Figure 2.1B: Comparison between Kernel Density of Analysts’ Innate Ability and Normal Distribution 
 
Figure 2.1 depicts the distribution of estimated analysts’ innate ability for 7540 analysts, with mean=-0.028, standard 
deviation=0.264, minimum=-1.163, and maximum=0.679. Figure 2.1A presents the distribution of estimated analysts’ 
innate ability using histograms and the kernel density estimation (curved line). Figure 2.1B is the comparison between 
the kernel density of analysts’ innate ability and normal distribution. To be consistent with previous tables, the 
estimated analysts’ innate ability is denoted as Talent. All data are winsorized at 1% level.  
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The data for construction of control variables and other measures are from 
multiple sources. The stock prices that are used to calculate insider trading value, 
earnings surprise, and cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are from CRSP. The analyst 
data that are used to calculate the number of analysts coving a firm, the EPS forecast 
timing, and earnings surprise are from I/B/E/S.  For other control variables, the data of 
market capitalization, total assets, B/M (book to market) ratio, R&D (the research and 
development expenses), and PP&E (the property, plant and equipment) are from 
COMPUSTAT.  All of the variables that are used in this study are summarized in Table 
2.2 and the Pearson correlation matrix for the major variables is shown in Table 2.3. 
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Table 2.2:  Sample Summary Statistics 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VARIABLES # of obs. mean std min max 
      
SUE1(earnings surprise1) 191,223 -0.005 0.400 -9.289 59.460 
SUE2(earnings surprise2) 183,620 -0.005 0.118 -9.751 0.651 
year 197,340 1,998 6.660 1,985 2,008 
sic2 197,340 41.480 19.800 0 99 
talent 197,340 0.009 0.158 -0.638 0.417 
log(mv) 185,230 7.371 1.769 3.423 11.430 
R&D 197,340 0.043 0.072 0 0.386 
PP&E 184,569 0.594 0.415 0.038 1.874 
book/market 185,212 0.488 0.335 -0.149 1.906 
log(number of analysts) 185,196 2.763 0.741 0.693 3.951 
netbuy_number 197,340 -2.091 3.956 -21 7 
netbuy_volume 197,340 -5.684 21.580 -146.600 60 
netbuy_value 197,340 -2.331 8.207 -61.730 9.356 
netbuy_adjusted volume 197,340 -1.049 5.343 -40.130 14.530 
post-SOX 197,340 0.372 0.483 0 1 
log(ann. timing) 197,340 5.201 0.583 3.584 5.994 
      
Table 2.2 reports summary statistics of data at forecast-firm-year level. The testing period is from 1985 to 2008. Insider 
trading data are in the 30-day window before annual earnings announcements by the firms. All data are winsorized at 
1% level. SUE1 is the difference between actual EPS and the EPS in the previous year (rescaled by share price); SUE2 
is the difference between actual EPS and the median of forecasts reported to I/B/E/S in the 90 days prior to the earnings 
announcement (rescaled by share price); talent is analysts’ innate ability or natural talent measured by the analyst fixed 
effect from the regressions on analysts’ forecast accuracy; netbuy_number is the number of buys minus the number of 
sells; netbuy_volume is buys volume minus sells volume and divided by 10,000; netbuy_value is buys value (buys 
volume times monthly stock price) minus sells value (buy volumes times monthly stock price) and divided by 
1,000,000; netbuy_volume is adjusted sell volumes (sells volume divided by the number of shares outstanding) minus 
buys volume (buys volume divided by the number of shares outstanding); log(MV) is the logarithm of market 
capitalization of the firm; book/market is the ratio of book value of the firm to its market value; the number of analysts 
is the logarithm of the number of analysts following the firm in a fiscal year; PP&E is the property, plant and 
equipment divided by total assets; R&D is the research and development expenses divided by total assets; post-SOX is 
a dummy that equals 1 if insider trading window is after 2002 September, and 0 elsewhere; log(ann. timing) is the 
logarithm of the number of days between the earnings forecast date (before insider trading window) by the analyst and 
the earnings announcement date by the firm.   
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Table 2.3: Correlation Matrix 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1=netbuy_number 1 
 
           
2=netbuy_volume 0.452 
(0.00) 
1           
3=netbuy_value 0.392 
(0.00) 
0.884 
(0.00) 
1          
4=netbuy_adj. vol. 0.322 
(0.00) 
0.764 
(0.00) 
0.610 
(0.00) 
1         
5=talent 0.004 
(0.11) 
-0.005 
(0.03) 
-0.007 
(0.00) 
-0.001 
(0.55) 
1        
6=log(mv) -0.097 
(0.00) 
-0.084 
(0.00) 
-0.139 
(0.00) 
0.117 
(0.00) 
0.056 
(0.00) 
1       
7=book/market 0.107 
(0.00) 
0.036 
(0.00) 
0.065 
(0.00) 
-0.027 
(0.00) 
0.007 
(0.00) 
-0.323 
(0.00) 
1      
8= log (# of ana.) -0.078 
(0.00) 
-0.040 
(0.00) 
-0.078 
(0.00) 
0.106 
(0.00) 
0.058 
(0.00) 
0.765 
(0.00) 
-0.158 
(0.00) 
1     
9=PP&E 0.117 
(0.00) 
0.069 
(0.00) 
0.058 
(0.00) 
0.038 
(0.00) 
0.045 
(0.00) 
0.099 
(0.00) 
0.164 
(0.00) 
0.181 
(0.00) 
1    
10=R&D -0.067 
(0.00) 
0.034 
(0.00) 
0.025 
(0.00) 
0.034 
(0.00) 
-0.022 
(0.00) 
-0.077 
(0.00) 
-0.261 
(0.00) 
-0.056 
(0.00) 
-0.376 
(0.00) 
1   
11=post-SOX 
 
-0.235 
(0.00) 
-0.113 
(0.00) 
-0.130 
(0.00) 
-0.010 
(0.00) 
-0.023 
(0.00) 
0.163 
(0.00) 
-0.142 
(0.00) 
0.028 
(0.00) 
-0.208 
(0.00) 
0.149 
(0.00) 
1 
 
 
12=log(ann. timing) 
 
-0.009 
(0.00) 
0.009 
(0.00) 
0.008 
(0.00) 
0.014 
(0.00) 
0.008 
(0.00) 
0.007 
(0.00) 
-0.016 
(0.00) 
-0.006 
(0.01) 
-0.022 
(0.00) 
0.024 
(0.00) 
0.042 
(0.01) 
1 
 
Table 2.3 reports the Pearson correlation matrix for the variables in the whole sample at forecast-firm-year level. The testing period is from 1985 to 2008. The number of 
observations is the same as that Table 2. Insider trading data are in the 30-day window before annual earnings announcements by the firms. All data are winsorized at 1% level. 
Netbuy_number is the number of buys minus the number of sells; netbuy_volume is buys volume minus sells volume and divided by 10,000; netbuy_value is buys value (buys 
volume times monthly stock price) minus sells value (buy volumes times monthly stock price) and divided by 1,000,000; netbuy_volume is adjusted sell volumes (sells volume 
divided by the number of shares outstanding) minus buys volume (buys volume divided by the number of shares outstanding); talent is the innate ability or natural ability of the 
analyst; log(MV) is the logarithm of market capitalization of the firm; book/market is the ratio of book value of the firm to its market value; the number of analysts is the logarithm 
of the number of analysts following the firm in a fiscal year; PP&E is the property, plant and equipment divided by total assets; R&D is the research and development expenses 
divided by total assets; post-Sox is a dummy that equals 1 if insider trading window is after 2002 September, and 0 elsewhere; log(ann. timing) is the logarithm of the number of 
days between the earnings forecast date (before insider trading window) by the analyst and the earnings announcement date by the firm.  Corresponding p-values are in the 
parentheses.
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In Table 2.2, it is worth noting that on average all measures about net buys are 
negative since there are more insider sells than insider buys. This is because insiders can 
obtain shares through grant, bonus and exercising options, but these transactions are not 
filed as buys in SEC Form 4. However, if such stocks are sold, they are recorded as sales. 
Thus net buys are mechanically negative on average. As for the nature of the earnings 
forecasts, the mean earnings surprise is -0.5% for both measures (SUE1 and SUE2), and 
37.2% of the earnings forecasts in our sample are announced in the post-SOX period.  
In Table 2.3, we find that among the paired insider trading measures, 
netbuy_number generates relatively lower Pearson correlation coefficients; this suggests 
the frequency of insider trading has a different nature from insider trading volume and 
insider trading value and thus can generate different empirical results. In addition, 
analysts’ innate ability (variable name as “Talent”) is negatively correlated with 
netbuy_volume and netbuy_value at 5% and 1% significance level respectively, 
consistent with our intuition that high-ability analysts help restrict insider trading. 
2.3 Analysts’ Innate Ability and Insider Trading Intensity 
2.3.1 Main Results 
First, we examine the effects of analysts’ innate ability (or natural talent) on open 
market insider trading before annual earnings announcements at forecast-analyst-firm-
year level. We believe forecast level is more accurate than other considerations. For our 
research purposes, analysts’ innate ability only works through earnings forecasts; two 
analysts with similar innate ability might have different effects on insider trading if their 
number of forecasts is different due to different frequency of information transformation. 
25 
 
Each forecast represents specific information flow given different forecast timing, 
thereby implying different information asymmetry levels. While controlling for the 
frequency of forecasts cannot identify the exact forecast timing, we control the number of 
days between earnings forecasts by analysts and earnings announcements by companies. 
We use the following specification to explore the effects of analysts’ innate ability on 
corporate insider trading: 
 
𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑘 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑀𝑉)𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽3(
𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡
)𝑖𝑗 +  𝛽4𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗 +
 𝛽5𝑃𝑃&𝐸𝑖𝑗 +  𝛽6 𝑅&𝐷𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽7𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 ̶𝑆𝑂𝑋𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽8𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐴𝑛𝑛. 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑔)𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑚 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗                                         (2.1) 
 
where 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗 is net buy or net sell of corporate insider trading in the 
30-day window prior to earnings announcement by firm 𝑖 for fiscal year j; 𝑇𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑘 is 
analyst k’ innate ability (measured by estimated analyst fixed effects) if analyst k covers 
firm 𝑖 in fiscal year j; 𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑀𝑉)𝑖𝑗 is the logarithm of market capitalization of firm 𝑖 in 
fiscal year j; (
𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡
)𝑖𝑗 is the ratio of book value of  firm  𝑖 to its market value in fiscal 
year j; 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗 is the logarithm of the number of analysts following firm 𝑖 
in fiscal year j; 𝑃𝑃&𝐸𝑖𝑗 is  the property, plant and equipment divided by total assets of 
firm 𝑖 in fiscal year j; 𝑅&𝐷𝑖𝑗 is the research and development expenses divided by total 
assets of firm 𝑖 in fiscal year j; 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 ̶𝑆𝑂𝑋𝑖𝑗 is  a dummy that equals 1 if insider trading 
window of firm 𝑖  in fiscal year j is after 2002 September, and 0 elsewhere; 
𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐴𝑛𝑛. 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑔)𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑚 is the logarithm of the number of days between the date of EPS 
forecast m (before insider trading window) by analyst k and the date of earnings 
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announcement by the firm 𝑖 for fiscal year j. We also add year fixed effect and industry 
(2-digit SIC) fixed effect for each regression.  
 For the insider net buys as 𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗 , we construct four different 
measures. And all measures of insiders’ net sells are the opposite numbers of the 
corresponding net buy measures. These fours measures are defined as: 
 
netbuy_number= the number of buys-the number of sells                                 (2.2) 
netbuy_volume= buys volume – sells volume                                                   (2.3) 
netbuy_value= buys volume *stock price-sells volume* stock price                (2.4) 
netbuy_adjustedvolume= (buys volume-sells volume)/ # shares outstanding   (2.5) 
The expected signs of the independent variables are: 𝛽1 < 0, 𝛽2 < 0, 𝛽3 < 0 , 
𝛽4 < 0, 𝛽5 < 0, 𝛽6 > 0, 𝛽7 < 0, 𝛽8  ambiguous. 
If insiders have good (bad) inside information
14
 about EPS, we expect   𝛽1 < 0 
for net buys (sells) by corporate insiders according to our hypotheses since analysts with 
high innate ability can mitigate information asymmetry. As for all the other control 
variables, they are almost all related to information asymmetry.  𝛽2 represents the effect 
of firm size. Elliot at al. (1984) hypothesize that corporate insiders have more inside 
information because smaller firms are followed by fewer analysts. In addition, the results 
of Finnerty (1976), Seyhun (1986), Lakonishok and Lee (2001), and Frankel and Li 
(2004) all indicate smaller firms are associated with higher insider trading profits.  𝛽3 
captures the informativeness of financial statements in the sense that firms with higher 
                                                 
14
 The definitions of information type are denoted in Equation (2.6) and (2.7).  
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book-to-market ratio have relatively less unrecorded assets, thus they have lower level of 
information asymmetry. 𝛽4  measures the effects of the intensity of analyst activities. 
Bhushan (1989) uses analyst following as a measure of private information collection, 
and Frankel and Li (2004) find that increased analyst following is related to reduced 
insider trading profits and reduced insider buys.  𝛽5 reveals the effects of the proportion 
of vital assets than cannot be readily liquidated and larger proportion of tangible assets 
implies lower level of information asymmetry. 𝛽6 indicates the effects of information 
asymmetry induced by R&D investment. Aboody and Lev (2000) provide evidence that 
insider trading profits are higher for firms with R&D investment. 𝛽7 reflects the effects of 
changed insider trading rules about accelerated filing deadlines issued by the SEC as 
required by the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Effective August 29, 2002, Form 4 
transactions must be reported to the SEC by the end of the second business day following 
the trading day. Thus, this policy should confine insider trading as accelerated filing 
deadlines help mitigate information asymmetry. 𝛽8 corresponds to the timing effect of 
the earnings forecasts by analysts. However, the effect is mixed by two conflicting 
effects. On the one hand, the earlier the forecast is announced, the lower the level of 
information asymmetry of earnings is handled with insiders. On the other hand, it is quite 
possible that insiders obtain private information very early in the event windows and aim 
to trade early to avoid the blackout windows required by firms.  
To distinguish the information type, we follow Livnat and Mendenhall (2006) and 
employ the following measures of earnings surprise (SUE1 and SUE2): 
𝑆𝑈𝐸1 =
𝑋𝑖𝑗−𝑋𝑖𝑗−1
𝑃𝑖𝑗
                                                                                               (2.6) 
28 
 
           𝑆𝑈𝐸2 =
𝑋𝑖𝑗−𝑀𝐹𝑋𝑖𝑗
𝑃𝑖𝑗
                                                                                               (2.7) 
In Equation (2.6),  𝑋𝑖𝑗 is the actual EPS announced by firm i for fiscal year j, 
𝑋𝑖𝑗−1 is the actual EPS announced by firm i for fiscal year j-1, 𝑃𝑖𝑗 is the stock price of 
firm i at the end of fiscal year j. In equation (2.7),  𝑋𝑖𝑗 is the actual EPS announced by 
firm i for fiscal year j, 𝑀𝐹𝑋𝑖𝑗 is the median of forecasts reported to I/B/E/S in the 90 days 
prior to the earnings announcement by firm i in fiscal year j, 𝑃𝑖𝑗 is the stock price of firm 
i at the end of fiscal year j. We denote that inside information is “good” if SUE is positive 
and that inside information is “bad” if SUE is negative. 
In a word, SUE2 uses forecast consensus among analysts as expected earnings, 
while SUE1 uses previous actual earnings as expected earnings. Both of them can serve 
as measures of earnings surprise, but we believe SUE2 is more accurate since information 
is updated, as compared with accounting numbers in the previous year, so we use SUE2 
as the main measure and SUE1 as robustness check. As Livnat and Mendenhall (2006) 
imply,  SUE1 is also reasonable since many shareholders do not bother to investigate in 
analyst consensus; they just use the earnings in the previous year for simplicity as the 
expectation. Thus, we also consider SUE1 for comparable comparisons. 
Table 2.4 provides the main empirical results based on the 30-day window before 
earnings announcement by firms. We use positive earnings surprise (SUE2>0) to measure 
good inside information in Columns 1-4, and correspondingly the results for bad inside 
information (SUE2<0) are reported in Columns 5-8. We find that higher analysts’ innate 
ability is associated with lower volumes of net buys, lower value of net buys, and lower 
adjusted volume of net buys when insiders have “good” inside information about 
earnings (positive SUE2). The economic significance is substantial: one standard 
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deviation increase of analysts’ innate ability is associated with 1.24% decrease in 
netbuy_volume, 1.33% decrease in netbuy_value, and 1.50% decrease in 
netbuy_adjustedvolume. As for the results for SUE2<0, we find that no measures of 
insiders’ net sells can significantly affect insiders’ net sells when insiders have bad 
information. This is not surprising because insiders are more cautious in exploiting 
negative information for lower litigation risk (Cheng and Lo(2006) etc.). Investors suffer 
from actual losses when stock prices decrease following insiders’ sells, but it is less likely 
for corporate insiders to be involved in legal troubles if stock prices decrease following 
insiders’ buys. It is worth noting that the forecast timing has positive effects on insiders’ 
net buys, this implies corporate insiders obtain private information of positive earnings 
surprise early and aim to trade early to avoid the blackout windows required by their 
firms. For other independent variables, we have mixed evidence for the signs and 
statistical significance of their coefficients. Most of them have expected signs except 
PP&E. In addition, netbuy_number has opposite signs in control variables compared with 
the other three measures in terms of volumes and values. 
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Table 2.4: Analysts’ Innate Ability and Insiders’ Net Buys
15
 
 Type of Inside Information: Good Type of Inside Information: Bad 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variables 
 
netbuy 
_number 
netbuy 
_volume 
netbuy 
_value 
netbuy 
_adjusted 
volume 
netsell 
_number 
netsell 
_volume 
netsell 
_value 
netsell 
_adjusted 
volume 
         
Talent 0.090 -1.696** -0.689** -0.507** 0.099 0.136 0.188 0.177 
 (0.150) (0.850) (0.330) (0.209) (0.177) (0.800) (0.284) (0.212) 
Log(MV) 0.284** -0.579 -0.523** 0.455*** 0.157 1.198** 0.646*** -0.141 
 (0.117) (0.669) (0.261) (0.126) (0.108) (0.582) (0.208) (0.09) 
Book/Market 0.791*** -1.180 -0.129 0.165 -0.138 2.181 0.803 0.120 
 (0.275) (1.855) (0.614) (0.416) (0.325) (2.005) (0.762) (0.488) 
# Analysts -0.985*** -0.876 -0.212 -0.102 0.087 -1.234 -0.775** -0.223 
 (0.220) (1.143) (0.418) (0.277) (0.245) (0.997) (0.335) (0.222) 
PP&E 0.952** 5.401** 2.289*** 0.879** -0.525 -1.563 -0.610 -0.060 
 (0.389) (2.191) (0.753) (0.370) (0.360) (1.496) (0.439) (0.339) 
R&D -0.243 15.27** 4.460* 3.746** -0.675 -16.740** -4.173** -4.604** 
 (1.626) (7.735) (2.675) (1.638) (1.513) (8.099) (2.083) (2.180) 
Post-Sox 0.314 -6.025 -2.745 -1.794 3.375* 2.894 2.107 -0.324 
 (0.914) (4.498) (1.778) (1.183) (2.002) (8.780) (2.105) (2.005) 
Ann. Timing -0.016 0.301* 0.140** 0.045 0.020 -0.034 -0.043 -0.0292 
 (0.033) (0.165) (0.061) (0.042) (0.034) (0.164) (0.054) (0.042) 
Constant -2.486 5.001 2.913* -3.336*** 0.612 -1.154 -0.878 1.823** 
 (1.568) (5.167) (1.767) (1.129) (0.859) (2.991) (0.990) (0.726) 
         
Observations 111,475 111,475 111,475 111,475 56,321 56,321 56,321 56,321 
R-squared 0.135 0.105 0.107 0.101 0.170 0.135 0.156 0.077 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
This table provides results of pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions on the effects of analysts’ innate ability on open market insider trading based on the 30-day window 
before annual earnings announcements for forecast-firm-year level observations from 1985 to 2008. All variables are winsorized at 1% level. Columns (1)-(4) are based on the 
                                                 
15
 The results of regressions at firm-year level are shown in Table 2.9 for robustness checks. In both tables, we control for the number of analysts. 
31 
 
sample of good insider information which is measured by positive earnings surprise (SUE2>0), i.e. positive difference between actual EPS and the median of forecasts reported to 
I/B/E/S in the 90 days prior to the earnings announcement (rescaled by share prices), and columns (5)-(8) are based on the sample of bad insider information corresponding to 
negative earnings surprise. Eight dependent variables are employed: netbuy_number is the number of buys minus the number of sells; netbuy_volume is buys volume minus sells 
volume and divided by 10,000; netbuy_value is buys value (buys volume times monthly stock price) minus sells value (buy volumes times monthly stock price) and divided by 
1,000,000; netbuy_volume is adjusted sell volumes (sells volume divided by the number of shares outstanding) minus buys volume (buys volume divided by the number of shares 
outstanding). All measures of insiders’ net sells are the opposite numbers of the corresponding net buy measures. The key independent variable is analysts’ innate ability or natural 
talent, hereinafter referred to as “Talent” in the regressions. The control variables are: Log(MV), the logarithm of market capitalization of the firm; Book/Market, the ratio of book 
value of the firm to its market value; The Number of Analysts,  the logarithm of the number of analysts following the firm in a fiscal year; PP&E, the property, plant and equipment 
divided by total assets; R&D, the research and development expenses divided by total assets. Post-Sox, the dummy that equals 1 if insider trading window is after 2002 September, 
and 0 elsewhere; Log(Ann. Timing) is the logarithm of the number of days between the earnings forecast date (before insider trading window) by the analyst and the earnings 
announcement date by the firm. All regressions include year fixed effect and industry (2-digit SIC) fixed effect. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at firm level, 
and ***, ** and * stand for statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 level respectively.  
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In Table 2.5, we use SUE1 to measure information type as a robustness check. 
The results of insider trading measures in Table 2.5 have the same signs with those in 
Table 2.4. Although in Table 2.5 netbuy_volume in Column 2 is not significant anymore, 
netbuy_value in Column 3 and netbuy_adjustedvolume in Column 4 are still significant. 
Again, higher innate ability is associated with lower value of net buys and lower adjusted 
volume of net buys when insiders have “good” inside information about earnings 
(positive SUE1). In addition, analysts’ innate ability has no significant effects on 
insiders’ net sells when insiders have “bad” information (negative SUE1). The sign, 
magnitude, and significance of control variables are quite similar with those in Table 2.4. 
In addition, the goodness of fit measured by R squared is very close to corresponding 
regressions in Table 2.4 and Table 2.5. The comparison between Table 2.4 and Table 2.5 
justifies that both measures (SUE1 and SUE2) of insiders’ information type generate 
congruent results, but the absolute values of coefficients are larger when SUE2 is 
employed. Thus the effects of analysts’ innate ability on insider buys are amplified if the 
consensus among analysts’ forecasts of earnings rather than lagged earnings is used as 
the measure of insiders’ information type.  
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Table 2.5: Robustness Check- Alternative Measure of Information Type 
 Type of Inside Information: Good Type of Inside Information: Bad 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variables 
 
netbuy 
_number 
netbuy 
_volume 
netbuy 
_value 
netbuy_adjusted
volume 
netsell 
_number 
netsell 
_volume 
netsell 
_value 
netsell_adjusted
volume 
         
Talent 0.002 -1.051 -0.586* -0.376** -0.072 0.848 0.175 0.296 
 (0.146) (0.872) (0.355) (0.184) (0.171) (0.737) (0.214) (0.242) 
Log(MV) 0.171 -0.669 -0.648** 0.478*** -0.045 1.052** 0.476*** -0.255** 
 (0.135) (0.716) (0.291) (0.110) (0.124) (0.535) (0.172) (0.116) 
Book/Market 0.769*** -1.743 -0.513 0.095 -0.558* -1.060 -0.686 -0.482 
 (0.274) (1.789) (0.648) (0.392) (0.302) (1.620) (0.423) (0.414) 
# Analysts -0.616*** -1.007 -0.078 -0.140 0.618*** -0.493 -0.100 -0.062 
 (0.221) (1.234) (0.483) (0.282) (0.226) (0.870) (0.254) (0.227) 
PP&E 0.637* 4.765*** 2.205*** 0.620* -1.202*** -3.884* -1.319* -0.507 
 (0.364) (1.690) (0.685) (0.322) (0.449) (2.306) (0.684) (0.375) 
R&D 0.555 18.000** 4.857 4.692** -1.620 -12.140* -2.949 -2.679 
 (1.639) (8.544) (3.259) (1.856) (1.426) (7.145) (1.837) (1.789) 
Post-Sox 0.264 -7.363 -2.666 -2.204* -0.472 4.157 3.036 1.188 
 (1.037) (4.580) (1.896) (1.273) (1.327) (6.220) (2.311) (1.634) 
Ann. Timing 0.000 0.372** 0.156** 0.068 0.025 -0.145 -0.087 -0.001 
 (0.030) (0.162) (0.063) (0.042) (0.034) (0.182) (0.060) (0.046) 
Constant -2.369* 6.816 3.589** -2.928*** 2.771** 15.520 2.134 3.836*** 
 (1.297) (4.412) (1.621) (0.872) (1.397) (10.020) (2.064) (1.139) 
         
Observations 109,678 109,678 109,678 109,678 73,453 73,453 73,453 73,453 
R-squared 0.145 0.096 0.101 0.090 0.137 0.125 0.145 0.074 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
This table provides results of pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions on the effects of analysts’ innate ability on open market insider trading based on the 30-day window 
before annual earnings announcements for forecast-firm-year level observations from 1985 to 2008. All variables are winsorized at 1% level. Columns (1)-(4) are based on the 
sample of good insider information which is measured by positive earnings surprise (SUE1>0), i.e. positive difference between actual EPS and lagged actual EPS (rescaled by 
share prices), and columns (5)-(8) are based on the sample of bad insider information corresponding to negative earnings surprise. Eight dependent variables are employed: 
netbuy_number is the number of buys minus the number of sells; netbuy_volume is buys volume minus sells volume and divided by 10,000; netbuy_value is buys value (buys 
volume times monthly stock price) minus sells value (buy volumes times monthly stock price) and divided by 1,000,000; netbuy_volume is adjusted sell volumes (sells volume 
divided by the number of shares outstanding) minus buys volume (buys volume divided by the number of shares outstanding). All measures of insiders’ net sells are the opposite 
numbers of the corresponding net buy measures. The key independent variable is analysts’ innate ability, which is labeled as Talent. The control variables are: Log(MV), the 
logarithm of market capitalization of the firm; Book/Market, the ratio of book value of the firm to its market value; The Number of Analysts,  the logarithm of the number of 
analysts following the firm in a fiscal year; PP&E, the property, plant and equipment divided by total assets; R&D, the research and development expenses divided by total assets. 
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Post-Sox, the dummy that equals 1 if insider trading window is after 2002 September, and 0 elsewhere; Log(Ann. Timing) is the logarithm of the number of days between the 
earnings forecast date (before insider trading window) by the analyst and the earnings announcement date by the firm. All regressions include year fixed effect and industry (2-
digit SIC) fixed effect. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at firm level, and ***, ** and * stand for statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 level respectively. 
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2.3.2 Opportunistic Trading and Routine Trading 
We postulate in general that insiders’ net buys are driven by good inside 
information and insiders’ net sells are driven by bad inside information. However, it is 
possible that buys or sells are not informative about firms’ futures, even though corporate 
insiders have favored access to private information about firm events.  For insider buys, 
an insider might purchase stock of his firm due to discount plans after receiving a bonus; 
for insider sells, an insider might sell stock of his firm for liquidity and portfolio 
rebalancing purposes. In either case, a given insider trade is not related to inside 
information. Thus, we follow Cohen et al. (2012) who distinguish opportunistic insider 
trading and routine trading.  They define a routine trader as an insider who traded in the 
same calendar month for at least three consecutive years in the past and define an 
opportunistic trader as everyone else. Then, all trades are classified into two categories: 
routine trades by routine traders and opportunistic trades by opportunistic traders.  We 
use the same method to identify routine trades and opportunistic trades.  
We report the results of opportunistic trades in Panel A, Table 2.6 and the results 
of routine trades in Panel B, Table 2.6.  In the sample of good inside information, about 
64.81% of total trades are opportunistic trades; in the sample of bad inside information, 
about 72.24% of total trades are opportunistic trades; in the whole sample of which inside 
information type can be identified, about 67.27% of total trades are opportunistic trades. 
In Table 2.6, Panel A, the absolute values of the coefficients of volume and adjusted 
volume of net buys for opportunistic traders are larger than those in Table 2.4, Panel A 
for the whole sample. However, these two coefficients are not statistically significant in 
Table 2.6, Panel B for routine traders. In both of Panel A and Panel B in Table 2.6, the 
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coefficient of net buy values is significant, but the coefficient is less significant for 
routine traders.  
These results suggest that the results in Table 2.4 mainly stem from opportunistic 
trades rather than routine trades, or in other words, the true relationship in Table 2.4 is 
mixed with noise compared with Table 2.6 - this difference is consistent with our 
hypothesis that insider trading prior to earnings announcements is driven by inside 
information to a large degree. Besides, post-SOX is significant for opportunistic trades, 
while it is insignificant in Table 2.4 for the sample of all trades, this also supports the 
importance of distinguishing information-driven trades from routine trades as stricter 
regulations are mainly against information-driven trades. 
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Table 2.6: Opportunistic Trading and Routine Trading 
Table 2.6, Panel A: Opportunistic Traders’ Trading 
 
 Type of Inside Information: Good Type of Inside Information: Bad 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variables 
 
netbuy 
_number 
netbuy 
_volume 
netbuy 
_value 
netbuy 
_adjustedvolume 
netsell 
_number 
netsell 
_volume 
netsell 
_value 
netsell 
_adjustedvolume 
         
Talent -0.013 -1.869* -0.603** -0.804** 0.176 1.334 0.431 0.507 
 (0.123) (0.955) (0.305) (0.331) (0.147) (0.991) (0.295) (0.320) 
Log(MV) 0.149* 0.339 -0.159 0.505*** 0.301*** 1.202** 0.595*** -0.087 
 (0.085) (0.603) (0.202) (0.181) (0.101) (0.598) (0.194) (0.122) 
Book/Market 0.217 -2.220 -0.386 -0.195 0.171 3.473 0.986 0.599 
 (0.244) (1.823) (0.493) (0.531) (0.308) (2.504) (0.786) (0.766) 
# Analysts -0.405** -0.478 -0.090 0.038 -0.233 -1.699 -0.759** -0.421 
 (0.175) (1.328) (0.419) (0.409) (0.204) (1.132) (0.326) (0.304) 
PP&E 0.615** 4.359* 1.829*** 0.745 -0.250 -2.388 -0.834* -0.210 
 (0.273) (2.388) (0.643) (0.501) (0.330) (1.723) (0.450) (0.424) 
R&D 2.608** 23.71*** 7.519*** 4.063* -0.748 -17.43* -3.231 -5.511* 
 (1.223) (8.721) (2.150) (2.281) (1.480) (10.57) (2.436) (3.108) 
Post-Sox -1.087* -7.848** -1.924 -2.596* 0.310 -2.788 0.940 -1.775 
 (0.592) (3.575) (1.200) (1.449) (1.405) (11.85) (2.033) (2.925) 
Ann. Timing 0.003 0.233 0.100* 0.060 0.018 0.001 -0.040 -0.032 
 (0.0251) (0.185) (0.057) (0.062) (0.031) (0.193) (0.057) (0.056) 
Constant -2.445* -0.400 0.680 -3.585** 0.391 -0.270 -0.653 1.859* 
 (1.314) (5.518) (1.419) (1.484) (0.781) (3.323) (0.956) (0.952) 
         
Observations 83,042 83,042 83,042 83,042 45,813 45,813 45,813 45,813 
R-squared 0.089 0.148 0.144 0.131 0.174 0.128 0.161 0.068 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
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Table 2.6, Panel B: Routine Traders’ Trading 
 
 Type of Inside Information: Good Type of Inside Information: Bad 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variables 
 
netbuy 
_number 
netbuy 
_volume 
netbuy 
_value 
netbuy 
_adjustedvolume 
netsell 
_number 
netsell 
_volume 
netsell 
_value 
netsell 
_adjustedvolume 
         
Talent 0.095 -1.298 -0.756* -0.122 0.166 -1.036 -0.185 -0.132 
 (0.205) (0.806) (0.395) (0.081) (0.270) (0.743) (0.209) (0.122) 
Log(MV) 0.290 -2.170* -1.184** 0.367*** -0.288 0.735 0.448** -0.186*** 
 (0.248) (1.212) (0.490) (0.102) (0.185) (0.567) (0.190) (0.071) 
Book/Market 1.436*** -0.201 -0.382 0.274 -1.227** -2.805 -0.850 -0.412 
 (0.508) (2.835) (1.200) (0.240) (0.551) (1.702) (0.595) (0.294) 
# Analysts -1.263*** -1.407 -0.230 -0.379 0.343 0.298 -0.271 -0.090 
 (0.351) (1.597) (0.537) (0.231) (0.363) (0.929) (0.278) (0.163) 
PP&E 1.221 4.703* 1.993* 0.710** -0.782 2.764 0.579 0.220 
 (0.750) (2.750) (1.200) (0.277) (0.699) (2.078) (0.602) (0.313) 
R&D -3.080 -5.272 -3.847 0.563 -2.160 -5.584 -2.980 -0.198 
 (2.687) (8.907) (3.821) (0.770) (2.205) (6.380) (1.926) (1.131) 
Post-Sox 1.630 0.483 -1.691 0.538 6.718** 6.725** 3.006*** 0.260 
 (1.612) (4.631) (2.019) (0.529) (2.639) (3.306) (1.090) (0.580) 
Ann. Timing -0.065 0.178 0.103 -0.004 0.0568 -0.090 -0.015 -0.001 
 (0.055) (0.181) (0.074) (0.021) (0.049) (0.147) (0.041) (0.021) 
Constant 0.415 20.62*** 9.593*** -2.193*** 1.659 -4.171 -1.267 1.739** 
 (2.002) (7.341) (3.176) (0.516) (1.557) (3.527) (1.045) (0.695) 
         
Observations 45,088 45,088 45,088 45,088 17,609 17,609 17,609 17,609 
R-squared 0.228 0.243 0.228 0.230 0.350 0.392 0.348 0.305 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
This table provides results of pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions on the effects of analysts’ innate ability on opportunistic and routine insider trading based on the 30-
day window before annual earnings announcements for forecast-firm-year level observations from 1985 to 2008. Opportunistic traders and routine traders are identified as in 
Cohen, Malloy, and Pomorski (2012, JF). All variables are winsorized at 1% level. Columns (1)-(4) are based on the sample of good insider information which is measured by 
positive earnings surprise (SUE2>0), i.e. positive difference between actual EPS and the median of forecasts reported to I/B/E/S in the 90 days prior to the earnings announcement 
(rescaled by share prices), and columns (5)-(8) are based on the sample of bad insider information corresponding to negative earnings surprise. Eight dependent variables are 
employed: netbuy_number is the number of buys minus the number of sells; netbuy_volume is buys volume minus sells volume and divided by 10,000; netbuy_value is buys value 
(buys volume times monthly stock price) minus sells value (buy volumes times monthly stock price) and divided by 1,000,000; netbuy_volume is adjusted sell volumes (sells 
volume divided by the number of shares outstanding) minus buys volume (buys volume divided by the number of shares outstanding). All measures of insiders’ net sells are the 
opposite numbers of the corresponding net buy measures. The key independent variable is analysts’ innate ability, which is labeled as Talent. The control variables are: Log(MV), 
the logarithm of market capitalization of the firm; Book/Market, the ratio of book value of the firm to its market value; The Number of Analysts,  the logarithm of the number of 
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analysts following the firm in a fiscal year; PP&E, the property, plant and equipment divided by total assets; R&D, the research and development expenses divided by total assets. 
Post-Sox, the dummy that equals 1 if insider trading window is after 2002 September, and 0 elsewhere; Log(Ann. Timing) is the logarithm of the number of days between the 
earnings forecast date (before insider trading window) by the analyst and the earnings announcement date by the firm. All regressions include year fixed effect and industry (2-
digit SIC) fixed effect. Panel A is for opportunistic trading, and Panel B is for routine trading. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at firm level, and ***, ** and * 
stand for statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 level respectively. 
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2.3.3 Initial Coverage: The Incremental Effect on Increased Insider 
Trading 
In previous sections, we did not specify which traits the innate ability or natural 
talent comprises. It might include an extraordinary economic sense of firm policies, wide 
social networks in professional connections (Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy, 2010), or any 
other valuable behavioral traits (Easterwood and Nutt, 1999) for better forecasts. So even 
if we use “innate ability” or “natural talent” to name our measure, probably analysts’ 
innate ability or natural talent can function through learning to trigger or strengthen itself, 
but such learning can be comprehensive and is not subject to work experience. We want 
to justify that analysts’ innate ability can work without learning. For this purpose, we 
follow Irvine (2003), Irvine et al. (2007), and Crawford et al. (2012) by constructing 
initial-coverage setting in the spirit of the difference-in-differences method. We define 
initial coverage as the first time that an analyst covers a firm on the I/B/E/S tape. To 
isolate innate ability from firm-specific experience, our sample is limited to analysts 
covering a firm for the first time. To isolate general experience based on this step, we 
then confine the sample to analysts covering a firm for the first time in their careers on 
the I/B/E/S tape
16
. 
As for the dependent variables, we use increased insider trading intensity 
measured as net buys (sells) minus lagged net buys (sells). In detail, we employ the 
following specification:  
                                                 
16
 This setting causes a substantial drop in sample size. 
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∆𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑘 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑀𝑉)𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽3 (
𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡
)
𝑖𝑗
+  𝛽4𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗  
                      + 𝛽5𝑃𝑃&𝐸𝑖𝑗 +  𝛽6 𝑅&𝐷𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽7𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 ̶𝑆𝑂𝑋𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽8𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐴𝑛𝑛. 𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑔)𝑖𝑗𝑘𝑚 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗 (2.8) 
Where ∆𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗 is the change of insiders’ net buys from fiscal year j-
1 to year j; 𝑇𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑘 is analyst k’ innate ability if analyst k covers a firm (firm 𝑖 ) for the 
first time on the I/B/E/S tape (in fiscal year j); and all other independent variables are the 
same as those in Equation (1)
17
. In Table 2.7, we use both the 14-day window
18
 and 30-
day window before earnings announcement, and both measures of information type 
(SUE1 and SUE2) to explore the results for comparison with Table 2.4-2.6. However, we 
do not study the samples of “bad” inside information for initial coverage because our 
main empirical results in Table 2.4-2.6 show that analysts’ innate ability is not significant 
for insiders’ net sells. 
                                                 
17
 Equation (8) studies the increased insider trading associated with initial coverage, while Equation (1) 
studies the total insider trading associated with all forecasts. 
18
 This 14-day window length generates stronger results perhaps due to less noise in shorter window. 
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Table 2.7: Initial Coverage: the Incremental Impact of Analyst Ability 
 
Table 2.7, Panel A: The 14-Day Window 
 SUE1>0 SUE2>0 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variables 
 
change in  
netbuy 
_number 
change in 
 netbuy 
_volume 
change in 
 netbuy 
_value 
change in 
 netbuy 
_adjusted 
volume 
change in 
 netbuy 
_number 
change in 
 netbuy 
_volume 
change in  
netbuy 
_value 
change in  
netbuy 
_adjusted 
volume 
         
Talent -0.233 -4.909** -3.968*** -1.564* -0.224 -5.090** -3.243** -1.851** 
 (0.220) (2.020) (1.455) (0.826) (0.230) (2.069) (1.437) (0.798) 
Log(MV) 0.025 0.082 -0.252 0.502* 0.040 -0.180 -0.728 0.214 
 (0.093) (0.776) (0.685) (0.262) (0.094) (0.800) (0.648) (0.261) 
Book/Market 0.477* -0.097 -0.314 -0.042 0.498** -2.358 -2.511 -0.852 
 (0.275) (1.831) (1.461) (0.701) (0.250) (2.266) (1.808) (0.759) 
# Analysts -0.167 -2.609 -1.930 -0.707 -0.399** -0.682 0.192 -0.088 
 (0.180) (1.737) (1.557) (0.626) (0.175) (1.379) (1.101) (0.532) 
PP&E 0.766** 1.546 1.337 0.258 1.031*** 3.806 3.284 1.343 
 (0.354) (2.602) (2.221) (0.927) (0.337) (2.587) (2.118) (0.933) 
R&D -0.513 21.420 22.810** 4.975 -0.100 12.060 13.64 1.983 
 (1.484) (14.690) (10.890) (5.713) (1.237) (11.830) (8.558) (4.138) 
Post-Sox 0.707 -26.110* -20.840* -9.340 0.730 -10.680 -7.938 -2.221 
 (1.354) (14.160) (11.750) (5.797) (1.077) (8.779) (6.501) (3.399) 
Ann. Timing -0.142 0.463 -0.201 0.218 -0.017 0.427 -0.114 0.0347 
 (0.094) (0.707) (0.513) (0.276) (0.092) (0.768) (0.521) (0.280) 
Constant 0.275 14.270* 13.720** 1.827 -0.202 7.672 8.628 1.401 
 (0.839) (8.582) (6.192) (3.513) (0.844) (11.500) (7.430) (4.495) 
         
Observations 3,601 3,601 3,601 3,601 3,493 3,493 3,493 3,493 
R-squared 0.063 0.070 0.102 0.053 0.079 0.057 0.082 0.048 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
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Table 2.7, Panel B: The30-Day Window 
 SUE1>0 SUE2>0 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variables 
 
change in  
netbuy 
_number 
change in  
netbuy 
_volume 
change in  
netbuy 
_value 
change in  
netbuy 
_adjusted 
volume 
change in  
netbuy 
_number 
change in  
netbuy 
_volume 
change in  
netbuy 
_value 
change in 
 netbuy 
_adjusted 
volume 
         
Talent -0.062 -3.991* -2.301* -1.238* 0.413 -4.244* -2.412 -1.082 
 (0.307) (2.115) (1.363) (0.652) (0.353) (2.442) (1.521) (0.749) 
Log(MV) 0.034 0.111 -0.020 0.466** 0.106 -0.496 -0.679 0.254 
 (0.158) (0.813) (0.676) (0.221) (0.138) (0.828) (0.646) (0.234) 
Book/Market 0.537 -4.755* -3.223 -0.699 1.037*** -3.268 -3.892 -0.348 
 (0.428) (2.848) (2.352) (0.811) (0.361) (2.989) (2.394) (0.861) 
# Analysts -0.433 -2.279 -1.767 -0.288 -0.500* -0.073 -0.189 0.145 
 (0.279) (1.491) (1.239) (0.465) (0.272) (1.422) (1.178) (0.446) 
PP&E 1.267** 0.714 -0.817 0.955 1.240*** 1.656 1.077 1.767** 
 (0.536) (2.953) (2.279) (0.795) (0.462) (3.186) (2.482) (0.754) 
R&D -1.033 15.180 14.130 4.984 0.156 15.420 10.850 2.329 
 (2.356) (14.980) (11.600) (4.572) (1.828) (12.210) (9.216) (3.776) 
Post-Sox 0.168 -19.830 -17.250 -3.958 -0.998 -7.452 -5.357 -0.151 
 (1.568) (13.910) (11.740) (4.221) (1.200) (6.017) (4.415) (1.629) 
Ann. Timing 0.057 0.392 0.096 0.114 0.366** 0.366 0.359 0.118 
 (0.161) (0.953) (0.633) (0.301) (0.163) (0.965) (0.646) (0.297) 
Constant -2.442 14.240 13.72** -0.830 -5.387** 5.502 8.359 -3.162 
 (1.855) (9.505) (6.830) (2.847) (2.185) (11.130) (7.198) (3.402) 
         
Observations 4,120 4,120 4,120 4,120 4,101 4,101 4,101 4,101 
R-squared 0.051 0.064 0.104 0.073 0.059 0.075 0.114 0.072 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
This table provides results of pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions on the incremental effects of analysts’ innate ability on open market insider trading based on the 14-
day and 30-day windows before annual earnings announcements for analyst-firm-year level observations from 1985 to 2008. Initial coverage is defined as the case that an analyst 
covers a stock for the first time in his/her career. All variables are winsorized at 1% level. Columns (1)-(4) are based on the sample of good insider information which is measured 
by positive earnings surprise (SUE1>0), i.e. positive difference between actual EPS and lagged actual EPS (rescaled by share prices), and columns (5)-(8) are based on the sample 
of good insider information which is measured by positive earnings surprise (SUE2>0), i.e. positive difference between actual EPS and the median of forecasts reported to I/B/E/S 
in the 90 days prior to the earnings announcement (rescaled by share prices). Four dependent variables are employed according to the annual changes of the following measures: 
netbuy_number is the number of buys minus the number of sells; netbuy_volume is buys volume minus sells volume and divided by 10,000; netbuy_value is buys value (buys 
volume times monthly stock price) minus sells value (buy volumes times monthly stock price) and divided by 1,000,000; netbuy_volume is adjusted sell volumes (sells volume 
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divided by the number of shares outstanding) minus buys volume (buys volume divided by the number of shares outstanding). The results of insiders’ net sells based on bad inside 
information are not significant and are not reported here. The key independent variable is analysts’ innate ability, which is labeled as Talent. The control variables are: Log(MV), 
the logarithm of market capitalization of the firm; Book/Market, the ratio of book value of the firm to its market value; The Number of Analysts, the logarithm of the number of 
analysts following the firm in a fiscal year; PP&E, the property, plant and equipment divided by total assets; R&D, the research and development expenses divided by total assets. 
Post-Sox, the dummy that equals 1 if insider trading window is after 2002 September, and 0 elsewhere; Log (Ann. Timing) is the logarithm of the number of days between the 
initial earnings forecast date (before insider trading window) by the analyst and the earnings announcement date by the firm. All regressions include year fixed effect and industry 
(2-digit SIC) fixed effect. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at firm level, and ***, ** and * stand for statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 level 
respectively.  
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The results in Panel A of Table 2.7 are more significant than the results in Panel B 
of Table 2.7, implying the effects of analysts’ innate ability on corporate insiders’ net 
buys through initial coverage are concentrated in the 14-day window
19
 prior to an 
earnings announcement, although as many as 87.40 % observations are overlapped in the 
two windows. Another obvious phenomenon is that the effects of innate ability from 
initial coverage are stronger compared with those based on the whole sample of all 
forecasts in Table 2.4-2.6; this might imply that analysts’ initial coverage is considered 
important by both analysts and corporate insiders. For example, in the 30-day event 
window, the coefficient of innate ability in the regression on net-buy volumes for initial 
coverage is 2.5 (=4.244/1.696) times larger than that for the whole sample if SUE2 is 
used.  
We also investigate the influences of initial coverage by the analysts of the 
highest ability among those who cover the same firm in the same fiscal year because 
high-talent analysts are supposed to be more capable of collecting firm-specific 
information. The specification is the same as equation (8) and the results are provided in 
Table 2.8. We find that in this case only SUE1 rather than SUE2 works if insiders have 
“good” inside information. In the 14-day window, the change in the number of net buys, 
the change in the volume of net buys, and the change in the value of net buys are all 
significant, while in the 30-day window only the change in the volume of net buys is 
significant.  If we compare Table 2.7 and Table 2.8, we find the absolute values of the 
coefficients of innate ability, as based on the sample of initial coverage by the highest-
                                                 
19
 It is still marginally significant in the 30-day window in Table 7, Panel B. 
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ability analysts, are stronger than those based on the whole sample of initial coverage. 
Combined with the results in Tables 2.4-2.6, the sequence of relative economic 
significance is: initial coverage by the analyst with the highest ability>initial coverage by 
all analysts> all coverage. 
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Table 2.8: Initial Coverage by an Analyst with Highest Ability 
 14-Day Window and SUE1>0 30-Day Window and SUE1>0 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variables 
 
change in  
netbuy 
_number 
change in  
netbuy 
_volume 
change in  
netbuy 
_value 
change in  
netbuy 
_adjusted 
volume 
change in  
netbuy 
_number 
change in  
netbuy 
_volume 
change in 
 netbuy 
_value 
change in  
netbuy 
_adjusted 
volume 
         
Talent -0.930* -13.75*** -7.941** -3.448 -0.351 -7.906* -4.720 -1.589 
 (0.492) (5.317) (3.450) (2.558) (0.561) (4.442) (2.892) (1.407) 
Log(MV) -0.142 -0.928 -1.425** 0.126 0.049 -1.780 -0.820 0.331 
 (0.125) (1.058) (0.718) (0.540) (0.159) (1.098) (0.718) (0.367) 
Book/Market 0.085 2.410 0.447 0.196 0.475 -2.281 -2.545 0.637 
 (0.325) (2.685) (1.860) (1.217) (0.402) (3.226) (2.201) (1.001) 
# Analysts 0.334 1.918 2.031 0.954 -0.402 2.126 0.017 0.476 
 (0.230) (1.864) (1.254) (1.045) (0.292) (1.955) (1.290) (0.742) 
PP&E 0.023 -1.172 1.286 -0.863 0.311 -0.510 0.069 1.326 
 (0.391) (3.962) (2.684) (1.844) (0.435) (3.699) (2.325) (1.164) 
R&D 1.664 39.670* 21.280 19.560* 1.996 36.360* 20.170* 15.660** 
 (1.646) (23.430) (13.080) (11.040) (2.254) (18.920) (11.590) (7.025) 
Post-Sox 2.391 -1.409 -9.551 3.893 1.940 -8.121 -6.875 -2.234 
 (1.514) (15.780) (8.786) (10.230) (1.788) (7.304) (5.537) (2.588) 
Ann. Timing -0.213 -1.425 -0.792 -0.529 -0.028 -1.285 -0.026 0.233 
 (0.176) (1.718) (0.974) (0.862) (0.217) (1.469) (0.887) (0.576) 
Constant 2.552 36.240* 19.170* 13.570 0.106 39.420** 19.470* 2.272 
 (1.651) (20.190) (11.230) (9.948) (1.644) (18.170) (10.460) (6.350) 
         
Observations 1,275 1,275 1,275 1,275 1,924 1,924 1,924 1,924 
R-squared 0.064 0.063 0.072 0.067 0.042 0.068 0.089 0.066 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
This table provides results of pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions on the incremental effects of the analyst with highest innate ability based on the 14-day and 30-day 
windows before annual earnings announcements for analyst-firm-year level observations from 1985 to 2008. Initial coverage is defined as the case that an analyst covers a stock 
for the first time in his/her career. The analyst with highest ability is among those who cover the same firm in the same fiscal year. All variables are winsorized at 1% level. All 
columns are based on the sample of good insider information which is measured by positive earnings surprise (SUE1>0), i.e. positive difference between actual EPS and lagged 
actual EPS (rescaled by share prices). Columns 1-4 are for the 14-day window and columns 5-8 are for the 30-day window. Four dependent variables are employed according to 
the annual changes of the following measures: netbuy_number is the number of buys minus the number of sells; netbuy_volume is buys volume minus sells volume and divided by 
10,000; netbuy_value is buys value (buys volume times monthly stock price) minus sells value (buy volumes times monthly stock price) and divided by 1,000,000; netbuy_volume 
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is adjusted sell volumes (sells volume divided by the number of shares outstanding) minus buys volume (buys volume divided by the number of shares outstanding). The key 
independent variable is analysts’ innate ability, which is labeled as Talent. The control variables are: Log(MV), the logarithm of market capitalization of the firm; Book/Market, the 
ratio of book value of the firm to its market value; The Number of Analysts,  the logarithm of the number of analysts following the firm in a fiscal year; PP&E, the property, plant 
and equipment divided by total assets; R&D, the research and development expenses divided by total assets. Post-Sox, the dummy that equals 1 if insider trading window is after 
2002 September, and 0 elsewhere; Log(Ann. Timing) is the logarithm of the number of days between the initial earnings forecast date (before insider trading window) by the 
analyst and the earnings announcement date by the firm. All regressions include year fixed effect and industry (2-digit SIC) fixed effect. Robust standard errors in parentheses are 
clustered at firm level, and ***, ** and * stand for statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 level respectively.  
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In addition, in Column 1 of Table 2.8, we find highest ability is negatively 
associated with the change in the number of transactions of net buys.  Frankel and Li 
(2004) argue that the frequency of insider trades can be used as a measure of insider 
trading profits because more trades are expected when insiders’ private information is 
more valuable given the same trading costs. In this economic sense, our results suggest 
that analysts with the highest innate ability can serve to confine insider trading profits. 
The empirical results of initial coverage imply that analysts’ innate ability can 
affect insider trading intensity without any general experience or firm-specific 
experience; this is consistent with the “innate” nature of our novel measure.  In addition, 
the stronger effects of initial coverage on insider trading do not mean analysts’ innate 
ability deteriorates with time, likely because analysts are more cautious and put more 
efforts to utilize their innate ability on their “first show”, or because innate ability is 
initially less twisted by other factors since analysts want to build their reputation through 
initial coverage.  
2.3.4 Regressions at Firm-Year Level and Analyst-Firm-Year 
Level 
This section is also dedicated to robustness checks. In section 2.3.1 to 2.3.3, we 
focus on regressions on the forecast level which conveys accurate information of forecast 
timing and frequency; in this section, we also test firm-year level and analyst-firm-year 
level to explore whether the relationship between analysts’ innate ability and insiders’ net 
buys still holds. However, we expect firm-year level and analyst-firm-year level to 
provide weaker results. Each forecast represents specific information flow given different 
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forecast timing, thereby implying a different information asymmetry level. Additionally 
controlling for the frequency of forecasts cannot identify the effects stemming from exact 
forecast timing.  
In the firm-year level, we use the following model: 
 
𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑀𝑉)𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽3(
𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡
)𝑖𝑗 +  𝛽4𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗 +
𝛽5𝑃𝑃&𝐸𝑖𝑗 +  𝛽6 𝑅&𝐷𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽7𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 ̶𝑆𝑂𝑋𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗                                                                                         (2.9)                                                                             
 
Equation (2.9) is similar with (2.1), but here 𝑇𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑗 is the average innate ability 
of all analysts who cover firm i in fiscal year j, and the forecast timing is not considered 
in equation (2.9). We report the results in Table 2.9.  
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Table 2.9: Analysts’ Average Innate Ability at Firm-Year Level 
 14-Day Window, SUE1>0 14-Day Window, SUE2>0 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variables 
 
netbuy 
_number 
netbuy 
_volume 
netbuy 
_value 
netbuy 
_adjusted 
volume 
netbuy 
_number 
netbuy 
_volume 
netbuy 
_value 
netbuy 
_adjustedvolum
e 
         
Talent 0.146 -8.279* -2.621* -3.069 0.252 -6.584* -1.990* -2.343 
 (0.800) (4.753) (1.512) (3.266) (0.752) (3.870) (1.145) (2.748) 
Log(MV) -0.052 -0.594 -0.487*** 0.605*** 0.029 -0.622 -0.486*** 0.627** 
 (0.083) (0.476) (0.159) (0.233) (0.088) (0.480) (0.146) (0.256) 
Book/Market 0.156 0.719 -0.056 0.909* 0.211 -1.022 -0.411 -0.598 
 (0.212) (1.020) (0.268) (0.539) (0.195) (1.264) (0.271) (0.875) 
# Analysts -0.184 -1.005 -0.158 -0.593 -0.501*** -0.888 -0.191 -0.753* 
 (0.136) (0.699) (0.192) (0.406) (0.135) (0.596) (0.154) (0.384) 
PP&E 0.812*** 3.787** 1.346** 1.660* 0.674** 3.591* 1.411** 1.508 
 (0.301) (1.875) (0.589) (0.958) (0.303) (1.973) (0.581) (1.100) 
R&D 0.650 18.97*** 4.561*** 10.10*** 0.679 7.247 2.103** 2.731 
 (1.123) (6.961) (1.386) (3.830) (0.883) (5.585) (0.960) (3.722) 
Post-Sox 0.926 -7.104 -3.236 -4.837 1.508 -1.239 -1.744 -1.739 
 (1.271) (7.763) (2.179) (4.606) (1.132) (5.465) (1.484) (3.170) 
Constant -1.067* 8.540 3.616*** -0.962 -0.658 10.650 3.646*** 0.921 
 (0.577) (6.325) (1.318) (2.750) (0.620) (6.862) (1.222) (3.000) 
         
Observations 1,943 1,943 1,943 1,943 2,046 2,046 2,046 2,046 
R-squared 0.151 0.087 0.111 0.061 0.155 0.080 0.102 0.061 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
This table provides results of pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions on the analysts’ average innate ability on open market insider trading based on the 14-day window 
before annual earnings announcements for firm-year level observations from 1985 to 2008. Columns (1)-(4) are based on the sample of good insider information which is 
measured by positive earnings surprise (SUE1>0), i.e. positive difference between actual EPS and lagged actual EPS (rescaled by share prices), and columns (5)-(8) are based on 
the sample of good insider information which is measured by positive earnings surprise (SUE2>0), i.e. positive difference between actual EPS and the median of forecasts reported 
to I/B/E/S in the 90 days prior to the earnings announcement (rescaled by share prices). Four dependent variables are employed according to the annual changes of the following 
measures: netbuy_number is the number of buys minus the number of sells; netbuy_volume is buys volume minus sells volume and divided by 10,000; netbuy_value is buys value 
(buys volume times monthly stock price) minus sells value (buy volumes times monthly stock price) and divided by 1,000,000; netbuy_volume is adjusted sell volumes (sells 
volume divided by the number of shares outstanding) minus buys volume (buys volume divided by the number of shares outstanding). The key independent variable is analysts’ 
innate ability, which is labeled as Talent. The control variables are: Log(MV), the logarithm of market capitalization of the firm; Book/Market, the ratio of book value of the firm to 
its market value; The Number of Analysts,  the logarithm of the number of analysts following the firm in a fiscal year; PP&E, the property, plant and equipment divided by total 
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assets; R&D, the research and development expenses divided by total assets. Post-Sox, the dummy that equals 1 if insider trading window is after 2002 September, and 0 
elsewhere; Log(Ann. Timing) is the logarithm of the number of days between the initial earnings forecast date (before insider trading window) by the analyst and the earnings 
announcement date by the firm. All regressions include year fixed effect and industry (2-digit SIC) fixed effect. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at firm level, 
and ***, ** and * stand for statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 level respectively.  
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In Table 2.9, innate ability is only significant in the 14-day window prior to 
earnings announcements, which may be due to the fact that the longer window (30-day) 
has more noise. For both SUE1 and SUE2, innate ability is negatively associated with the 
volume of net buys and the value of net buys when insiders have “good” information 
about earnings. These results are consistent with the results in Table 2.4-Table 2.6, 
although Table 2.9 provides less significant results.  The possible reason is that we ignore 
forecast timing and frequency in Table 2.9 so the role of analysts’ innate ability cannot be 
examined accurately.  
In the analyst-firm-year level, we add the frequency of forecasts as a control 
variable, which is defined as the number of forecasts by an analyst for a covered firm in a 
fiscal year.  The specification at analyst-firm-year level is: 
 
𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑗 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑇𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑗𝑘 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑀𝑉)𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽3(
𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘
𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡
)𝑖𝑗 +  𝛽4𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑎𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑦𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑗 +
𝛽5𝑃𝑃&𝐸𝑖𝑗 +  𝛽6 𝑅&𝐷𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽7𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 ̶𝑆𝑂𝑋𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽8𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑘 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗                                                       (2.10)                                  
Where 𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑘 is the number of forecasts by analyst k covering firm i for 
fiscal year j, and all other variables are the same as the setting in equation (2.1). We 
expect 𝐹𝑟𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦𝑖𝑗𝑘 has a negative sign since more forecasts help reduce information 
asymmetry. However, we are aware that frequency cannot identify the information that 
the timing of each forecast conveys. If an analyst forecasts the EPS of a firm one year 
beforehand, intuitively it will have weaker effects than a forecast which is announced just 
a few months beforehand. We report the results at analyst-firm-year level in Table 2.10. 
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Table 2.10: Analysts’ Innate Ability at Analyst-Firm-Year Level 
 14-Day Window, SUE1>0 30-Day Window, SUE1>0 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variables 
 
netbuy 
_number 
netbuy 
_volume 
netbuy 
_value 
netbuy 
_adjusted 
volume 
netbuy 
_number 
netbuy 
_volume 
netbuy 
_value 
netbuy 
_adjusted 
volume 
         
Talent 0.079 -1.226* -0.550 -0.350* 0.101 -1.094 -0.472 -0.318* 
 (0.107) (0.720) (0.340) (0.183) (0.112) (0.751) (0.357) (0.188) 
Log(MV) 0.024 -1.104* -0.629** 0.393*** 0.027 -1.141* -0.636** 0.378*** 
 (0.099) (0.638) (0.288) (0.119) (0.098) (0.636) (0.285) (0.117) 
Book/Market 0.837*** -0.044 0.001 0.467 0.863*** 0.091 0.028 0.475 
 (0.255) (1.328) (0.554) (0.362) (0.257) (1.346) (0.552) (0.366) 
# Analysts -0.131 -0.234 0.023 -0.234 -0.136 -0.163 0.040 -0.204 
 (0.161) (1.114) (0.485) (0.313) (0.160) (1.109) (0.481) (0.308) 
PP&E 0.832*** 4.099** 1.747** 0.524 0.846*** 4.032** 1.715** 0.525 
 (0.312) (1.839) (0.831) (0.426) (0.310) (1.821) (0.817) (0.420) 
R&D 1.496 15.65*** 7.202*** 4.761*** 1.577 16.39*** 7.374*** 4.880*** 
 (1.147) (5.901) (2.624) (1.680) (1.212) (6.152) (2.717) (1.723) 
Post-Sox 0.787 -7.258 -4.731 -2.104 0.745 -7.092 -4.574 -2.070 
 (1.071) (5.761) (3.143) (1.742) (0.952) (5.490) (3.041) (1.695) 
Frequency -0.054** -0.242 -0.083 -0.043 -0.056** -0.252 -0.088 -0.039 
 (0.022) (0.149) (0.070) (0.037) (0.023) (0.155) (0.072) (0.039) 
Constant -1.682** 9.914* 4.496** -0.911 -1.742*** 9.974* 4.489** -1.000 
 (0.667) (5.565) (1.871) (1.380) (0.668) (5.671) (1.869) (1.352) 
         
Observations 18,036 18,036 18,036 18,036 17,845 17,845 17,845 17,845 
R-squared 0.176 0.113 0.103 0.091 0.174 0.113 0.103 0.090 
Industry FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
This table provides results of pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions on the analysts’ innate ability based on the 14-day and 30-day windows before annual earnings 
announcements for analyst-firm-year level observations from 1985 to 2008. All variables are winsorized at 1% level. All columns are based on the sample of good insider 
information which is measured by positive earnings surprise (SUE1>0), i.e. positive difference between actual EPS and lagged actual EPS (rescaled by share prices). Columns 1-4 
are for the 14-day window and columns 5-8 are for the 30-day window. Four dependent variables are employed according to the annual changes of the following measures: 
netbuy_number is the number of buys minus the number of sells; netbuy_volume is buys volume minus sells volume and divided by 10,000; netbuy_value is buys value (buys 
volume times monthly stock price) minus sells value (buy volumes times monthly stock price) and divided by 1,000,000; netbuy_volume is adjusted sell volumes (sells volume 
divided by the number of shares outstanding) minus buys volume (buys volume divided by the number of shares outstanding). The key independent variable is analysts’ innate 
ability, which is labeled as Talent. The control variables are: Log(MV), the logarithm of market capitalization of the firm; Book/Market, the ratio of book value of the firm to its 
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market value; The Number of Analysts,  the logarithm of the number of analysts following the firm in a fiscal year; PP&E, the property, plant and equipment divided by total 
assets; R&D, the research and development expenses divided by total assets. Post-Sox, the dummy that equals 1 if insider trading window is after 2002 September, and 0 
elsewhere; Log(Ann. Timing) is the logarithm of the number of days between the initial earnings forecast date (before insider trading window) by the analyst and the earnings 
announcement date by the firm. Frequency is the number of forecasts by an analyst for a covered firm in a fiscal year. All regressions include year fixed effect and industry (2-digit 
SIC) fixed effect. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at firm level, and ***, ** and * stand for statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 level respectively.  
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In Table 2.10, Only SUE1 generates significant results for analysts’ innate ability 
if corporate insiders have “good” inside information about annual EPS. In the 14-day 
event window, analysts with higher innate ability are associated with smaller volumes 
and smaller adjusted volumes of insiders’ net buys. In the 30-day event window, the 
negative relation only resides in adjusted volumes of insiders’ net buys. Compared with 
Table 2.4, Table 2.10 has less statistically significant results and the effects of analysts’ 
innate ability on insider trading are weaker in economic significance. Thus we should not 
ignore the exact timing of forecasts even if we consider the frequency of forecasts.   
2.4 Analysts’ Innate Ability and Insider Trading 
Informativeness 
The informativeness of insider trading is well documented in the literature 
although the SEC requires that no trading by corporate insiders be based on non-public 
and material information. For example, Finnerty(1976), Seyhun(1986), Rozeff and 
Zaman(1988), and Lakonishok and Lee(2001), all find that corporate insider can earn 
abnormal returns.  For our research purpose, we care about how analysts’ innate ability 
can affect insider trading informativeness. Piotroski and Roulstone (2004), and Chan and 
Hameed (2006) find that analyst following positively affects the relative amount of 
market- and industry-level information in stock prices, while Liu (2011) and Crawford, 
Roulstone, and So (2012) suggest analysts can provide firm-specific information in stock 
prices. We assume analysts with higher ability are more capable of collecting firm-
specific information and postulate that analysts can reduce the magnitude of insider 
trading informativeness around earnings announcements through earnings forecasts. 
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We measure insider trading informativeness by post-trade cumulated abnormal 
return (CAR). This measure is widely used to measure informativeness in the existing 
literature such as Lakonishok and Lee (2001) and Frankel and Li (2004).  To generate 
CARs, we employ the market model and sum up daily abnormal returns.  Consistent with 
the window used in the main regressions, we restrict the insider trading sample at the 
forecast-analyst-firm-year level within one month prior to annual earnings 
announcements by firms. In addition, to guarantee the commonly used one-week event 
window is prior to earnings announcements by firms, the sample includes all insider 
trades in the -30 to -7 trading day window prior to earnings announcements. However, 
this consideration is only for accuracy in the regressions on CAR [0,i] for 𝑖 ≤ 5. For 
CARs in the longer periods such as the 3-month and 6-month window, as we have a large 
data sample, the effects of announcements of good earnings and bad earnings can 
basically cancel out.   
First, we investigate the insider trading informativeness for different quantiles of 
analysts’ innate ability in long, post-trading periods. We divide the ability data into 9 
quantiles
20
 where quantile 1 refers to low ability, quantile 5 refers to median ability, and 
quantile 9 refers to high ability. Then, we calculate the mean CAR for each trading day 
surrounding earnings announcement dates by the firms and generate the time-series of the 
mean CARs in the days of [-20, 120] window (day 0 is the trading day) for different 
ability quantiles in Figure 2.2. In Figure 2.2A and Figure 2.2B, we find analysts with 
higher ability are mapped into lower level of insider trading informativeness for insider 
                                                 
20
 It is convenient to identify the median quantile in odd quantiles. We also conduct sensitivity analysis for 
5 quantiles, 7quantiles, and 11 quantiles. The results are quite similar for the time series of mean CARs. 
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sells and higher levels of insider trading informative for insider buys. But when we 
distinguish the insiders’ information type, we see some differences. In Figure 2.2C, we 
find higher ability is related to smaller positive CARs when insiders have good 
information about earnings, while this relation does not hold when insiders have bad 
information about earnings. In Figure 2.2D, higher ability is related to smaller absolute 
values of CARs no matter what the information type is, which is consistent with Figure 
2.2A. 
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Figure 2.2: Ability Quantiles and Market Reactions to Insider Trading 
Figure 2.2A MKT Reactions around Insider Buys for the Whole Sample 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2B MKT Reactions around Insider Sells for the Whole Sample 
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Figure 2.2C1 MKT Reactions around Insider Buys for DIFF. INFO. Type: Bad INFO. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2C2 MKT Reactions around Insider Buys for DIFF. INFO. Type: Good INFO. 
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Figure 2.2D1 MKT Reactions around Insider Sells for DIFF. INFO. Type: Bad INFO. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2D2 MKT Reactions around Insider Sells for DIFF. INFO. Type: Good INFO. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2 shows stock market reactions (CARs) surrounding insider trading among different ability 
quantiles for 367,973 observations at forecast-analyst-firm-trading day level. The talent data is divided into 
9 quantiles, where quantile 1=low, quantile 5=median, quantile 9=high. Horizontal axis denotes the event 
days, where day 0 is the day of insider trading. The abnormal stock returns are calculated by the market 
model. Pooled results are based on the whole sample, and good (bad) information is measured by positive 
(negative) earnings surprise. Data are not winsorized, and include all insider trading in the [-30, -7] days of 
window prior to annual earnings announcements by the firms. 
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To explain Figure 2.2, we conduct the t-statistics for the comparisons of paired 
sample in the time-series means of stock market reactions between the high ability group 
and the low ability group. We test the difference for four time-series CARs: one and a 
half months(from CAR[0,0] to CAR[0,30]), three months (from CAR[0,0] to 
CAR[0,60]), four and a half months (from CAR[0,0] to CAR[0,90]), and half a year(from 
CAR[0,0] to CAR[0,120]). In Table 2.11, Panel A, we find all of the differences are 
statistically significant at the 1% level, and the signs are consistent with the Figure 2.2. 
Higher ability is related to lower level of insider trading informativeness for insider sells, 
but this relation only applies for insider buys if insiders have “good” information about 
earnings. This is consistent with our results in insider trading intensity that analysts’ 
annual forecasts mainly help restrict insider trading when insiders have “good” 
information. In Table 2.11, Panel B, we find the differences of means between the high-
ability group and the low-ability group are larger as the time-series expands, for example, 
in the half a year window, if insiders have good information about earnings, the mean 
difference of mean CARs is 0.95% for insider sells and -1.65% for insider buys.  
Table 2.11: Ability Difference and Market Reactions to Insider Trading 
Table 2.11, Panel A: T Statistics for Means of Paired Samples 
 High Ability minus Low Ability 
  all sells all buys sells+good sells+bad buys+good buys+bad 
CAR[0,0]~CAR[0,120] -15.92*** -20.77*** -22.94*** -12.01*** 19.20*** -21.08*** 
CAR[0,0]~CAR[0,90] -13.50*** -16.88*** -18.16*** -10.52*** 14.44*** -16.92*** 
CAR[0,0]~CAR[0,60] -13.20*** -12.78*** -17.82*** -7.79*** 9.00*** -12.55*** 
CAR[0,0]~CAR[0,30] -6.54*** -5.76*** -10.24*** -2.00* 5.75*** -6.27*** 
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Table 2.11, Panel B: Differences of Means 
 High Ability minus Low Ability 
  all sells all buys sells+good sells+bad buys+good buys+bad 
Expected Sign 
 (Mean Diff.) 
+ - + + - - 
Actual Sign  
(Mean Diff.) 
+ + + + - + 
CAR[0,0]~CAR[0,120] 0.01320 0.02193 0.00947 0.01436 -0.01652 0.05576 
CAR[0,0]~CAR[0,90] 0.00907 0.01743 0.00800 0.00792 -0.01404 0.04490 
CAR[0,0]~CAR[0,60] 0.00527 0.01251 0.00553 0.00387 -0.00980 0.03206 
CAR[0,0]~CAR[0,30] 0.00280 0.00677 0.00493 0.00049 -0.00238 0.01509 
Table 2.11 provides the t-statistics for the comparisons of paired samples in the time-series means of stock 
market reactions (CARs) between high ability group and low ability group surrounding insider trading (day 
0 is the day of insider trading) corresponding to Figure 2.2 for 367,973 observations at forecast-analyst-
firm-trading day level. The abnormal returns are calculated by the market model. The ability data is divided 
into 9 quantiles, where quantile 1=low, quantile 5=median, quantile 9=high. The abnormal stock returns are 
calculated by the market model. Pooled results are based on the whole sample in Columns 1-2, and good 
(bad) information is measured by positive (negative) earnings surprise (SUE2) in Columns 3-6. Data are 
not winsorized, and include insider trading in the [-30, -7] days of window before annual earnings 
announcements by the firms. The t-statistics are reported in Panel A, and ***, ** and * stand for statistical 
significance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 level respectively. The differences of means are reported in Panel B. 
 
In addition, for each point in the time series of Figure 2.2, we want to know in the 
regressions whether analysts’ innate ability is negatively associated with insider trading 
informativeness. One potential concern is the proper window length for this purpose. 
Since insider trading might precede major corporate events, such as dividend 
announcements and mergers and acquisitions, longer window length can generate more 
noise and destroy the true information. As the SEC requires that insider trades be 
reported within two days after the trades are executed, one-day CAR might be the most 
informative. We focus on the one-day post-trade window and report the results in Table 
2.12.  We find analysts’ innate ability negatively affects positive CARs for both insider 
buys and insider sells at the 10% significance level with the same magnitude. However, 
these results are not robust if we try other longer windows rather than CAR [0,1] (the 
results are not reported here for simplicity).  
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Table 2.12: Analyst’s Innate Ability and Market Reactions to Insider Trading 
 CAR[0,1] 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES buys buys sells sells 
  positive car negative car positive car negative car 
     
Talent -0.0020* -0.0001 -0.0020* -0.0002 
 (0.0012)     (0.0010) (0.0012)  (0.0010) 
Log(MV) -0.0036*** 0.0032*** -0.0037*** 0.0032*** 
 (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
Book/Market -0.0073*** 0.0057** -0.0070*** 0.0053** 
 (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023) (0.0023) 
Volume(buys) 0.0004** -0.0004*   
 (0.0002) (0.0002)   
Volume(sells)   -0.0001 0.0001 
   (0.0001) (0.0002) 
Log (Timing) -0.0002 0.0002 -0.0002 0.0002 
 (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Constant 0.0525*** -0.0452*** 0.0541*** -0.0474*** 
 (0.0047) (0.0049) (0.0047) (0.0056) 
     
Observations 177,149 190,824 177,149 190,824 
R-squared 0.097 0.091 0.095 0.088 
Year FE YES YES YES YES 
Table 2.12 provides stock market reactions (CARs [0, 1]) surrounding insider trading (day 0 is the day of 
insider trading) for 367,973 observations at forecast-analyst-firm-trading day level. The abnormal returns 
are calculated by the market model. All insider trading are in the [-30,-7] window prior to annual earnings 
announcements by the firms. Talent is estimated analysts’ innate ability or natural talent; Log (MV) is the 
logarithm of market capitalization of the firm; Book/Market is the ratio of book value of the firm to its 
market value; Log (buys) is the logarithm of insider buys volumes of the firms in a trading day; Log (sells) 
is the logarithm of insider sell volumes of the firm in a trading day ; Log(Timing) is the logarithm of the 
number of days between the earnings forecast date (which is before insider trading window) by the analyst 
and the earnings announcement date by the firm. All variables are winsorized at 1% level. All regressions 
include year fixed effect. Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered at firm level, and ***, ** and 
* stand for statistical significance at 0.01, 0.05 and 0.1 level respectively.  
 
 Overall, the data provide mixed evidence for the effects of analysts’ innate ability 
on insider trading informativeness. When insiders have “good” inside information about 
earnings, analysts’ innate ability is negatively related to the informativeness of both 
insider buys and insider sells, which is consistent with our postulation that analysts can 
reduce the magnitude of insider trading informativeness around earnings announcements 
through earnings forecasts. However, for the regressions of each trading day, the result is 
mixed and sensitive to window length.  
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2.5 Discussion about Endogeneity 
Endogeneity is highlighted in the studies of the effect of analyst coverage on 
corporate governance outcomes. By convention we discuss three cases of endogeneity, of 
which reverse causality should be the most important consideration in this study.   
First, we try to exclude the possibility of reverse causality that insider trading 
causes analyst forecasts. We use insider trading data in the 30-day window prior to 
annual earnings announcements by the firms, and all analysts’ forecasts in our sample are 
restricted to at least one month prior to earnings announcements, thus all forecasts 
precede insider trading; given this, it is unlikely that insider trading with large volumes 
attracts analyst coverage and further affect analysts’ innate ability due to the changes in 
the number of analysts covering a firm. However, we are aware that this setting cannot 
completely rule out the possibility of reverse causality. Analyst forecasting accuracy has 
been shown to be higher in firms with a relatively higher transparency level (Brown et al. 
1987, Lang and Lundhold 1996, etc). If an analyst always picks high-transparency firms 
to follow, she may constantly have more accurate forecasts and be considered as a high-
ability analyst, even if she is no better than other analysts. Suppose there is a life cycle of 
transparency then corporate insiders may naturally trade less when transparency level is 
higher, thus we would observe a negative relation which is caused by endogeneity, even 
if we use the setting of initial coverage.  
Second, we try to avoid measurement error for both dependent variable and 
independent variables. For the measures of insider trading intensity, we use trading 
frequency (the number of trades, which can also measure trading profitability), trading 
volume, trading value (volume*price), and adjusted trading volume (volume/number of 
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shares outstanding) for comparison of empirical results. For analysts’ unobservable 
innate ability or natural talent, our measure, the isolated analyst fixed effect, is novel and 
its “quasi” normal distribution is consistent with reality. No measures in the existing 
literature can serve as alternative proxies for our research purpose. 
Third, we try to overcome the problem of omitted variables. There are always 
endless explanatory variables for consideration, and the existing literature of insider 
trading does not provide a consensus of necessary explanatory variables. Most 
importantly, information asymmetry is the prior concern according to our research 
purpose. Previous studies show that analysts tend to cover firms with a lower level of 
information asymmetry (Lang and Lundholm, 1996; Bhushan, 1989; Hshman, Piotroski, 
and Smith, 2005 etc.), so in order to avoid the situation that omitted variables of 
information asymmetry are correlated with both analysts’ innate ability and insider 
trading, we use as many measures of information asymmetry as we can to mitigate the 
problem of omitted variables for information asymmetry. 
2.6 Conclusion 
Financial analysts can affect insider trading through the information channel. This 
paper employs a novel measure of sell-side financial analysts’ innate ability or natural 
talent and explores its effects on reported corporate insider trading. We postulate that 
analysts with high innate ability can reduce information asymmetry between corporate 
insiders and outside investors through earnings forecasts, thereby negatively affecting 
insider trading intensity and informativeness.  
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The empirical results show that analysts with higher innate ability are associated 
with less net buys measured by trading volume, adjusted trading volume, and trading 
value when insiders have “good” inside information about annual EPS, but this relation 
does not hold for net sells when insiders have “bad” information. In addition, we conduct 
tests of initial coverage and find the effects of analysts’ ability on insider trading are 
stronger for these incremental impacts and the results are much stronger for high-ability 
analysts in the sample of initial coverage. Additionally, we examine the time-series of 
mean post-trading CARs and find that insider sells better predict future stock returns of 
the companies that are covered by analysts with lower innate ability, but the evidence is 
mixed for insider buys of which the results depends on information type. Overall, this 
paper suggests a negative relation between analysts’ innate ability and insider trading 
intensity and informativeness.   
Our research confirms the role of analyst ability in insider trading and suggests 
that high-ability analysts may serve in restricting excessive corporate insider trading. 
Additionally, our study sheds light on the nature of analyst information. Our results imply 
that the degree of firm-specific information an analyst can provide may be determined by 
her innate ability. Compared with market-specific and industry-specific information, 
firm-specific information is more difficult to collect and analyze; thus, analysts with low 
ability may not be able to include firm-specific information in their forecasts.  
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Chapter 3  
3 Measuring Firm Size in Empirical Corporate Finance 
3.1 Introduction 
The studies of firm size date back to a seminal article, Coase (1937), which raises 
the questions of how firm boundaries affect the allocation of resources and what 
determines firm boundaries. A large body of research follows the topic, and both 
questions have received much attention in theoretical studies in economics and finance 
(e.g., Williamson (1975, 1986), Klein, Crawford, and Alchian (1978), and Grossman and 
Hart (1986)). Empirical researchers in corporate finance also consider firm size an 
important and fundamental firm characteristic, and in many situations, observe the “size 
effect” – and firm  size matters in determining the dependent variables. For example, in 
capital structure, Frank and Goyal (2003) show that pecking order is only found in large 
firms; Rajan and Zingales (1995) discover that leverage increases with firm size. In 
mergers and acquisitions, Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004) find that small ﬁrms 
have larger abnormal announcement returns; Vijh and Yang (2013) document that for 
cash offers, targetiveness (probability of being targeted) decreases with firm size, but for 
stock offers they find an inverted-U relation. 
Although firm size matters in empirical corporate finance, the existing literature is 
silent on the rationale of using a certain measure of firm size, and no paper provides a 
comprehensive assessment of the sensitivity of empirical results in corporate finance to 
different measures of firm size. To the best of our knowledge, Vijh and Yang (2013) 
provide a list of firm size proxies and corresponding coefficients of firm size proxies in 
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the literature of takeover likelihood models. Their study indicates that the sign and 
significance of the coefficients of firm size in different papers are sensitive to firm size 
measures. While Vijh and Yang (2013) suggest that firm size measures should receive 
more attention, they do not compare the results based on the same regression, or conduct 
the assessment of firm size measures in broad corporate finance literature. 
We use 20 representative specifications, in the areas of executive compensation, 
board of directors, corporate control, financial policy, payout policy, investment policy, 
diversification, firm performance, and study the influences (sign sensitivity, significance 
sensitivity, and R-squared sensitivity) of employing different measures of firm size. For 
each specification we employ the natural logarithm forms of three firm size measures: 
total assets, total sales, and market value of equity. We choose these three measures 
because, according to our survey of 100 research papers, they are the most popular firm 
size proxies in corporate finance. However, other measures, such as number of 
employees and net assets, also appear in empirical work.  
We choose the 20 representative specifications from Coles, Daniel, and Naveen 
(2006), Comment and Schwert (1995), Core and Guay (1999), DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and 
Stulz (2006), Graham, Li, and Qiu (2012), Harford (1999), Harford, Mansi, and Maxwell 
(2008), Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008), Linck, Netter, and Yang (2008) and 
Mehran (1995). For brevity and data availability, we select the same papers as those in 
Coles and Li (2012). With a different goal, Coles and Li (2012) assess firm, manager, and 
time fixed effects in these 20 prominent areas in empirical corporate finance. On one 
hand, our project is modest. Using our data sample with year fixed effect and industry 
fixed effect, our empirical models resemble the corresponding benchmark specifications 
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in these papers.
21
 This allows an even-handed comparison between our results and those 
in the original papers and the results based on different firm size measures. On the other 
hand, our research thrust is ambitious in data collection and analysis for a large number 
of regression specifications across a wide spectrum of subfields in corporate finance. 
Although all firm size measures are significantly correlated, they are theoretically 
and empirically different.
22
 Because size is a firm fundamental variable, any subtle 
differences may have critical impact on the dependent variable and other independent 
variables in empirical study.
23
 Our results indeed confirm this “measurement effect” in 
“size effect” in empirical corporate finance. First, the coefficients on regressors often 
change sign and significance when we use difference firm size measures. We observe 
sign changes and significance changes in almost all the areas except dividend policy and 
executive compensation. Unfortunately, this suggests that, when using different firm size 
proxies, some previous studies are not robust.
24
 Researchers should either use all the 
                                                 
21
 We introduce industry fixed effect because some benchmark papers employ 2-digit SIC controls (e.g. 
Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006)) and others include industrial firms (e.g. DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Stulz 
(2006)) or manufacturing firms (e.g. Mehran (1995)). Broadly speaking, the industry fixed effects are 
widely documented in the empirical corporate finance research. We also tried firm fixed effects and 
obtained qualitatively similar results, although the implications, by looking at within-firm variations, are 
different from those of the original papers. 
22
 The correlation coefficients range from 0.64 to 0.81 in our sample. 
23
 According to our results, the firm size measures are consistently one of the most significant independent 
variables in all the subfields of corporate finance. In 18 out of 20 subfields, size proxy is statistically 
significant at 1% level. 
24
 In order to provide even-handed comparisons, we attempted to use exactly the same methodology and 
variable definitions in our experiments; we also tried the subsamples in the same time periods as in the 
original papers. The results are not qualitatively different, giving us some confidence that our data and 
estimation are not so different from those papers. More importantly, we are not trying to argue against the 
results in these papers. Instead, we test the sensitivity and robustness of the size measures in our larger, 
more comprehensive, and more recent data to raise awareness. For comparisons of the testing periods 
between our sample and the samples in the benchmark papers, please refer to footnote 26. 
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important proxies as robustness checks, or provide rationale of using any specific proxy. 
Second, the goodness of fit measured by R-squared varies significantly with different 
firm size measures. Some size measures appear more “relevant” than others in different 
areas, implying that they are better control variables to reduce omitted variable bias and 
improve the estimation of the main coefficients of interest. Different size proxies capture 
different aspects of “firm size”, and thus have different implications. The choice of these 
firm size measures can be a theoretical and empirical question. Finally, based on all our 
results, we attempt to provide guidelines on the choice of size measure in different areas 
and situations. The sensitivity of empirical results to different size measures not only 
provides guidance for researchers who must use firm size proxies in empirical corporate 
finance research, but also sheds light on future research that might incorporate 
measurement effect into other research fields, such as empirical asset pricing and 
empirical accounting. 
We have some guidelines for future research. First, we do not employ all possible 
measures of firm size; we only study the most popular three measures. Researchers can 
use some alternative size proxies such as enterprise value (market capitalization plus net 
debt), the number of employees, total profits, or net assets (total assets minus total 
liabilities) when the main measures are not available or irrelevant (e.g., market cap for 
private firms and total sales for start-up firms). Second, we might omit some important 
representative papers in specific sub-fields due to data and time constraints. Third, some 
linear models may lose power if the true relation between firm size and the dependent 
variable is non-linear (such as quadratic form). Fourth, most of our empirical results are 
based on year fixed effects and/or industry fixed effects, while introducing other 
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considerations, such as firm fixed effects (for consideration of with-in firm variations of 
interest rather than cross-sectional variations) or manager fixed effects (for emphasis on 
corporate governance issues such as managerial compensation), might change our results, 
and result in different implications. In a word, for future research, on the one hand 
explicit theories should be refined for the proper usage of different measures of firm size; 
on the other hand, a general role should be developed for empirical justification given 
specific econometric methods.  
The outline of this chapter is as follows. Section 3.2 discusses research 
motivation, literature review, and the measures of firm size. Section 3.3 describes our 
data and the sample. Section 3.4 provides discussion of empirical results. Section 3.5 
concludes. 
3.2 Framework for Analysis and Literature Review 
Coase (1937) states that firms are formed with boundaries to substitute markets to 
save transaction costs such as contracting and monitoring fees. For the effects of firm 
boundaries on firm behavior, Williamson (1975, 1986), Klein, Crawford, and Alchian 
(1978), and Grossman and Hart (1986) provide theoretical insights, while some recent 
works such as Holmstrom and Kaplan (2001), Robinson (2008), and Seru (2010) present 
empirical evidence that links the theory of firm and corporate finance to firm activities 
such as capital allocation. Specifically, Bolton and Scharfstein (1998) review the 
relationship between corporate finance and the theory of firm and organizations. 
As for the determinants of firm size, Kumar, Rajan, and Zingales (1999) 
comprehensively review the literature and classify the theories into four categories: 
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technological theories (Lucas (1978), Rosen (1982), Kremer (1993), etc.), organizational 
theories (Williamson (1975, 1986), Klein, Crawford and Alchian (1978), Grossman and 
Hart (1986), Rajan and Zingales (1998b, 2001), Holmstrom (1999), Holmstrom and 
Roberts (1998), etc.), regulatory theories (Ringleb and Wiggins (1990), Hopenhayn 
(1992), etc.), and financial theories (Rajan and Zingales (1998a),  etc.). Kumar, Rajan, 
and Zingales (1999) provide empirical evidence that the utility sector, R&D intensive 
industries, capital intensive industries, high wage industries, and industries that need little 
external financing all feature large firms.
25
 
Several papers also investigate whether the measures of firm size are 
interchangeable in microeconomics and industrial organization, and these works are more 
associated with our goal to evaluate the effects of employing different firm size measures 
in empirical research. Smyth, Boyes, and Peseau (1975) first demonstrate that measures 
of firm size are only interchangeable when more rigorous technical conditions than 
correlation are met. Smyth, Boyes, and Peseau (1975) show that economies of scale are 
sensitive to different firm size measures. Jackson and Dunlevy (1982) employ an 
asymptotically valid procedure to test the null hypothesis of orthogonal least squares 
suggested by Smyth, Boyes, and Peseau (1975). However, these works play little role in 
the existing corporate finance literature. Financial researchers usually use firm size 
measures without examining correlations and other interrelationships among different 
firm size measures. The empirical results in this paper support that the measures of firm 
size are indeed not interchangeable.  
                                                 
25
 Such evidence also motivates us to use industry fixed effect in our empirical investigations. 
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From the review above, we find that the overall assessment of firm size measures 
in empirical corporate finance has largely been ignored in the existing literature. 
However, this topic deserves attention. In most prominent areas of empirical corporate 
finance research, finance scholars employ firm size as an important firm characteristic, 
and, in many situations, finance scholars have observed the “size effect” - firm size 
matters in determining the dependent variables. For example, it is well recognized that 
top-management compensation level increases with firm size (Jensen and Murphy 
(1990), Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999), etc.). Baker and Hall (2004) find that CEO 
marginal products increase substantially with firm size. Gabaix and Landier (2008, 2014) 
show that small differences in CEO talent can result in substantial differences in CEO 
pay through the effect of firm size, and, in particular, larger firms usually have more 
skilled managers (Himmelberg and Hubbard (2000)).  
Although the majority of the literature takes for granted that the choice of firm 
size measures is not a vital concern, we doubt the existence of selection bias of empirical 
results in some papers. Recent works (e.g. Vijh and Yang (2013, Appendix 2)) find that 
the sign and significance of the coefficients of size proxies in the literature of mergers 
and acquisitions are sensitive to different firm size measures. While Vijh and Yang 
(2013) indicate that firm size measures should receive more attention, they are silent on 
the assessment of firm size measures based on the same regression and the 
comprehensive assessment in broad corporate finance literature. In addition, Vijh and 
Yang (2013) have little to say on the sensitivity of the coefficients of regressors other 
than firm size when different firm size measures are employed. These limitations in the 
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existing literature motivate us to investigate the effects of different size measures 
comprehensively. 
For the purpose of conducting a comprehensive empirical assessment of firm size 
measures in different sub-fields of empirical corporate finance, we follow Coles and Li 
(2012),  covering 20 prominent research areas in corporate finance: financial policy 
(book leverage, market leverage, and cash holdings), payout policy (dividend dummy), 
investment policy (CAPEX, R&D, and firm risk), diversification (Herfindahl index and 
business segments), firm performance (Tobin’s Q, which is the sum of market 
capitalization of equity plus liabilities divided by total book assets, and ROA, which is 
the ratio of net income to total assets), mergers and acquisitions and corporate control 
(bidder, target, and poison pills), managerial compensation and incentives (delta, vega, 
and pay level), and board of directors (board size, board independence, and CEO duality). 
We employ three firm size measures: total assets, total sales, and market value of 
equity. These measures are the most popular firm size proxies in empirical corporate 
finance research, according to our survey in which we investigate 100 empirical papers 
from top finance, accounting, and economics journals that use firm size measures on the 
topics of empirical corporate finance.  We collect a total of 100 papers through Google 
Scholar by searching subfield key words, and the results are listed by descending number 
of citations. We only choose the papers that appear in top journals and use firm size 
measures in empirical studies. The papers are distributed across extensive areas in 
corporate finance, including capital structure, debt policy, payout policy, cash holdings, 
corporate investment and financial constraints, cross listings, CEO turnover, CEO 
compensation, board of directors, law and finance, ownership structure, mergers and 
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acquisitions and corporate control (see the Appendix 3.1 for the detailed information of 
these papers.). We find that these three firm size proxies are used in 85 papers out of the 
87 papers that use single measures, and the remaining 13 papers use multiple measures 
for robustness checks. Among these 87 papers, 49 papers use total assets, 20 papers use 
market capitalization, 16 papers use sales, and 2 papers use number of employees. We are 
aware that other measures, such as number of employees and net assets, also appear, 
though infrequently, in empirical finance works, but for conciseness we only use these 
three measures. In addition, most papers in empirical corporate finance use the logarithm 
form of firm size measures. In the 100 papers we surveyed, only 3 papers use the original 
form of the three size measures. This suggests the rule of thumb in corporate finance is to 
use log form to mitigate the high skewness of firm size data. 
It is interesting that Forbes Global 2000 uses four measures (assets, sales, profits, 
and market cap) to rank all the large companies in the world, and Fortune 500 uses two 
measures (sales and profits). Both of them employ sales and profits, but profits seldom 
appear as a proxy for firm size in academic research. 
Every firm size measure exhibits advantages and disadvantages, and no measure 
can capture all characteristics of “firm size”. Generally speaking, total assets measures 
total firm resources; market capitalization involves firm growth opportunities and equity 
market condition; total sales measures product market competition and is not forward 
looking. In addition, researchers can use the number of employees, total profits, and net 
assets when the main measures are not available or irrelevant (e.g., market cap for private 
firms and total sales for start-up firms). Moreover, Hart and Oulton (1996) argue that net 
assets can be negative but sales are always positive. They also point out that the number 
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of employees does not include the number of part-time workers, but these days part-time 
workers play an important role. Because every measure has pros and cons, Hart and 
Oulton (1996) suggest that in practice choosing which measure to use depends on data 
availability. In addition, we think the choice of firm size measures also depends on the 
purpose of the specific study. For example, Prowse (1992) applies different firm size 
measures as the research purpose changes from the ownership of equity to the ownership 
of asset.  
In sum, we find that the existing literature has little to say about the rationale of 
using a certain measure of firm size for specific corporate finance research, and no paper 
provides a comprehensive assessment of the sensitivity of empirical results in corporate 
finance to different measures of firm size. This hole in the literature motivates us to find 
evidence for “measurement effect” in “size effect”, and to provide a general guideline to 
researchers who must use firm size, whether as key variable or control variable, in their 
empirical corporate finance studies.  
3.3 The Data 
We extract the data from multiple sources. Corporate governance data are from 
RiskMetrics Governance, director data are from RiskMetrics Directors, stock daily 
returns and prices are from CRSP, company diversification data are from Compustat 
Segment, corporate bond data are from Compustat Ratings, institutional holdings data are 
from Thomson Reuters, Executive data, up to five top executives per firm, are from 
ExecuComp, M&A deals and corporate control data are from SDC, and all other financial 
items are from Compustat Fundamentals. We restrict the observations to only those 
which match North American data from CRSP and Compustat for firms with fiscal years 
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1993-2006
26
.  In line with conventional tradition, we exclude data from the financial and 
utility sectors. See Table 3.1 for summary statistics for all the variables featured in our 
representative specifications from corresponding benchmark papers.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
26
 This is different from the testing periods in the benchmark papers. Mehran (1995) uses a sample from 
1979 to 1980; Linck, Netter, and Yang (2008) use a sample from 1990 to 2004; DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and 
Stulz (2006) use a sample from 1973 to 2002; Comment and Schwert (1995) use a sample from 1977 to 
1991; Harford (1999) uses a sample from 1977 to 1993; Lemon, Roberts, and Zender (2008) use a sample 
from 1965 to 2003; Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006)  use a sample from 1992 to 2002; Graham, Li, and 
Qiu (2012) use a sample from 1992 to 2006; Harford, Mansi, and Maxwell (2008) use a sample from 1993 
to 2004.  
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Table 3.1: Summary Statistics 
  
Mean Median Stdev 
Linck, Netter, and Yang (2008) : Board of Directors 
LogAssets 7.86 7.69 1.48 
LogSales 7.86 7.70 1.50 
LogMVE 7.99 7.85 1.65 
Board size 9.52 9.00 2.57 
Board independence 0.68 0.71 0.17 
Board leadership 0.80 1.00 0.40 
Debt 0.19 0.18 0.15 
LogSegments 0.82 1.10 0.69 
FirmAge 23.62 25.67 11.33 
MTB 2.15 1.67 1.44 
R&D 0.04 0.01 0.06 
RETSTD 0.43 0.37 0.21 
CEO_Own 0.005 0.00 0.03 
Director_Own 0.04 0.01 0.08 
FCF 0.08 0.06 0.10 
Performance 0.04 0.003 0.18 
Lag(CEO_Chair) 0.80 1.00 0.40 
Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008)  : Leverage 
LogAssets 7.86 7.68 1.48 
LogSales 7.40 7.36 1.65 
LogMVE 7.98 7.85 1.65 
Book Leverage 0.23 0.22 0.19 
Initial book leverage 0.21 0.19 0.19 
Market Leverage 0.21 0.16 0.21 
Initial market leverage 0.20 0.15 0.20 
Profitability 0.14 0.14 0.12 
Cash Flow Volatility 0.05 0.03 0.06 
Tangibility 0.3 0.25 0.21 
Dividend Payer 0.56 1.00 0.50 
Harford, Mansi, and Maxwell (2008) : Cash Holdings 
LogAssets 7.86 7.68 1.48 
LogSales 7.49 7.43 1.64 
LogMVE 7.98 7.85 1.65 
Cash Holdings -2.83 -2.80 1.70 
Gindex 7.32 8.00 4.61 
Inside Ownership 0.002 0.001 0.004 
Delta 0.22 0.04 0.59 
Institutional ownership 10.62 0.00 25.00 
Leverage 0.21 0.16 0.20 
Cash flow 0.07 0.04 0.11 
85 
 
Working capital 0.07 0.06 0.15 
CF Volatility 0.40 0.04 1.62 
R&D 0.04 0.01 0.07 
CapEx 0.04 0.03 0.05 
Acquisition 0.03 0.00 0.06 
Dividend indicator 0.57 1.00 0.49 
Bond indicator 0.58 1.00 0.49 
DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Stultz (2006) : Payout policy 
LogAssets 7.84 7.65 1.47 
LogSales 7.84 7.67 1.50 
LogMVE 7.96 7.84 1.65 
Dividend payout 0.60 1.00 0.49 
RE/TE 0.04  0.00 0.20 
TE/TA 0.06 0.04 0.06 
Sales growth 0.07 0.07 0.22 
Mehran (1995) : Firm Performance 
LogAssets 7.84 7.65 1.47 
LogSales 7.84 7.67 1.50 
LogMVE 7.96 7.84 1.65 
Tobin’s Q 2.15 1.68 1.43 
ROA 14.48 14.09 9.44 
% of managers’ equity compensation 0.58 0.61 0.23 
% of shares held by all outside 
blockholders 
0.18 0.00 0.31 
% of outside directors 0.68 0.70 0.17 
Std of % change in operating  income 0.44 0.34 0.36 
Graham, Li, and Qiu (2012) : Executive Pay Level 
LogAssets 7.84 7.65 1.47 
LogSales 7.83 7.67 1.50 
LogMVE 7.96 7.84 1.65 
Tobin’s Q 2.16 1.66 1.52 
Stock Return 0.16 0.09 0.56 
ROA 0.14 0.14 0.13 
Stock Volatility 4.42 3.42 3.56 
Director  0.33 0.00 0.47 
Tenure 3.40 0.00 7.83 
CEO 0.18 0.00 0.38 
Female 0.05 0.00 0.21 
Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006): Delta and Vega 
LogAssets 7.84 7.65 1.47 
LogSales 7.83 7.67 1.50 
LogMVE 7.96 7.84 1.65 
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Vega 0.05 0.01 0.11 
Delta 0.22 0.04 0.59 
Tobin’s Q 2.16 1.66 1.52 
Book Leverage 0.23 0.22 0.19 
R & D 0.04 0.01 0.08 
CAPEX 0.04 0.03 0.05 
Firm Risk 0.35 0.32 0.17 
Cash Compensation 0.85 0.60 0.90 
Tenure 3.40 0.00 7.83 
Surplus Cash 0.06 0.04 0.11 
Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006): Investment Policy 
LogAssets 7.84 7.65 1.47 
LogSales 7.40 7.36 1.65 
LogMVE 7.96 7.68 1.65 
R & D 0.04 0.01 0.07 
Delta 0.41E-3 0.03E-3 1.00E-3 
Vega 0.18E-2 0.02E-2 0.55E-2 
Cash Compensation 0.07E-2 0.05E-2 0.11E-2 
Tobin’s Q 2.17 1.67 1.52 
Surplus Cash 0.07 0.04 0.11 
Sales Growth 0.10 0.08 0.28 
Stock Returns 0.01 0.00 0.58 
Book Leverage 0.23 0.22 0.18 
Tenure 0.34 0.00 0.79 
Firm Risk 2.74 2.67 0.93 
CAPEX 0.05 0.03 0.05 
Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006): Diversification 
LogAssets 7.77 7.60 1.44 
LogSales 7.34 7.30 1.63 
LogMVE 7.89 7.78 1.62 
Herfindahl Index 0.65 0.69 0.68 
Vega 0.39E-3  0.03E-3 0.95E-3 
Delta 0.18E-2 0.02E-2 0.54E-2 
Cash Compensation 0.07E-2 0.05E-2 0.11E-2 
Tobin’s Q 2.17 1.66 1.54 
ROA 0.14 0.14 0.12 
Stock Return 0.01 0.11E-2 0.60 
Sales Growth 0.10 0.08 0.28 
Dividend Cut 0.27 0.00 0.44 
CEO Turnover 0.16 0.00 0.37 
Book Leverage 0.22 0.22 0.18 
Tenure 3.37 0.00 7.78 
Harford (1999) : Bidder    
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LogAssets 7.42 7.35 1.60 
LogSales 7.40 7.36 1.66 
LogMVE 8.00 7.87 1.66 
Bidder Dummy 0.12 0.00 0.33 
Abnormal Return 1.08 0.09 55.38 
Sales Growth 0.11 0.08 0.30 
Liquidity 0.07 0.07 0.15 
Leverage 0.23 0.22 0.18 
Tobin’s Q 2.21 1.69 1.57 
Price-to-Earnings -2.84 0.00 15.12 
Comment and Schwert (1995): Target and Poison Pill 
Target Dummy 0.02 0.00 0.15 
LogAssets 7.84 7.65 1.48 
LogSales 7.40 7.35 1.65 
LogMVE 7.96 7.84 1.65 
Poison Pill 0.62 1.00 0.49 
Control Share Law 0.17 0.00 0.38 
Business Combination Law 0.69 1.00 0.46 
Abnormal Return 1.09 0.08 56.15 
Sales growth 0.10 0.08 0.28 
Liquidity 0.07 0.07 0.15 
Leverage 0.23 0.22 0.18 
Tobin’s Q 2.17 1.67 1.52 
Price-to-earnings -2.80 0.00 15.19 
Table 3.1 presents summary statistics for the samples of the panel data from 1993 to 2006. Please refer to the 
corresponding benchmark papers for the variable definitions. All dollar values are stated in 2006 dollars.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
88 
 
Specifically, we report data properties and bivariate scattergrams of the 
alternative firm size measures in logarithm numbers for the regressions of firm 
performance (Tobin’s Q and ROA) as an example. Table 3.2 Panel A reports summary 
statistics of firm size measures for both raw numbers and logarithm numbers. Panel B 
presents the Pearson correlation coefficients of firm size measures across raw numbers 
and logarithm numbers. Figure 3.1 shows bivariate scattergrams of alternative firm sizes 
measured in logarithm numbers, which we employ in the regressions. We find that the 
correlation coefficients among log (assets), log (sales), and log (market value of equity) 
are between 0.77 and 0.92, and those among raw numbers are between 0.64 and 0.81.  
The highest correlation coefficient is between log (assets) and log (sales) (0.92), and the 
lowest correlation coefficient is between sales and log (market value of equity) (0.50). 
These correlations indicate that although all the size measures are significantly correlated, 
they are different and some are more correlated than others.  
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Table 3.2: Firm Size Measures for Firm Performance Regression 
Panel A: Summary Statistics  
Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
assets 4718 8485 22702 31.849 304594 
sales 4698 8212 21174 1.857 345977 
mve 4718 11880 31676 4.477 460768 
logassets 4718 7.81405 1.47247 3.46101 12.62674 
logsales 4698 7.81236 1.50306 0.61896 12.75413 
logmve 4718 7.94546 1.64479 1.49895 13.04065 
This table presents summary statistics of firm size measures that we use for the regressions of Tobin’s Q and ROA. 
“Assets”, “sales” and “mve” denote total assets, total sales and market value of equity respectively. The data are for the 
fiscal years 1993-2006.  
Panel B: Correlation  
  assets sales mve logassets logsales logmve 
assets 1 0.80988 0.6351 0.62978 0.56359 0.51524 
 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
4718 4698 4718 4718 4698 4718 
sales  1 0.67084 0.58564 0.61417 0.50087 
  <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
 4698 4698 4698 4698 4698 
mve   1 0.55892 0.51373 0.63399 
   <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
  4718 4718 4698 4718 
logassets    1 0.92061 0.85227 
    <.0001 <.0001 
   4718 4698 4718 
logsales     1 0.77029 
     <.0001 
    4698 4698 
logmve      1 
      
     4718 
For any two measures of firms size, the first line reports the Pearson correlation coefficient, the second line denotes the 
Probability > |r| under H0: Rho=0. The third line refers to the number of observations. 
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Figure 3.1: Bivariate Scattergrams of Alternative Firm Size Measures for Firm 
Performance 
 
 
91 
 
 
 
This figure depicts bivariate scattergrams of alternative firm size measures for firm performance data. The solid line 
represents the regression line; the dotted line represents 95% confidence limits for individual predicted values. 
 
We also show the trends of the three different firm size measures over our testing 
period in Figure 3.2. Figure 3.2A is expressed in logarithm form, and Figure 3.2B in 
original form in 2006 dollars. The average market capitalization in 2002 went down 
dramatically, consistent with the dot-com bubble burst. The bottom line is that time 
trends appear different for different measures, mainly because they capture different 
aspects of “firm size”. 
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Figure 3.2: Time Series of Alternative Firm Size Measures 
Figure 2A: The Trends of Firm Size Measures (in Logarithm Terms) 
 
Figure 2B: The Trends of Firm Size Measures (in Original Terms) 
         
Figure 2 provides the time series of the average firm size measures for all the firms in the data sample for firm 
performance. Figure 2A shows trends in logarithm form, and Figure 2B shows trends in original form (in 2006 dollars).  
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3.4 Methodology and Empirical Results 
We adopt the empirical methodologies in the benchmark papers by employing 
conventional short-panel techniques for basic empirical analysis. For each specification, 
we apply both basic OLS regressions and industry fixed effect regressions. Time fixed 
effects are included in every regression. We use industry fixed effect because some 
benchmark papers employ 2-digit SIC controls (e.g. Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006)), 
and others only include industrial firms (e.g. DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Stulz (2006)) or 
manufacturing firms (e.g. Mehran (1995)). The industry fixed effects and time fixed 
effects are widely used in the empirical corporate finance research. 
We only use the benchmark papers for comparison, not to replicate their results, 
given the fact that some papers use old data that are hard to track, some papers do not 
employ year fixed effect and industry fixed effect, some papers conduct different 
econometric specifications (cross-sectional vs. panel), and the databases are adjusted over 
long periods. Fortunately, our results are by and large consistent with those in the 
benchmark papers. 
As we follow the benchmark papers, we are implicitly assuming that the 
explanatory variables do not affect both dependent variable and firm size. We believe that 
firm size is a more important fundamental firm characteristic than other control variables, 
based on the theoretical and empirical works in the corporate finance literature and our 
experiments in this paper. Therefore, it is more likely that the causality runs from the firm 
size to corporate policies. We follow the literature and the seminal papers that we 
replicate in treating the firm size as exogenous. Additionally, since we cannot rule out 
collinearity, researchers should be cautious about the “bad control” problem. 
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It is possible that some relationships that we study are not static. For robustness, 
we used GMM to estimate dynamic models, although none of the benchmark papers 
mention that dynamic models should be used. For many tests, the Arellano-Bond test of 
auto-correlation can’t reject H0: no auto-correlation in error terms. Although the GMM 
may not be a good model for many corporate finance subfields, the (unreported) results 
are still robust and the sensitivity to different size measures still exists.   
Note also that although different size proxies, if with measurement errors or 
random noise, might affect the coefficients in the regressions by chance, we believe that 
the three size proxies have different economic meanings that are far beyond random 
noise. The size proxies have different economic meanings and therefore we cannot regard 
the difference between the size proxies as random noise. In addition, the firm size proxies 
we use and the whole literature employs, namely total assets, sales, and market cap, are 
generally measured and reported accurately for all public corporations. The literature 
implicitly assumes that there are no measurement errors or random noise in these 
variables, although researchers might need to deal with this problem in their specific data 
samples. 
We report our results in Table 3.3 through Table 3.22 for 20 separate fields and 
summarize the results in Table 3.23 and Figure 3.3. We discuss the results in each field as 
follows.  
3.4.1 Firm Performance 
We use Tobin’s Q and ROA (return on assets) as measures of firm performance. 
For Tobin’s Q, the representative specification is based on Mehran (1995, Table 4, Panel 
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A, Column 4), which applies the log of total assets as the measure of firm size. Table 3.3 
reports the results when we use Tobin’s Q as the dependent variable. Industry fixed effect 
models are employed to be consistent with Mehran (1995), whose sample includes only 
manufacturing firms. When we use the log of market value of equity, we observe higher 
𝑅2 because market capitalization is in the nominator of Tobin’s Q; thus, these results 
suffer from mechanical correlation. Total assets and sales have the same 𝑅2: 0.22 for 
OLS and 0.28 for industry fixed effect respectively. The coefficients of all size measures 
are positive and significant at 1% level, while the coefficient of firm size in Mehran 
(1995) is negative. This is not surprising. Although the negative relation reflects that 
small firms have high growth opportunities, this only happens beyond some point as the 
true relation between firm size and performance can be curvilinear, which suggests 
quadratic functional form.  Neither too small nor too big is optimal, and this is one of the 
reasons why we observe firm growth and firm divesture in reality. Another reason might 
stem from the time trends of Tobin’s Q and ROA in our data sample (1993-2006), while 
the benchmark paper uses cross-sectional data (the averages of 1979-1980). We also find 
that for Tobin’s Q, the sign of business risk (measured by standard deviation of 
percentage change in operating income) is sensitive to different firm size measures. In 
addition, the coefficient of the percentage of managers’ equity compensation turns 
insignificant when we use the log of market value of equity. 
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Table 3.3: Firm Performance-Tobin’s Q 
 (1) 
Pooled OLS 
 
(2) 
Pooled OLS 
 
(3) 
Pooled OLS 
(4) 
Industry FE 
(5) 
Industry FE 
(6) 
Industry FE 
% of managers' 0.793*** 0.793*** 0.017 0.696*** 0.663*** 0.019 
equity compensation 20.89 21.19 0.48 18.75 18.01 0.57 
       
Managers' delta 0.317*** 0.315*** 0.082*** 0.281*** 0.269*** 0.075*** 
 23.05 23.02 6.46 21.02 20.19 6.15 
       
% of shares held by all  0.283*** 0.288*** 0.203*** 0.345*** 0.354*** 0.215*** 
outside blockholders 5.49 5.58 4.34 6.92 7.11 4.76 
       
% of outside directors -0.388*** -0.400*** -0.595*** -0.360*** -0.409*** -0.518*** 
 -7.60 -7.82 -12.89 -6.93 -7.83 -11.04 
       
R&D/sales 5.447*** 5.544*** 4.703*** 4.683*** 4.784*** 4.107*** 
 33.12 33.44 31.44 26.32 26.87 25.49 
       
(Inventory+PPE)/assets -0.302*** -0.299*** -0.599*** -0.640*** -0.652*** -0.414*** 
 -6.75 -6.72 -14.82 -9.64 -9.84 -6.88 
       
Long-term debt/assets -0.198*** -0.196*** -0.158*** -0.210*** -0.209*** -0.151*** 
 -35.08 -34.95 -31.00 -36.24 -36.18 -28.57 
       
Std of % change in  0.052* -0.067** 0.391*** -0.092*** 0.130*** 0.428*** 
operating income 1.95          2.46         16.15 3.37 4.74 17.46 
       
Size-Log of  0.030***   0.043***   
total assets 4.77   6.35   
       
Size-Log of sales       0.037***   0.076***  
  5.84   11.02  
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Size-Log of market           0.370***                0.398*** 
value of equity   72.36   73.87 
       
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes                             
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.22 0.22 0.35 0.28 
 
0.28 
 
0.41 
     N 24,582 24,579 24,582 24,582 
 
24,579 
 
24,582 
The explanatory variables in this table resemble those in Table 4, Panel A, Column 4 in Mehran (1995). The dependent variable is Tobin’s Q. Models (1)-(3) are based on pooled 
OLS regressions without industry fixed effects, models (4)-(6) include industry fixed effects. We include year fixed effects in all models. The data are for fiscal years 1993-2006. 
***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.  
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For ROA as the dependent variable, the representative specification refers to 
Mehran (1995, Table 4, Panel B, Column 4), which also applies the log of total assets as 
the measure of firm size. In Table 3.4, we find that when market value of equity is used 
as firm size, 𝑅2 increases sharply (Figure 3.3) for both OLS and industry fixed effect 
regressions, while the 𝑅2s are similar if we use total assets or sales. We further find that 
the size proxy log of assets is not significant in the industry fixed effect regression. In 
addition, unlike the results for Tobin’s Q, the sign and significance of the coefficients of 
business risk are robust. However, the sign of the percentage of managers’ equity 
compensation and managers’ delta both change to negative when firm size is market 
value of equity, which suggests scholars should be especially careful about the firm size 
measured by market value of equity for studies of firm performance. 
It is worth noting that market value of equity is in the numerator Tobin’s Q, so it 
is possible that they are mechanically correlated and thus affect empirical sensitivity such 
as goodness-of-fit. Therefore, a high R-squared does not necessarily suggest a good 
proxy of firm size.  In Table 3.23 and Figure 3.3, we find the goodness-of-fit exhibits 
substantial changes when market capitalization is used as a firm size proxy. 
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Table 3.4: Firm Performance-ROA (Return on Assets) 
 (1) 
Pooled OLS 
 
(2) 
Pooled OLS 
 
(3) 
Pooled OLS 
(4) 
Industry FE 
(5) 
Industry FE 
(6) 
Industry FE 
% of managers' 2.091*** 1.228*** -1.873*** 1.905*** 0.876*** -1.411*** 
equity compensation 8.09 4.82 -7.42 7.65 3.57 -5.86 
       
Managers' delta 0.967*** 0.689*** -0.235*** 0.851*** 0.514*** -0.159* 
 10.31 7.39 -2.58 9.48 5.78 -1.84 
       
% of shares held by all  1.732*** 1.839*** 1.416*** 1.844*** 1.966*** 1.251*** 
outside blockholders 4.93 5.24 4.18 5.50          5.91 3.90 
       
% of outside directors 2.001*** 1.390*** 0.789*** 1.859*** 0.932*** 1.018*** 
 5.75 4.00 2.37 5.32 2.67 3.06 
       
R&D/sales -21.478*** -20.036***     -24.454*** -24.464*** -22.892*** -26.97*** 
 -19.17 -17.76 -22.63 -20.47 -19.26 -23.59 
       
(Inventory+PPE)/assets 6.807*** 6.304*** 5.165*** 9.387*** 9.347*** 10.46*** 
 22.34 20.83 17.70 21.06 21.13         24.50 
       
Long-term debt/assets -1.165*** -1.196*** -1.024*** -1.149*** -1.162*** -0.887*** 
 -30.35 -31.39 -27.74 -29.49 -30.11 -23.60 
       
Std of % change in  -6.094*** -5.430** -4.280*** -6.546*** -5.671*** -4.863*** 
operating income -33.32        -29.37         -24.48 -35.82 -31.04        -27.99 
       
Size-Log of  0.181***   0.049   
total assets 4.21   1.06   
       
Size-Log of sales       0.379***   0.889***  
  8.91   19.31  
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Size-Log of market           1.629***                1.829*** 
value of equity   44.15   47.81 
       
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes                             
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.17 0.17 0.23 0.25 
 
0.26 
 
0.32 
     N 24,582 24,579 24,582 24,582 
 
24,579 
 
24,582 
The explanatory variables in this table resemble those in Table 4, Panel B, Column 4 in Mehran (1995). The dependent variable is ROA (return on assets). Models (1)-(3) are based 
on pooled OLS regressions without industry fixed effects, models (4)-(6) include industry fixed effects. We include year fixed effects in all models. The data are for fiscal years 
1993-2006.  ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
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3.4.2 Board Structure 
Board structure has received much attention as an important topic in corporate 
governance; the existing literature covers three prominent board characteristics: 
independence, i.e. the proportion of outside directors (Weisbach (1988), Byrd and 
Hickman (1992), Brickley, Coles and Terry (1994), etc.); size (Jensen (1993), Yermack 
(1996), Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2008), etc.); and leadership, i.e. separation of CEO 
and Chairman of the Board (COB) (Baliga, Moyer, and Rao (1996) and Brickley, Coles, 
and Jarrel (1997), etc.).   
We use Linck, Netter, and Yang (2008) for the examination of board structure, 
more specifically, board independence as in Linck, Netter, and Yang (2008, Table 4, 
Column 2). This benchmark paper uses the market value of equity as the firm size 
measure. We denote the proportion of non-executive board members as the dependent 
variable and report the results in Table 3.5. The positive sign of firm size indicates that 
big firms tend to have more outside directors. The sign and significance of coefficients of 
firm size are robust for both OLS and industry fixed effect models to different firm size 
measures. While the 𝑅2𝑠  are similar, we observe that the sign and significance are 
sensitive for debt (total long term debt divided by total assets) and R&D (R&D 
expenditures divided by total assets) when we employ different firm size proxies. Fama 
and Jensen (1983) suggest that outside directors who bring valuable expertise and 
connections are beneficial to firms with complex operating or financial structures, 
thereby leading to larger and more independent boards, and the pros of effective 
monitoring should dominate the monitoring costs that go hand in hand with firm 
complexity. Thus, Linck, Netter, and Yang (2008) predict that, as a proxy for growth 
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opportunities, R&D expenditures, which increase monitoring and advising costs, are 
negatively related to board size and independence. However, debt proportion should be 
positively related to board size and independence since debt proportion is a proxy for 
firm complexity and advising benefits. In our results, the coefficient of debt is positive, as 
predicted, but only significant when log of market value of equity is used. The coefficient 
for R&D is positive for OLS regression but negative for industry fixed effect regression, 
suggesting the results of industry fixed effect regressions are consistent with the 
prediction. However, the significance is sensitive when we apply different firm size 
measures in the industry fixed regressions. 
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Table 3.5: Board of Directors-Board Independence 
 (1) 
Pooled OLS 
 
(2) 
Pooled OLS 
(3) 
Pooled OLS 
(4) 
Industry FE 
(5) 
Industry FE 
(6) 
Industry FE 
 
Log(MVE) 0.015***   0.017***   
 17.03   18.00   
       
Log(Assets)  0.018***   0.020***  
  20.27   20.97  
       
Log(Sales)   0.019***   0.025*** 
   21.17   25.91 
       
Debt 0.016** -0.005 0.008 0.027*** 0.006 0.009 
         2.17 -0.63 1.06 3.57 0.86 1.18 
       
Log(Segments) 0.024*** 0.022*** 0.022*** 0.017*** 0.015*** 0.012*** 
 15.06 13.77 13.61 10.33 8.89 6.85 
       
FirmAge -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.004*** -0.004***     -0.003*** 
 -9.28 -8.74 -8.20      -5.57 -5.20 -4.11 
       
FirmAge^2 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0001***      0.0001***      0.0001*** 
 12.01 11.29 10.58 7.95 7.39 6.07 
       
MTB -0.012*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.010*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 
 -12.59 -6.52 -6.13 -11.50 -4.91 -5.22 
       
R&D 0.116*** 0.134*** 0.202*** -0.054** -0.037* 0.006 
 5.39 6.25 9.27 -2.41 -1.68 0.28 
       
RETSTD -0.055*** -0.066*** -0.067*** -0.023*** -0.035*** -0.030*** 
 -8.31 -10.01 -10.03 -3.38 -5.20 -4.58 
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CEO_Own -0.302*** -0.293*** -0.311*** -0.211*** -0.206*** -0.199*** 
 -6.68 -6.52 -6.93 -4.88 -4.78 -4.64 
       
Director_Own 0.647*** 0.663*** 0.657*** 0.644*** 0.658*** 0.670*** 
 45.64 46.97        47.20 46.74 47.95 49.71 
       
FCF 0.150*** 0.153*** 0.133*** 0.125*** 0.127*** 0.098*** 
 11.05 11.33 9.77 9.34 9.56 7.39 
       
Performance -581.307*** -702.407*** -647.593*** -617.460*** -706.805** -786.459*** 
 -6.65 -8.02 -7.51 -7.28 -8.33 -9.37 
       
Lag(CEO_Chair) 0.054*** 0.051*** 0.052*** 0.050*** 0.047*** 0.045*** 
 21.01 19.99 20.12 20.12 19.09 18.20 
       
Age -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 -16.78 -16.70 -16.53 -14.29 -14.25 -14.03 
       
       
Tenure 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 0.70 0.60 0.63 0.35 0.20 -0.16 
       
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.23 0.24 0.24         0.31 
 
0.32 
 
0.32 
N 21,708 21,708 21,708 21,708 
 
21,708 
 
21,708 
The explanatory variables in this table resemble those in Table 4, Column 2 in Linck, Netter, and Young (2008). The dependent variable is board independence, defined as the 
proportion of non-executive board members. Models (1)-(3) are based on pooled OLS regressions without industry fixed effects, models (4)-(6) include industry fixed effects. We 
include year fixed effects in all models. The data are for fiscal years 1993-2006. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
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The representative specification of board size refers to Linck, Netter, and Yang 
(2008, Table 4, Column 1), and we report the results in Table 3.6. The dependent variable 
is the number of directors on the board. The positive sign of firm size is also consistent 
with Linck, Netter, and Yang (2008), indicating that board size increases with firm size. 
The sign and significance of coefficients of firm size are robust to different size measures 
in both OLS and industry fixed effect regressions. The 𝑅2𝑠 are quite similar. Once again, 
the abnormal results reside in the sign and significance of the coefficients on debt and 
R&D if different firm size measures are used. 
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Table 3.6: Board of Directors-Board Size 
 (1) 
Pooled OLS 
 
(2) 
Pooled OLS 
(3) 
Pooled OLS 
(4) 
Industry FE 
(5) 
Industry FE 
(6) 
Industry FE 
Log(MVE) 0.597***   0.554***   
 52.86   46.01   
       
Log(Assets)  0.657***   0.624***  
  58.15   50.73  
       
Log(Sales)   0.635***   0.605*** 
   57.57   48.15 
       
Debt 1.273*** 0.514*** 1.011*** 0.756*** 0.100 0.253** 
 12.98 5.27 10.41 7.42 0.99 2.50 
       
Log(Segments) 0.204*** 0.149*** 0.147*** 0.307*** 0.246*** 0.225*** 
 9.31 6.83 6.73 13.29 10.68 9.60 
       
FirmAge -0.079*** -0.062*** -0.049*** -0.050*** -0.040***     -0.025** 
 -7.23 -5.75 -4.55      -4.62 -3.76 -2.31 
       
FirmAge^2 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002***      0.002***      0.002*** 
 12.06 10.16 8.59 9.36 8.14 6.54 
       
MTB -0.279*** -0.032*** -0.034*** -0.277*** -0.061*** -0.074*** 
 -23.54 -3.13 -3.28 -23.57 -5.98 -7.19 
       
R&D -2.521*** -1.732*** 0.054 -0.002 0.577** 1.115*** 
 -9.66 6.72 0.21 -0.01 2.06 3.95 
       
RETSTD -1.411*** -1.831*** -1.806*** -1.009*** -1.412*** -1.333*** 
 -15.65 -20.85 -20.53 -11.02 -15.85 -14.83 
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CEO_Own -1.754*** -1.717*** -2.308*** -1.559*** -1.578*** -1.852*** 
 -2.90 -2.88 -3.86 -2.70 -2.76 -3.22 
       
Director_Own -3.362*** -3.072*** -3.466*** -3.189*** -2.931*** -3.406*** 
 -17.30 -16.03 -18.27 -16.90 -15.70 -18.37 
       
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.39 0.40 0.40         0.45 
 
0.46 
 
0.45 
N 21,758 21,758 21,255 21,758 
 
21,758 
 
21,755 
The explanatory variables in this table resemble those in Table 4, Column 1 in Linck, Netter, and Young (2008). The dependent variable is board size, defined as the number of 
directors on the board. Models (1)-(3) are based on pooled OLS regressions without industry fixed effects, models (4)-(6) include industry fixed effects. We include year fixed 
effects in all models. The data are for fiscal years 1993-2006. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
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We refer to Linck, Netter, and Yang (2008, Table 4, Column 3) for the study of 
board leadership (CEO duality). The dependent variable is the logit-transformed dummy 
variable that equals 1 if the CEO and COB positions are combined and 0 otherwise. The 
regressions are based on logistic models with and without industry fixed effects. Table 
3.7 shows that the 𝑅2𝑠 are quite similar. The positive sign of firm size suggests CEO 
duality increases with firm size. Different firm size measures do not change the sign and 
significance of firm size coefficients. The sensitivity of R&D still exists in our results of 
board leadership, suggesting scholars should pay special attention to this issue in the 
extensive study of board governance. Standard deviation of stock returns, which is a 
proxy for information asymmetry that increases monitoring and advising costs, also has 
sensitive significance for different firm size measures. 
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Table 3.7: Board of Directors-Board Leadership 
 (1) 
Logistic 
 
(2) 
Logistic 
(3) 
Logistic 
(4) 
Logistic 
Industry FE 
(5) 
Logistic 
Industry FE 
(6) 
Logistic         
Industry FE 
Log(MVE) 0.324***   0.305***   
 520.326   390.963   
       
Log(Assets)  0.406***   0.396***  
  785.862   611.320  
       
Log(Sales)   0.365***   0.415*** 
   664.551   659.980 
       
MTB -0.230*** -0.086*** -0.091*** -0.221*** -0.095*** -0.105*** 
 297.455 52.101 59.008 242.113 56.232 68.293 
       
R&D 0.130 0.822*** 1.670*** -0.063 0.456 0.953*** 
 0.194 7.667 29.891 0.034 1.760 7.667 
       
RETSTD -0.664*** -0.755*** -0.742*** -0.231** -0.323*** -0.180 
 38.689 53.991 51.959 4.101 7.946 2.292 
       
Performance -4490.8*** -6921.2*** -5396.9*** -5628.1*** -7561.1*** -7745.6*** 
 17.200 -41.894 25.010 24.236 43.212 46.183 
       
Age -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
 34.440 29.469 28.006 21.052 18.749 16.106 
       
Tenure 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 
 0.002 0.002 0.030 0.249 0.481 0.606 
       
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.09 0.11 0.10 0.15 0.16 0.16 
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N 23,750 23,750 23,750 23,750 
 
23,750 
 
23,750 
The explanatory variables in this table resemble those in Table 4, Column 3 in Linck, Netter, and Young (2008). The dependent variable is board leadership, a log-transformed 
dummy that equals 1 if the CEO and Chairman of the Board are combined and 0 otherwise. Models (1)-(3) are based on logistic regressions without industry fixed effects, models 
(4)-(6) include industry fixed effects. We include year fixed effects in all models. The data are for fiscal years 1993-2006. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level 
respectively. 
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3.4.3 Dividend Policy 
We choose DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Stulz（2006, Table 3, Column 1） as the 
benchmark paper for our analysis of payout policy. DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Stulz（
2006）apply the market value of equity as the size proxy. The dependent variable is a 
dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm pays out dividends and 0 otherwise. The 
regressions are based on logistic models with and without industry fixed effect. We report 
the results in Table 3.8. All results are robust: there were no changes in sign and 
significance of the regressors when different size proxies were used. 
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Table 3.8: Payout Policy-Dividend Dummy 
  
(1) 
Logistic 
 
(2) 
Logistic 
  
(3) 
Logistic 
 
(4) 
Logistic 
Industry FE 
         (5) 
     Logistic  
   Industry FE 
(6) 
Logistic 
Industry FE  
RE/TE 1.120*** 1.229*** 1.394*** 1.045*** 0.985*** 1.214*** 
 73.831 91.419 114.726 56.581 52.267 74.823 
       
TE/TA -7.040*** -6.819*** -9.217*** -4.946*** -4.721*** -6.940*** 
 -1109.875 -1011.415 -1913.596 -452.294 -409.500 -874.909 
       
Profitability 1.608*** 1.168*** 0.818*** 1.320*** 0.785*** 0.491*** 
 211.333 111.596 53.953 117.566 41.197 16.069 
       
Sales growth -0.801*** -0.744*** -0.850*** -0.687*** -0.641*** -0.758*** 
 -335.184 -290.140 -375.478 -212.541 -182.770 -258.087 
       
       
Log(Assets) 0.255***   0.284***   
 1086.849   987.380   
       
Log(Sales)  0.250***   0.320***  
  1092.687   1232.935  
       
Log(Market   0.172***   0.201*** 
Capitalization)   676.817   680.229 
       
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.30 0.30 0.28 0.44 0.45 0.42 
N 24,573 24,573 24,573 24,573 24,573 24,573 
The explanatory variables in this table resemble those in Table 3, Column 1 in DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Stulz (2006). The dependent variable equals 1 if the firm pays out 
dividend and 0 otherwise. Models (1)-(3) are based on logistic regressions without industry fixed effects, models (4)-(6) include industry fixed effects. We include year fixed 
effects in all models. The data are for fiscal years 1993-2006. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively
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3.4.4 Financial Policy 
We examine capital structure (book leverage and market leverage) and cash 
holdings in this section. We investigate both book leverage and market leverage because 
Frank and Goyal (2009) find firm size has different effects on book leverage and market 
leverage. The benchmark paper we select for capital structure is Lemmon, Roberts, and 
Zender (2008), which uses the log of sales as the measure of firm size. The benchmark 
specification for book leverage refers to Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008, Table II, 
Panel A, Column3). We report the results for book leverage in Table 3.9. All firm size 
measures are significant, and the sign is positive when we use total assets and sales, but 
the sign turns out to be negative when we use market value of equity. This change might 
be due to mechanical correlation, as leverage is one minus equity ratio. The other obvious 
change is that the sign and significance of the cash flow volatilities is sensitive if we 
apply different firm size measures. The 𝑅2 is lower for the log of sales in the industry 
fixed effect regressions. 
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Table 3.9: Book Leverage 
 (1) 
Pooled OLS 
 
(2) 
Pooled OLS 
(3) 
Pooled OLS 
(4) 
Industry 
Fixed Effect 
(5) 
Industry 
Fixed Effect 
(6) 
Industry 
Fixed Effect 
Initial book lev. 0.209*** 0.264*** 0.211*** 0.188*** 
 
0.235*** 
 
0.192*** 
 36.46 65.78 36.78 32.95 57.40 33.64 
       
Log(Assets) 0.008***   0.009***   
 11.83   12.71   
       
       
Log(Sales)  0.002***   0.007***  
  4.61   12.14  
       
       
Log(Market Value    -0.001**   -0.002*** 
of Equity)   -2.02   -3.18 
       
       
Market-to-book -0.014*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.019*** -0.015*** -0.016*** 
 -16.92 -20.80 -13.01 -22.99 -25.31 -18.64 
       
Profitability -0.122*** -0.134*** -0.135*** -0.098*** -0.134*** -0.101*** 
 -9.78 -18.26 -10.79 -7.86 -18.24 -8.11 
       
Tangibility 0.040*** 0.088*** 0.048*** 0.091*** 0.120*** 0.085*** 
 7.53 23.00 8.92 12.10 22.74 11.23 
       
Industry median lev. 0.295*** 0.325*** 0.309*** 0.355*** 0.369*** 0.342*** 
 28.31 39.54 29.71 9.35 14.46 8.96 
       
Dividend payer 0.049*** 0.019*** 0.057*** 0.040*** 0.013*** 0.048*** 
 23.21 12.32 27.13 18.41 7.97 22.49 
       
Cash flow vol. 0.127*** -0.108*** 0.047 0.191*** -0.065***    0.097*** 
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 4.18 -7.24 1.56 6.23 -4.46 3.18 
       
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.24 0.23 0.23 0.32 0.27 0.31 
N 25,680 56,590 25,680 25,680 
 
 
56,590              
 
 
25,680 
The explanatory variables in this table resemble those in Table II, Panel A, Column 3 in Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008). The dependent variable is book leverage, defined as 
the ratio of total debt to book assets. Models (1)-(3) are based on pooled OLS regressions without industry fixed effects, models (4)-(6) include industry fixed effects. We include 
year fixed effects in all models. The data are for fiscal years 1993-2006. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
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We refer to Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008, Table II, Panel A, Column 6) 
for the study of market leverage. Results are in Table 3.10. Similar with the results of 
book leverage, the sign of the coefficient of firm size is positive when we use total assets 
and sales, but turns negative when we use market value of equity. In addition, the sign 
and significance of the cash flow volatilities is also sensitive to different size measures. 
The goodness of fit is lower, with a difference of about 0.03-0.04 for the log of sales in 
the industry fixed effect regressions. The coefficient of dividend payer is not significant if 
we use the log of total assets in the pooled OLS regression.    
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Table 3.10: Market Leverage 
 (1) 
Pooled OLS 
 
(2) 
Pooled OLS 
(3) 
Pooled OLS 
(4) 
Industry 
Fixed Effect 
(5) 
Industry 
Fixed Effect 
(6) 
Industry 
Fixed Effect 
Initial market lev. 0.211*** 0.265*** 0.216*** 0.204*** 
 
0.240*** 
 
0.204*** 
 36.49 67.68 37.83 34.77 59.19 35.05 
       
Log(Assets) 0.007***   0.008***   
 10.49   11.02   
       
       
Log(Sales)  0.010***   0.011***  
  19.20   20.86  
       
       
Log(Market Value    -0.017***   -0.018*** 
of Equity)   -24.39   -25.02 
       
       
Market-to-book -0.035*** -0.035*** -0.024*** -0.035*** -0.034*** -0.025*** 
 -41.23 -61.33 -26.27 -41.76 -60.02 -27.94 
       
Profitability -0.380*** -0.286*** -0.387*** -0.341*** -0.275*** -0.328*** 
 -29.68 -39.86 -30.65 -26.64 -38.17 -25.85 
       
Tangibility 0.056*** 0.058*** 0.072*** 0.138*** 0.106*** 0.119*** 
 10.26 15.39 13.34 17.79 20.53 15.49 
       
Industry median lev. 0.343*** 0.393*** 0.364*** 0.564*** 0.540*** 0.514*** 
 32.05 48.27 34.47 14.45 21.51 13.27 
       
Dividend payer 0.030*** -0.001 0.049*** 0.023*** -0.003** 0.042*** 
 14.02 -0.75 23.32 10.55 -2.04       19.41 
       
Cash flow vol. -0.109*** -0.150*** -0.288*** -0.018 -0.138***    -0.219*** 
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 -3.46 -10.23 -9.29 -0.57 -9.53 -6.99 
       
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.39 0.38 0.40 0.45 0.42 0.46 
N 25,680 56,590 25,680 25,680 
 
 
56,590              
 
 
25,680 
The explanatory variables in this table resemble those in Table II, Panel A, Column 6 in Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008). The dependent variable is market leverage, defined 
as total debt/ (total debt market equity). Models (1)-(3) are based on pooled OLS regressions without industry fixed effects, models (4)-(6) include industry fixed effects. We 
include year fixed effects in all models. The data are for fiscal years 1993-2006.  ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
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The analysis for cash holdings is based on Harford, Mansi, and Maxwell (2008, 
Table 3, Column 1), which applies the natural log of total assets as firm size measure and 
the natural log of cash/sales ratio as the dependent variable. We report the results in Table 
3.11. In pooled OLS regressions, only the coefficient of firm size measured by the log of 
sales is significant, while all  firm size coefficients are significant in the industry fixed 
effect model. The sign of firm size is negative if the log of sales is used, consistent with 
the conventional wisdom that small firms have financial constraints, limited access to 
external financing, and higher marginal probability of bankruptcy. But when we use the 
log of assets and the log of market value of equity, the signs are positive in the industry 
fixed effect regressions. The significance of inside ownership, pay sensitivity, and 
institutional ownership is sensitive, especially in the industry fixed effect model. In 
addition, both the sign and the significance of cash flow are sensitive to different size 
measures. We do not observe obvious differences of goodness of fit across the 
regressions. 
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Table 3.11: Cash Holdings 
 (1) 
Pooled OLS 
 
(2) 
Pooled OLS 
(3) 
Pooled OLS 
(4) 
Industry 
Fixed Effect 
(5) 
Industry 
Fixed Effect 
(6) 
Industry 
Fixed Effect 
Gindex -0.063*** -0.067*** -0.063*** -0.065*** -0.068*** -0.064*** 
 -17.10 -18.66 -17.15 -18.97 -19.97 -18.89 
       
Inside Ownership 9.764*** 30.057*** 10.730*** 3.006 18.165*** 4.252* 
 3.69 11.73 4.07 1.27 7.74 1.79 
       
Pay sensitivity 0.042*** 0.085*** 0.044*** 0.031** 0.058*** 0.033** 
 2.58 5.31 2.70 2.09 4.02 2.27 
       
Institutional 0.001* 0.001 0.001* 0.001* 0.001 0.001 
ownership 1.95 1.34 1.95 1.69 1.14 1.60 
       
Log(Assets) 0.011   0.079***   
 1.20   9.00   
       
Log(Sales)  -0.231***   -0.129***  
  -28.35   -14.81  
       
Log(Market Value   -0.000   0.061*** 
of Equity)   -0.01   7.27 
       
Leverage -1.446*** -1.514*** -1.446*** -1.195*** -1.269*** -1.042*** 
 -23.79 -25.38 -22.27 -20.63 -21.97 -16.67 
       
Market-to-book 0.046*** 0.043*** 0.046*** 0.050*** 0.051*** 0.031*** 
 5.66 5.32 5.37 6.79 6.95 3.97 
       
Cash flow 0.007 0.362*** 0.013 -0.271** -0.070 -0.279** 
 0.06 2.96 0.11 -2.38 -0.61 -2.45 
       
Working capital  -1.042*** -1.390*** -1.068*** -0.981*** -1.333*** -1.027*** 
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 -14.82 -20.86 -15.24 -12.77 -17.67 -13.44 
       
CF volatility 6.588*** 5.012*** 6.537*** 4.192*** 3.210*** 4.111*** 
 22.01 16.97 21.87 14.90 11.42 14.62 
       
R&D 9.579*** 8.567*** 9.566*** 6.625*** 6.238*** 6.637*** 
 42.84 38.63 42.75 29.68 27.95 29.69 
       
CapEx -2.286*** -2.632*** -2.303*** -1.907*** -2.225*** -1.959*** 
 -12.55 -14.76 -12.67 -10.81 -12.69 -11.11 
       
Acquisition -1.986*** -2.403*** -1.996*** -2.148*** -2.303*** -2.192*** 
 -14.69 -18.07 -14.79 -17.49 -18.79 -17.85 
       
Dividend indicator -0.370*** -0.259*** -0.365*** -0.410*** -0.307*** -0.403*** 
 -17.97 -12.85 -17.73 -20.89 -15.57 -20.50 
       
Bond indicator -0.199*** 0.114*** -0.185*** -0.183*** 0.070*** -0.167*** 
 -8.36 4.94 -7.71 -8.13 3.12 -7.36 
       
       
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.46 0.48 0.46 0.57 0.58 0.57 
       
N 19,899 19,899 19,899 19,899 19,899 19,899 
The explanatory variables in this table resemble those in Table 3, Column 1 in Harford, Mansi, and Maxwell (2008). The dependent variable is the natural log of cash/sales ratio. 
Models (1)-(3) are based on pooled OLS regressions without industry fixed effects, models (4)-(6) include industry fixed effects. We include year fixed effects in all models. The 
data are for fiscal years 1993-2006. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
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3.4.5 Compensation Policy 
We build on Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006) for vega (the sensitivity of 
managerial compensation to stock volatility) and delta (the sensitivity of managerial 
compensation to stock price, i.e. the pay-performance sensitivity). For vega we use the 
same independent variables as in Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006, Table 3, Panel A, 
Column 2), who apply the log of sales as firm size. We consider industry fixed effect 
because Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006) employ 2-digit SIC control. The empirical 
results are reported in Table 3.12. The sign is positive for different firm size proxies, 
consistent with Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006). The sign and sensitivity are not robust 
for the coefficients of market-to-book ratio and book leverage level. The R-squared does 
not change. 
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Table 3.12: Vega 
 (1) 
Pooled OLS 
 
(2) 
Pooled OLS 
(3) 
Pooled OLS 
(4) 
Industry FE 
(5) 
Industry FE 
(6) 
Industry FE 
Delta 0.071*** 0.073*** 0.070*** 0.067*** 0.067*** 0.066*** 
 64.09 65.19 63.67 60.43 61.23 60.17 
       
Cash Compensation 0.032*** 0.035*** 0.032*** 0.037*** 0.038 *** 0.037*** 
 39.67 42.17 39.71 44.12 45.08 44.44 
       
Log(Assets) 0.021***   0.021***   
 41.00   38.01   
       
Log(Sales)  0.017***   0.020***  
  32.74   34.16  
       
Log(MVE)   0.021***   0.021*** 
   43.40   39.56 
       
Market-to-Book 0.001*** 0.002*** -0.008*** 0.001** 0.001*     -0.008*** 
 2.93 3.04 -14.78 2.15 1.74 -13.69 
       
Book Leverage -0.022*** -0.004 0.003 -0.029***      -0.022*** -0.006 
 -5.23 -1.04 0.63 -6.49 -4.88 -1.29 
       
R&D 0.137*** 0.181*** 0.117*** 0.093*** 0.116*** 0.079*** 
 11.43 14.69 9.78 6.95 8.59 5.91 
       
CAPEX -0.041*** -0.055*** -0.059*** -0.040*** -0.061*** -0.057*** 
 -3.00 -4.05 -4.39 -2.64 -4.06 -3.78 
       
Firm Risk 0.047*** 0.041*** 0.061*** 0.054*** 0.057*** 0.068*** 
 8.43 7.27 10.82 8.59 9.04 10.72 
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Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.41 0.40 0.41         0.46 
 
0.45 
 
0.46 
N 24,638 24,636 24,638 24,638 
 
24,636 
 
24,638 
The explanatory variables in this table resemble those in Table 3, Panel A, Column 2 in Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006). The dependent variable is vega, defined as the dollar 
change in the value of the CEO’s stock and option portfolio for a 1% change in standard deviation of returns. Models (1)-(3) are based on pooled OLS regressions without industry 
fixed effects, models (4)-(6) include industry fixed effects. We include year fixed effects in all models. The data are for fiscal years 1993-2006. ***, **, * denote significance at 
1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
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We refer to Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006, Table 3, Panel A, Column 2) for 
delta and report the results in Table 3.13. The sign of firm size is positive when we apply 
different measures of firm size, indicating that larger firms have larger pay-performance 
sensitivity. The results for other regressors are robust, except for the firm risk. We find 
that the coefficient of firm risk is significant in the OLS regressions, but when we add 
industry fixed effect it is no longer significant, though the sign remains positive. The 
goodness of fit remains the same across different regressions. 
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Table 3.13: Delta 
 (1) 
Pooled OLS 
 
(2) 
Pooled OLS 
(3) 
Pooled OLS 
(4) 
Industry FE 
(5) 
Industry FE 
(6) 
Industry FE 
Vega 2.141*** 2.155*** 2.143*** 2.136*** 2.155*** 2.138*** 
 72.32 74.34 72.09 69.79 71.15 69.73 
       
Tenure 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015 *** 0.015*** 
 36.40 36.37 36.30 35.80 35.77 35.74 
       
Log(Assets) 0.028***   0.026***   
 10.75   8.62   
       
Log(Sales)  0.029***   0.023***  
  11.02   7.57  
       
Log(MVE)   0.027***   0.025*** 
   10.34   8.39 
       
Market-to-Book 0.078*** 0.079*** 0.067*** 0.078*** 0.078***     0.068*** 
 28.61 28.80 22.55 26.58 26.65 21.37 
       
Surplus Cash -0.243*** -0.268*** -0.255*** -0.231*** -0.247*** -0.241*** 
 -5.45 -5.99 -5.70 -4.87 -5.18 -5.08 
       
Book Leverage -0.198*** -0.181*** -0.165*** -0.144***      -0.136*** -0.116*** 
 -8.97 -8.29 -7.60 -5.86 -5.54 -4.77 
       
R&D -0.513*** -0.414*** -0.533*** -0.382*** -0.346*** -0.393*** 
 -7.21 -5.72 -7.50 -4.87 -4.39 -5.02 
       
CAPEX 0.261*** 0.254*** 0.233*** 0.299*** 0.273*** 0.275*** 
 3.66 3.56 3.27 3.66 3.35 3.37 
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Firm Risk 0.179*** 0.186*** 0.188*** 0.042 0.042 0.053 
 5.99 6.21 6.23 1.23 1.21 1.52 
       
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.33 0.33 0.33         0.35 
 
0.35 
 
0.35 
N 24,638 24,636 24,638 24,638 
 
24,636 
 
24,638 
The explanatory variables in this table resemble those in Table 3, Panel A, Column 3 in Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006). The dependent variable is delta, defined as the dollar 
change in the value of the CEO’s stock and option portfolio for a 1% change in stock price. Models (1)-(3) are based on pooled OLS regressions without industry fixed effects, 
models (4)-(6) include industry fixed effects. We include year fixed effects in all models. The data are for fiscal years 1993-2006. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 
10% level respectively. 
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For executive pay level (i.e. total compensation), we refer to Graham, Li, and Qiu 
(2012, Table 4, Panel A, Column 1). Graham, Li, and Qiu (2012) use the log of assets as 
firm size proxy. We report the results in Table 3.14. The sign is positive for different firm 
size measures, consistent with the fact that larger firms lead to higher top-management 
pay levels. The results are robust for the coefficient of stock return, but not for the lagged 
stock return. In addition, the results are robust for lagged ROA, but not for ROA. Thus, 
we should pay special attention to whether we should use lagged terms or current terms 
as asset performance in determining executive pay level.  We also find the significance 
for coefficients of stock return volatility and gender changes slightly across different 
regressions.  We do not observe obvious differences in goodness of fit. 
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Table 3.14: Executive Pay Level 
 (1) 
Pooled OLS 
 
(2) 
Pooled OLS 
(3) 
Pooled OLS 
(4) 
Industry FE 
(5) 
Industry FE 
(6) 
Industry FE 
Lag(logassets) 1.276*** 
  
1.289*** 
   79.14 
  
69.37 
         
Lag(logsales) 
 
1.209*** 
  
1.260*** 
  
 
72.82 
  
66.15 
        
Lag(logmve) 
 
 1.275*** 
 
 1.239*** 
 
 
 78.92 
 
 68.56 
       
Lag(Q) 0.632*** 0.732*** 0.106*** 0.613*** 0.693*** 0.151*** 
 32.17 36.58 5.00 28.84 32.44 6.58 
       
Stock Return 0.592*** 0.542*** 0.654*** 0.576*** 0.543*** 0.636*** 
 13.51 12.16 14.91 12.29 11.50 13.53 
       
Lag(Stock Return) 0.205*** 0.133*** 0.085* 0.111** 0.075 -0.037 
 4.65 2.96 1.93 2.40 1.60 -0.80 
       
ROA -0.477 -0.278 -1.064*** -0.651 -0.744* -1.134*** 
 -1.16 -0.66 -2.58 -1.53 -1.73 -2.66 
       
Lag(ROA) -1.708*** -4.549*** -3.119*** -1.819***      -4.609*** -3.323*** 
 -3.98 -10.39 -7.26 -4.13 -10.35 7.52 
       
Stock Return 0.063*** 0.080*** 0.031*** 0.039*** 0.035*** 0.015* 
Volatility 8.64 10.60 4.35 4.98 4.37 1.87 
       
Lag(Director) 0.911*** 0.923*** 0.883*** 0.844*** 0.899*** 0.811*** 
 13.26 13.19 12.85 12.44 13.14 11.92 
       
Tenure 0.017*** 0.019*** 0.013*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.021*** 
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 5.50 6.04 4.24 7.45 7.51 6.79 
       
CEO 2.958*** 2.926*** 3.008*** 2.978*** 2.927*** 3.019*** 
 37.78 36.70 638.40 38.80 37.81 39.23 
       
Female 0.190* 0.067 0.194* 0.121 0.143 0.119 
 1.91 0.66 1.95 1.22 1.43 1.20 
       
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.40 0.38 0.40         0.45 
 
0.44 
 
0.44 
N 20,046 20,046 20,046 20,046 
 
20,046 
 
20,046 
The explanatory variables in this table resemble those in Table 4, Panel A, Column 1 in Graham, Li, and Qiu (2012). The dependent variable is total executive compensation. 
Models (1)-(3) are based on pooled OLS regressions without industry fixed effects, models (4)-(6) include industry fixed effects. We include year fixed effects in all models. The 
data are for fiscal years 1993-2006. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
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3.4.6 Investment Policy 
We refer to Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006) for the studies of investment policy 
(CAPEX, R&D, and firm risk). For firm size measures, Coles, Daniel, and Naveen 
(2006) use the log of sales. In Table 3.15, we use the R&D (the research and 
development expenditures scaled by assets) as the dependent variable, and the 
independent variables are based on Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006, Table 3, Panel A, 
Column 1). The coefficients of different firm size measures are all significantly negative, 
which means small firms tend to invest in riskier projects, but large, mature firms are less 
involved in risky investments. The results for several regressors are not robust, especially 
for cash compensation and stock return. Another obvious change lies in R-squared, which 
is sharply lower if we use the log of sales. 
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Table 3.15: R&D 
 (1) 
Pooled OLS 
 
(2) 
Pooled OLS 
(3) 
Pooled OLS 
(4) 
Industry FE 
(5) 
Industry FE 
(6) 
Industry FE 
Vega 3.737*** 5.964*** 3.669*** 2.505*** 4.176*** 2.466*** 
 11.38 18.54 11.15 8.35 13.80 8.22 
       
Delta -0.248***     -0.330*** -0.246*** -0.194*** -0.193*** -0.191*** 
 -3.97 -5.76 -3.92 -3.41 -3.60 -3.35 
       
Cash  -2.172*** 1.759*** -2.591*** -0.267 1.772*** -0.502 
Compensation -5.15 6.61 -6.16 -0.68 7.05 -1.28 
       
Log(Assets) -0.006***  
 
-0.006***  
  -25.04  
 
-23.12  
        
Log(Sales) 
 
-0.016*** 
  
-0.015*** 
  
 
-86.31 
  
-74.39 
        
Log(Mkt Value 
  
-0.006*** 
  
-0.005*** 
of Equity) 
  
-23.22 
  
-22.23 
       
MKT-To-Book 0.004*** 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.003** 0.006*** 0.006*** 
 14.37 31.74 21.28 13.29 29.07 19.73 
       
Surplus Cash 0.282*** 0.187*** 0.286*** 0.209*** 0.126*** 0.212*** 
 74.70 65.85 75.42 57.08 44.61 57.72 
       
Sales Growth -0.035*** -0.024*** -0.035*** -0.031***      -0.022*** -0.031*** 
 -23.47 -23.12 -23.47 -22.59 -22.48 -22.51 
       
Stock Return -0.359*** -0.001 -0.288*** -0.278*** -0.000 -0.205*** 
 
-5.79 -1.31 -4.64 -4.93 -0.18 -3.63 
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Book Leverage -0.019*** -0.022*** -0.027*** -0.013*** -0.009*** -0.020*** 
 -9.29 -13.74 -12.98 -6.39 -5.24 -9.66 
       
Tenure -0.001*** -0.001** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001** -0.001** 
 -3.54 -2.00 -3.14 -2.65 -2.23 -2.38 
       
Year Fixed 
Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.33 0.27 0.33         0.46 
 
0.37 
 
0.46 
N 24,518 52,935 24,518 24,518 
 
52,935 
 
24,518 
The explanatory variables in this table resemble those in Table 3, Panel A, Column 1 in Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006). The dependent variable is the research and development 
(R&D) expenditures scaled by assets. Models (1)-(3) are based on pooled OLS regressions without industry fixed effects, models (4)-(6) include industry fixed effects. We include 
year fixed effects in all models. The data are for fiscal years 1993-2006. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
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For the examination of CAPEX (net capital expenditures scaled by assets), we 
refer to Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006, Table 3, Panel B, Column 1). We report the 
results in Table 3.16.  Theoretically, CAPEX corresponds to safer investment policy 
when compared with R&D and leverage, so we have significantly positive coefficients 
for firm size, except that the coefficient is not significant when we use the log of market 
value of equity as the firm size measure in the pooled OLS regressions. In addition, the 
coefficient of stock return becomes insignificant when we employ the log of sales as firm 
size proxy. 
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Table 3.16: CAPEX 
 (1) 
Pooled OLS 
 
(2) 
Pooled OLS 
(3) 
Pooled OLS 
(4) 
Industry FE 
(5) 
Industry FE 
(6) 
Industry FE 
Vega -2.758*** -1.497*** -2.898*** -1.454*** -0.879*** -1.657*** 
 -6.82 -4.37 -7.18 -4.32 -2.9 -4.92 
       
Delta 0.158***     0.249*** 0.149** 0.136** 0.193*** 0.127** 
 2.33 4.55 2.20 2.41 3.99 2.24 
       
Cash  -1.077* -1.315*** -1.498** -0.204 -1.341*** -0.839* 
Compensation -1.84 -2.95 -2.57 -0.41 -3.31 -1.7 
       
Log(Assets) 0.002***  
 
-0.001***  
  6.03  
 
-3.84  
        
Log(Sales) 
 
0.001*** 
  
0.000* 
  
 
5.59*** 
  
-1.95 
        
Log(Market 
Value 
  
0.003*** 
  
0.000 
of Equity) 
  
8.29 
  
0.05 
       
MKT-To-Book 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.002*** 
 6.19 11.04 2.74 6.98 14.67 6.30 
       
Surplus Cash -0.018*** -0.009*** -0.019*** 0.028*** 0.014*** 0.027*** 
 -4.04 -3.4 -4.41 7.15 5.64 7.01 
       
Sales Growth 0.019*** 0.012*** 0.019*** 0.013***      0.010*** 0.013*** 
 10.13 11.43 9.91 8.25 10.72 8.02 
       
Stock Return -0.876*** 0.000 -0.893*** -0.885*** 0.000 -0.876*** 
 
-12.74 -0.89 -13 -15.4 0.17 -15.24 
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Book Leverage -0.003 -0.006*** -0.002 -0.007*** -0.015*** -0.009*** 
 -1.35 -3.9 -0.66 -3.11 -9.97 -3.83 
       
Tenure 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000*** 0.000** 
 5.63 4.40 5.61 2.15 3.38 2.26 
       
Year Fixed 
Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.09 0.08 0.09         0.38 
 
0.29 
 
0.38 
N 14,625 30,819 14,625 14,625 
 
30,819 
 
14,625 
The explanatory variables in this table resemble those in Table 3, Panel B, Column 1 in Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006). The dependent variable is CAPEX, defined as net 
capital expenditure scaled by assets. Models (1)-(3) are based on pooled OLS regressions without industry fixed effects, models (4)-(6) include industry fixed effects. We include 
year fixed effects in all models. The data are for fiscal years 1993-2006. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
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In Table 3.17, we report the results for firm risk (stock return volatility). We use 
the independent variables in Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006, Table 9 Column 1). The 
coefficients of different firm size measures are all significantly negative, indicating small 
firms have high stock return variances. We find that the coefficients are not robust for 
vega, cash compensation, market to book ratio, book leverage, and tenure. These results 
indicate that the choice of firm size is vital in determining firm risk as measured by stock 
return volatility.  
 
138 
 
Table 3.17: Firm Risk 
 (1) 
Pooled OLS 
 
(2) 
Pooled OLS 
(3) 
Pooled OLS 
(4) 
Industry FE 
(5) 
Industry FE 
(6) 
Industry FE 
Lag(Vega) -14.521*** -31.389*** -5.877 -16.621*** -19.674*** -10.005** 
 -3.16 -9.03 -1.31 -4.06 -6.28 -2.51 
       
Lag(Delta) 10.029***     8.551*** 10.042*** 6.931*** 5.312*** 6.993*** 
 11.57 13.61 11.85 8.96 9.42 9.27 
       
Cash  -34.159*** -2.034 -15.928*** -35.654*** -3.129 -18.416*** 
Compensation -6.07 -0.73 -2.91 -6.91 -1.23 -3.67 
       
Log(Assets) -0.136***  
 
-0.136***  
  -40.80  
 
-40.88  
        
Log(Sales) 
 
-0.199*** 
  
-0.197*** 
  
 
-95.79 
  
-95.43 
        
Log(Market 
Value 
  
-0.167*** 
  
-0.167*** 
of Equity) 
  
-52.93 
  
-53.89 
       
MKT-To-Book -0.039*** -0.018*** 0.037*** -0.018*** -0.010*** 0.053*** 
 -12.13 -8.22 10.45 -5.96 -5.15 16.42 
       
R&D 4.009*** 2.563*** 4.003*** 3.528*** 2.452*** 3.475*** 
 52.49 56.75 53.80 45.48 55.13 45.97 
       
CAPEX 0.551*** 0.683*** 0.618*** -0.146      0.172*** -0.105 
 6.04 11.91 6.94 -1.64 3.13 -1.22 
       
Book Leverage -0.016 -0.066*** -0.169*** 0.304*** 0.211*** 0.133*** 
 -0.59 -3.71 -6.30 11.27 12.22 5.07 
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Tenure 0.018*** -0.022*** -0.016*** -0.008 -0.009** -0.006 
 -3.26 -5.92 -2.94 -1.49 -2.49 -1.30 
       
       
Year Fixed 
Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.48 0.50 0.50         0.59 
 
0.60 
 
0.61 
N 22,733 51,335 22,733 22,733 
 
51,335 
 
22,733 
The explanatory variables in this table resemble those in Table 9, Column 1 in Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006). The dependent variable is firm risk, defined as stock return 
volatility. Models (1)-(3) are based on pooled OLS regressions without industry fixed effects, models (4)-(6) include industry fixed effects. We include year fixed effects in all 
models. The data are for fiscal years 1993-2006. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
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3.4.7 Diversification 
We focus on the Herfindahl index and business segments for the studies of 
diversification. We refer to Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006) as the benchmark paper. 
The Herfindahl index is defined as the sum of the square of segment sales divided by the 
square of firm sales. Our choices of explanatory variables resemble those in Coles, 
Daniel, and Naveen (2006, Table 4, Panel A, Column 1). Table 3.18 reports the results. 
The sign of firm size is significantly negative, implying that large firms have high levels 
of diversification, which is consistent with the fact that large firms have better capability 
to diversify revenue concentration across different business segments.  The models with 
industry fixed effect produce robust results, with the exceptions that the coefficient of 
lagged delta becomes insignificant when we use the log of sales, and the coefficient of 
lagged vega becomes significant when we use the log of assets. Besides, the coefficient 
of ROA changes sign for different firm size measures. When it comes to the results of 
OLS regressions without industry fixed effect, in addition to these sensitive variables, we 
find stock return and tenure have changes in the significance of their coefficients.  
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Table 3.18: Herfindahl Index 
 (1) 
Pooled OLS 
(2) 
Pooled OLS 
(3) 
Pooled OLS 
(4) 
Industry FE 
(5) 
Industry FE 
(6) 
Industry FE 
Lag(Vega) -1.607 -6.181*** -1.958 4.151** 1.720 2.949 
 -0.77 -4.07 -0.94 2.22 1.23 1.56 
       
Lag(Delta) 0.490     0.961*** 0.481 -0.975*** -0.182 -1.004*** 
 1.29 3.57 1.26 -2.85 -0.74 -2.91 
       
Cash  -7.562*** -4.727*** -10.721*** -7.397*** -3.308*** -12.249*** 
Compensation -3.04 -4.1 -4.32 -3.22 -3.11 -5.31 
       
Log(Assets) -0.041***  
 
-0.055***  
  -27.90  
 
-37.45  
        
Log(Sales) 
 
-0.040*** 
  
-0.055*** 
  
 
-45.87 
  
-60.93 
        
Log(Market 
Value 
  
-0.037*** 
  
-0.045*** 
of Equity) 
  
-25.65 
  
-32.38 
       
MKT-To-Book 0.033*** 0.021*** 0.048*** 0.043*** 0.025*** 0.059*** 
 21.46 23.06 28.52 27.83 28.50 36.92 
       
ROA -0.163*** 0.066*** -0.121*** -0.280*** 0.064*** -0.235*** 
 -7.45 6.09 -5.48 -13.52 6.24 -11.17 
       
Stock Return -0.208 -0.007*** 0.407 -1.943***      -0.007*** -1.091*** 
 -0.56 -3.65 1.09 -5.77 -3.78 -3.23 
       
Sales Growth 0.073*** 0.040*** 0.069*** 0.050*** 0.020*** 0.045*** 
 
8.38 8.93 7.94 6.35 4.88 5.73 
       
Dividend Cut -0.085*** -0.084*** -0.088*** -0.057*** -0.054*** -0.061*** 
 -19.94 -29.82 -20.70 -14.54 -20.28 -15.39 
       
CEO Turnover 0.004 -0.004 0.004 0.000 -0.003 0.000 
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 0.78 -1.17 0.81 -0.07 -1.15 -0.09 
       
Book Leverage -0.035*** -0.038*** -0.088*** -0.051*** -0.040*** -0.117*** 
 -2.85 -5.57 -7.40 -4.28 -5.93 -9.91 
       
Tenure 0.001** 0.000 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000 0.001*** 
 2.26 0.38 2.63 2.60 1.57 2.93 
       
       
Year Fixed 
Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.12 0.14 0.12         0.31 
 
0.29 
 
0.30 
N 21,966 48,381 21,966 21,966 
 
48,381 
 
21,966 
The explanatory variables in this table resemble those in Table 4, Panel A, Column 1 in Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006). The dependent variable is Herfindahl index, the sum of 
the square of segment sales divided by the square of firm sales. Models (1)-(3) are pooled OLS regressions without industry fixed effects, models (4)-(6) include industry fixed 
effects. All models use year fixed effects. The data are for fiscal years 1993-2006. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
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In addition, we examine the number of operating business segments that also 
capture the diversification. We use the same explanatory variables as in Coles, Daniel, 
and Naveen (2006, Table 4, Panel A, Column 1). The dependent variable is the logarithm 
of the number of business segments. We report the results in Table 3.19. As expected, our 
results show that firm size has a positive effect on the number of business segments. 
When we use different size measures for the regressions with industry fixed effect, the 
coefficients of lagged vega and ROA are not robust.  
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Table 3.19: Business Segments 
 (1) 
Pooled OLS 
 
(2) 
Pooled OLS 
(3) 
Pooled OLS 
(4) 
Industry FE 
(5) 
Industry FE 
(6) 
Industry FE 
Lag(Vega) 0.823 12.910*** 2.471 -11.257** -2.780 -7.935* 
 0.17 3.65 0.51 -2.57 -0.85 -1.79 
       
Lag(Delta) -2.911***     -2.669*** -2.870*** 0.442 -0.275 0.527 
 -3.30 -4.31 -3.24 0.56 -0.48 0.66 
       
Cash  29.203*** 15.485*** 40.089*** 10.659** 7.506*** 24.565*** 
Compensation 5.02 5.76 6.89 1.98 3.00 4.53 
       
Log(Assets) 0.127***  
 
0.164***  
  37.08  
 
48.04  
        
Log(Sales) 
 
0.117*** 
  
0.148*** 
  
 
56.96 
  
70.17 
        
Log(Market 
Value 
  
0.112*** 
  
0.138*** 
of Equity) 
  
33.38 
  
41.87 
       
MKT-To-Book -0.081*** -0.050*** -0.124*** -0.094*** -0.053*** -0.143*** 
 -22.16 -23.86 -31.65 -26.93 -26.31 -38.07 
       
ROA 0.357*** -0.223*** 0.228*** 0.587*** -0.226*** 0.445*** 
 6.98 -8.77 4.42 12.09 -9.30 9.02 
       
Stock Return 0.980 0.012** -0.894 4.620***      0.009** 2.107*** 
 1.16 2.49 -1.05 6.03 2.05 2.73 
       
Sales Growth -0.150*** -0.073*** -0.137*** -0.120*** -0.044*** -0.106*** 
 
-7.37 -7.03 -6.73 -6.52 -4.55 -5.70 
       
Dividend Cut 0.228*** 0.198*** 0.239*** 0.145*** 0.121*** 0.155*** 
 23.07 30.39 24.08 15.85 19.62 16.79 
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CEO Turnover -0.012 0.000 -0.013 0.003 0.004 0.003 
 -1.07 0.03 -1.12 0.34 0.61 0.34 
       
Book Leverage 0.079*** 0.118*** 0.245*** 0.109*** 0.087*** 0.307*** 
 2.79 7.39 8.83 3.95 5.48 11.12 
       
Tenure 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 -0.52 0.68 -1.07 -0.12 -0.43 -0.67 
       
Year Fixed 
Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.18 0.20 0.18         0.35 
 
0.33 
 
0.34 
N 22,395 49,470 22,395 22,395 49,470 
 
22,395 
The explanatory variables in this table resemble those in Table 4, Panel B, Column 1 in Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006). The dependent variable is the logarithm of the number 
of business segments. Models (1)-(3) are pooled OLS regressions without industry fixed effects, models (4)-(6) include industry fixed effects. We include year fixed effects in all 
models. The data are for fiscal years 1993-2006. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
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3.4.8 Corporate Control 
We use Probit specifications to study the mergers and acquisitions and corporate 
control. We cover three topics in this section: propensity to bid, propensity to be a target, 
and poison pill adoption as an antitakeover device. For the propensity to bid, we use the 
bidder dummy as the dependent variable, which is 1 if a firm announces a bid in a 
specific year and 0 otherwise. The explanatory variables resemble those in Harford 
(1999, Table III, Column 1). Harford (1999) uses the log of total assets as the measure of 
firm size. As shown in Table 3.20, the coefficient is significantly positive for each firm 
size measure, which is consistent with the results in Harford (1999). The positive sign of 
firm size implies that large firms tend to announce bids, as these firms have higher 
absolute levels of cash holdings or market capitalization to participate in mergers and 
acquisitions activities. However, we find that the results for other regressors are not 
robust whether industry fixed effects are employed or not: the significance and/or sign 
changes for abnormal returns, noncash working capital, market-to-book ratio, and price-
to-earnings ratio. The main changes reside in the usage of market value of equity. Also 
the R-squared is higher when we employ the market value of equity for the industry fixed 
effect regressions. 
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Table 3.20: Bidder Dummy 
 (1) 
Probit 
(Without  
Industry FE) 
(2) 
Probit 
(Without  
Industry FE) 
(3) 
Probit 
(Without 
Industry FE) 
(4) 
Probit 
Industry Fixed 
Effect  
(5)  
Probit 
 Industry  
Fixed Effect 
(6) 
Probit 
 Industry  
Fixed Effect 
Abnormal return 0.002* 0.002* 0.048** 0.002** 0.002* 0.063*** 
 3.715 2.790 6.244 4.646 3.547 9.718 
       
Sales growth 0.511*** 0.536*** 0.158*** 0.471*** 0.517*** 0.184*** 
 377.885 405.670 9.794 275.482 320.954 12.404 
       
Noncash working  0.407*** 0.179*** -0.018 0.448*** 0.252*** 0.079 
capital 50.6207 10.733 -0.044 41.246 13.894 0.547 
       
Leverage -0.476*** -0.394*** -0.562*** -0.221*** -0.171*** -0.246*** 
 -92.447 -67.331 -53.649 -17.419 10.822 -8.372 
       
Market-to-book 0.115*** 0.113*** 0.005 0.086*** 0.083*** -0.035*** 
 580.212 566.234 0.342 276.339 262.665 -14.780 
       
Price-to-earnings 0.001* -0.000 0.004*** -0.001 -0.001*     0.002*** 
 2.891 -0.001 38.758 2.311 -3.223 9.365 
       
Size(Assets) 0.143***   0.185***   
 697.303   919.980   
       
Size(Sales)  0.114***   0.172***  
  499.812   827.812  
       
Size(MVE)   0.184***   0.220*** 
   503.663   582.113 
       
       
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
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Adjusted R2 0.10 0.09 0.10         0.16 
 
0.16 
 
0.18 
N 49,541 49,541 22,658 49,541 
 
49,541 
 
22,658 
The explanatory variables in this table resemble those in Table III, Column 1 in Harford (1999). The dependent variable is equal to 1 if a firm announces a bid in a certain year and 
0 otherwise. Models (1)-(3) are based on Probit regressions without industry fixed effects, models (4)-(6) include industry fixed effects in Probit regressions. We include year fixed 
effects in all models. The data are for fiscal years 1993-2006. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.  
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For the examination of the propensity to be a target, we use the independent 
variables in Comment and Schwert (1995, Table 3, Column 1). The dependent variable is 
a target dummy, which is 1 if a company is announced as a target of a successful M&A 
deal in a specific year and 0 otherwise. Comment and Schwert (1995) use the log of total 
assets as the measure of firm size. In contrast to Comment and Schwert (1995), in our 
results (Table 3.21) the coefficient is significantly positive for each firm size measure 
across different regressions, suggesting that larger firms are more likely to be targeted in 
M&A. The sign and/or significance change for sales growth and leverage when we use 
the log of sales, regardless of whether the industry fixed effect is used. In addition, the R-
squared is smaller when we use the log of sales. Furthermore, the market-to-book ratio 
becomes insignificant when we use the log of assets. 
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Table 3.21: Target Dummy 
 (1) 
Probit 
(Without  
Industry FE) 
(2) 
Probit 
(Without  
Industry FE) 
(3) 
Probit 
(Without 
Industry FE) 
(4) 
Probit 
(Industry FE)  
(5) 
Probit 
(Industry  FE) 
(6) 
Probit 
 (Industry  FE) 
Poison Pill 0.098** 0.099*** 0.105** 0.1937*** 0.140*** 0.203*** 
 4.391 7.234 4.984 13.116 12.539 14.212 
       
Control share law -0.200*** -0.304*** -0.196*** -0.240*** -0.316*** -0.236*** 
 -11.709 -39.660 -11.168 -12.764 -35.759 -12.263 
       
Business  0.084 -0.058 0.087 0.138 -0.099 0.144 
Combination law 0.501 -0.609 0.545 1.041 -1.559 1.124 
       
Abnormal return 0.074* 0.028 0.065 0.058 0.035 0.049 
 3.515 0.653 2.527 1.593 0.873 1.127 
       
Sales growth -0.197* 0.031 -0.203* -0.250** -0.035 -0.261** 
 -3.589 0.128 -3.780 -5.480 -0.152 -5.875 
       
Noncash working  0.139 0.103 0.156 0.519** 0.475*** 0.511** 
capital 0.597 0.624 0.739 4.823 8.182 4.667 
       
Leverage 0.341** 0.119 0.457*** 0.281* 0.091 0.391** 
 5.350 1.120 9.721 3.208 0.051 6.106 
       
Market-to-book -0.031* -0.042*** -0.089*** -0.027 -0.051*** -0.068*** 
 -2.804 -6.809 -17.834 -1.603 -8.392 -8.554 
       
Price-to-earnings 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002** 0.002*     0.002** 
 1.120 0.323 1.874 4.272 3.565 5.125 
       
Size(Assets) 0.115***   0.088***   
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 44.355   18.953   
       
Size(Sales)  0.079***   0.081***  
  38.007   28.372  
       
Size(MVE)   0.123***   0.097*** 
   53.545   24.980 
       
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.08 0.06 0.08         0.18 
 
0.13 
 
0.18 
N 22,012 37,198 22,012 22,012 
 
37,198 
 
22,012 
The explanatory variables in this table resemble those in Table 3, Column 1 in Comment and Schwert (1995). The dependent variable is equal to 1 if a firm is a target of a 
successful M&A deal in a certain year and 0 otherwise. Models (1)-(3) are based on Probit regressions without industry fixed effects, models (4)-(6) include industry fixed effects 
in Probit regressions. We include year fixed effects in all models. The data are for fiscal years 1993-2006. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
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We also use Comment and Schwert (1995) as the benchmark paper to study 
poison pill adoption as an antitakeover device. The dependent variable is equal to 1 if a 
firm has the poison pill in place in a specific year and 0 otherwise. The independent 
variables resemble those in Comment and Schwert (1995, Table 3, Column 4). In contrast 
to Comment and Schwert (1995), in our results (Table 3.22) the coefficient of each firm 
size measure is significantly negative, suggesting larger firms are less likely to adopt 
poison pill. When the log of sales is used, the sign of the coefficient of share law changes 
from negative to positive. The coefficient of leverage level is only significant in the 
regressions without industry fixed effect when we use the log of assets, and it is also 
significant in the regressions with industry fixed effect when we use the log of sales. The 
usage of log of market value of equity leads to insignificant coefficient of leverage. The 
goodness of fit is lower when we use the log of sales in the industry fixed effect 
regressions. 
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Table 3.22: Poison Pill 
 (1) 
Probit 
(Without  
Industry FE) 
(2) 
Probit 
(Without  
Industry FE) 
(3) 
Probit 
(Without 
Industry FE) 
(4) 
Probit 
(Industry FE)  
(5) 
Probit 
(Industry  FE) 
(6) 
Probit 
 (Industry  FE) 
Control share law -0.032 0.109*** -0.038* -0.065*** 0.068*** -0.072*** 
 -2.414 45.390 -3.401 -7.779 14.961 -9.609 
       
Business  0.421*** 0.617*** 0.419*** 0.338*** 0.558*** 0.333*** 
Combination law 106.171 485.470 105.118 56.611 343.221 54.935 
       
Abnormal return 0.079*** 0.060*** 0.086*** 0.093*** 0.058*** 0.103*** 
 21.740 22.102 25.621 27.965 18.989 34.164 
       
Sales growth -0.209*** -0.204*** -0.200*** -0.231*** -0.243*** -0.219*** 
 -25.330 -42.595 -23.089 -27.111 -55.543 -24.329 
       
Liquidity  -0.079 0.028 -0.103 -0.106 -0.109* -0.124 
 -1.314 0.320 -2.250 -1.521 -3.159 -2.093 
       
Leverage 0.144** 0.011 0.061 0.200*** 0.160*** 0.089 
 6.122 0.068 1.120 9.290 11.884 1.847 
       
Market-to-book -0.091*** -0.090*** -0.053*** -0.094*** -0.086*** -0.049*** 
 -178.796 -271.848 -51.396 -159.641 -212.118 -37.371 
       
Price-to-earnings 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.007***     0.005*** 
 48.948 83.892 41.488 58.399 130.516 49.787 
       
Size(Assets) -0.079***   -0.099***   
 -119.842   -145.089   
       
Size(Sales)  -0.056***   -0.049***  
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  -125.744   -69.445  
       
Size(MVE)   -0.091***   -0.113*** 
   -170.735   -213.785 
       
       
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.05 0.06 0.06         0.19 
 
0.16 
 
0.19 
N 22,012 37,198 22,012 22,012 
 
37,198 
 
22,012 
The explanatory variables in this table resemble those in Table 3, Column 4 in Comment and Schwert (1995). The dependent variable is equal to 1 if a firm applies poison pill in a 
certain year and 0 otherwise. Models (1)-(3) are based on Probit regressions without industry fixed effects, and models (4)-(6) include industry fixed effects in Probit regressions. 
We include year fixed effects in all models. The data are for fiscal years 1993-2006. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 
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3.5 Summary, Guidelines, and Limitations 
We summarize our results in Table 3.23 and Figure 3.3, and hereby provide a 
general guideline to researchers who may use firm size, whether as key variable or 
control variable, in their empirical corporate finance studies. 
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Table 3.23: Summary of Results 
Panel A: Sensitivity of Firm Size Coefficient Based on OLS 
          measures 
field 
Sign Significance 𝑅2 
Assets Sales Mkt Cap Assets Sales Mkt Cap Assets Sales Mkt Cap 
Tobin’s Q + + + <1% <1% <1% 0.22 0.22 0.35 
ROA + + + <1% <1% <1% 0.17 0.17 0.23 
Board Size + + + <1% <1% <1% 0.40 0.40 0.39 
Board Independence + + + <1% <1% <1% 0.24 0.24 0.23 
Board Leadership + + + <1% <1% <1% 0.11 0.10 0.09 
Dividend Payout + + + <1% <1% <1% 0.30 0.30 0.28 
Book Leverage + + - <1% <1% <5% 0.24 0.23 0.23 
Market Leverage + + - <1% <1% <1% 0.39 0.38 0.40 
Cash Holdings + - - >10% <1% >10% 0.46 0.48 0.46 
Vega + + + <1% <1% <1% 0.41 0.40 0.41 
Delta + + + <1% <1% <1% 0.33 0.33 0.33 
Executive Pay Level + + + <1% <1% <1% 0.40 0.38 0.40 
R & D - - - <1% <1% <1% 0.33 0.27 0.33 
Capital Expenditure + + + <1% <1% <1% 0.09 0.08 0.09 
Herfindahl Index - - - <1% <1% <1% 0.12 0.14 0.12 
Business Segments + + + <1% <1% <1% 0.18 0.20 0.18 
Firm Risk - - - <1% <1% <1% 0.48 0.50 0.50 
Bidder + + + <1% <1% <1% 0.10 0.09 0.10 
Target + + + <1% <1% <1% 0.08 0.06 0.08 
Poison Pill - - - <1% <1% <1% 0.05 0.06 0.06 
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Panel B: Sensitivity of Firm Size Coefficient Based on Industry Fixed Effect 
          measures 
field 
Sign Significance 𝑅2 
Assets Sales MktCap Assets Sales MktCap Assets Sales Mkt Cap 
Tobin’s Q + + + <1% <1% <1% 0.28 0.28 0.41 
ROA + + + >10% <1% <1% 0.25 0.26 0.32 
Board Size + + + <1% <1% <1% 0.45 0.46 0.45 
Board Independence + + + <1% <1% <1% 0.32 0.32 0.31 
Board Leadership + + + <1% <1% <1% 0.16 0.16 0.15 
Dividend Payout + + + <1% <1% <1% 0.44 0.45 0.42 
Book Leverage + + - <1% <1% <1% 0.32 0.27 0.31 
Market Leverage + + - <1% <1% <1% 0.45 0.42 0.46 
Cash Holdings + - + <1% <1% <1% 0.57 0.58 0.57 
Vega + + + <1% <1% <1% 0.46 0.45 0.46 
Delta + + + <1% <1% <1% 0.35 0.35 0.35 
Executive Pay Level + + + <1% <1% <1% 0.45 0.44 0.44 
R & D - - - <1% <1% <1% 0.46 0.37 0.46 
Capital Expenditure + + + <1% <1% >10% 0.38 0.29 0.38 
Herfindahl Index - - - <1% <1% <1% 0.31 0.29 0.30 
Business Segments + + + <1% <1% <1% 0.35 0.33 0.34 
Firm Risk - - - <1% <1% <1% 0.59 0.60 0.61 
Bidder + + + <1% <1% <1% 0.16 0.16 0.18 
Target + + + <1% <1% <1% 0.18 0.13 0.18 
Poison Pill - - - <1% <1% <1% 0.19 0.16 0.19 
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Panel C: Sensitivity of Regressor (Other than Firm Size) Coefficient  
methods OLS Regressions Industry Fixed Effect Regressions 
          sensitivity 
 
field 
Sign  
Sensitivity 
Significance sensitivity Sign  
Sensitivity 
Significance sensitivity 
Sign  
changes 
# of  var. Sig. 
Changes 
# of var.  Sign  
changes 
# of  var. Sig. 
Changes 
# of var.  
Tobin’s Q Yes 1 Yes 2 Yes 1 Yes 1 
ROA Yes 2 Yes 1 Yes 2 Yes 1 
Board Size Yes 1 Yes 1 Yes 1 Yes 3 
Board Independence Yes 1 Yes 1 Yes 1 Yes 2 
Board Leadership No 0 Yes 1 Yes 1 Yes 2 
Dividend Payout No 0 No 0 No 0 No 0 
Book Leverage Yes 1 Yes 1 Yes 1 No 0 
Market Leverage Yes 1 Yes 1 Yes 1 Yes 1 
Cash Holdings No 0 Yes 2 No 0 Yes 4 
Vega Yes 2 Yes 1 Yes 1 Yes 2 
Delta No 0 No 0 No 0 No 0 
Executive Pay Level No 0 Yes 3 Yes 1 Yes 3 
R & D Yes 1 Yes 2 Yes 1 Yes 4 
Capital Expenditure Yes 1 Yes 4 Yes 1 Yes 4 
Herfindahl Index Yes 3 Yes 5 Yes 2 Yes 3 
Business Segments Yes 4 Yes 2 Yes 3 Yes 3 
Firm Risk Yes 2 Yes 3 Yes 2 Yes 4 
Bidder Yes 2 Yes 4 Yes 2 Yes 3 
Target Yes 2 Yes 5 Yes 2 Yes 5 
Poison Pill Yes 2 Yes 2 Yes 1 Yes 2 
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Figure 3.3: Maximum Change of R Squared for Alternative Firm Size Measures 
 
Figure 3.3 depicts the maximum change of goodness of fit when we employ different measures of firm size in the regressions for 20 sub-fields in corporate finance. 
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Figure 3.3: Maximum Change of R Squared for Different Size Measures 
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First, in most areas of corporate finance, the coefficients of firm size measures are 
robust in sign and statistical significance. However, when studying firm performance and 
capital structure, researchers should consider empirical sensitivity because market 
capitalization, as a size proxy, can be mechanically correlated with the dependent 
variables. 
Second, the coefficients on regressors other than firm size often change sign and 
significance. We observe sign changes and significance changes (change from significant 
to insignificant) in almost all the areas except dividend policy and delta (Table 3.23). 
Unfortunately, this suggests that some previous studies are not robust to using different 
firm size proxies. Researchers should either use all the important firm size measures as 
robustness checks or provide a rationale of using any specific measure.  
 Third, the goodness of fit measured by R-squared also varies when we use 
different firm size measures (Figure 3.3 and Table 3.23, Panel B). The variation indicates 
that some size measures are more relevant than others in certain areas. In particular, total 
assets seems more relevant for executive compensation, firm diversification, capital 
structure, and investment policy, but not for firm performance and risk; total sales matters 
more for dividend policy, cash holdings, but not for investment, diversification, and 
M&A; market cap increases the goodness of fit more for firm risk, capital structure, 
investment, and M&A, but not for corporate governance. Although a size proxy that 
delivers a higher goodness-of-fit alone cannot justify a good model specification, 
researchers should not ignore abnormal changes in goodness-of-fit. 
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Fourth, in terms of research areas that are robust to size measures, Table 3.23, 
Panel C on Sensitivity of Regressor (Other than Firm Size) Coefficient can serve as 
guidance. The most robust areas are dividend policy, executive compensation, and then 
capital structure, which means the choice of the size measures may not matter much in 
those areas. The least robust areas include M&A and firm diversification, suggesting that 
researchers should select size proxies with consideration for sensitivity tests. 
Fifth, different size proxies capture different aspects of “firm size”, and thus have 
different implications in corporate finance. For example, market cap is more market 
oriented and forward looking, and reflects the ownership of equity only, while total assets 
measures the firm’s total resources. Total sales are more related to product market and 
are not forward looking. The choice of these firm size measures can be a theoretical and 
empirical question. For example, if researchers want to control for the company’s “size” 
in product market, they should use total sales; if they want to control for the size in stock 
market, they should use market cap; if the size refers to the total resources that the 
company can generate profit from, they should use total assets.  
We have some guidelines for future research. . First, we do not employ all 
possible measures of firm size; we only study the most popular three measures. 
Researchers can use some alternative size proxies such as enterprise value (market 
capitalization plus net debt), the number of employees, total profits, or net assets (total 
assets minus total liabilities) when the main measures are not available or irrelevant (e.g., 
market cap for private firms and total sales for start-up firms). Second, we might omit 
some important representative papers in specific sub-fields due to data and time 
constraints. Third, some linear models may lose power if the true relation between firm 
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size and the dependent variable is non-linear (such as quadratic form). Fourth, most of 
our empirical results are based on year fixed effects and/or industry fixed effects, while 
introducing other considerations, such as firm fixed effects (for consideration of within 
firm variations of interest rather than cross-sectional variations) or manager fixed effects 
(for emphasis on corporate governance issues such as managerial compensation), might 
change our results, and result in different implications. For future research, on the one 
hand explicit theories should be refined for the proper usage of different measures of firm 
size; on the other hand, a general role should be developed for empirical justification 
given specific econometric methods.  
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Appendix for Chapter 3 
Appendix 3.1: A survey of 100 empirical corporate finance papers that use firm size 
measures 
Paper Sources by journal: 
Sources # of Articles 
Journal of Financial Economics 50 
Journal of Finance 34 
Review of Financial Studies 8 
Journal of Accounting and Economics 4 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 1 
Journal of Political Economy 1 
 Journal of Accounting Research 1 
The Accounting Review 1 
 
 By field: 
 
              
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Sources # of Articles 
Mergers and Acquisitions 13 
Cash Holdings 12 
Executive Compensation 12 
Ownership Structure 11 
Capital Structure 9 
Board of Directors 8 
Law and Finance 7 
Dividend Policy 6 
Corporate Investment 6 
CEO Turnover 6 
Debt Policy 5 
Cross Listings 5 
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Chapter 4  
4 Impact: Evidence from Top Journals  
4.1 Introduction 
Publishing papers in refereed journals plays a vital role in academia, as the 
“publish or perish” rule gives the true portrayal for tenure promotion in this profession. 
For finance faculty, publications in the top finance journals are justified to boost annual 
salary and promotion, and even full professors continue to obtain returns in thousands of 
dollars for publications in the top finance journals (Swidler and Goldreyer, 1998). In 
addition to the importance of publication records, the number of citations has received 
more and more attention. It is often used, particularly in research universities, to assess 
scholars’ research impact, and thus, their career. The increasing focus on research impact 
triggers the development of online Google Scholar Citations which can readily keep track 
of paper citations. However, the top 1% (10%) papers in the leading finance journals 
have received 1/3 (3/4) of the total number of citations (Chung, Cox, and Mitchell, 2001).  
This phenomenon indicates the value of a paper depends on both journal placement and 
research impact. To our knowledge, the literature has not fully answered the questions of 
how paper characteristics change over time, how paper characteristics differ between 
more influential papers and less influential papers, and what are the factors that affect the 
citations of the published papers in top finance journals. We aim to fill these holes in the 
literature and provide evidence for finance scholars, university administrators, and 
journal management who care about research impact. 
The existing finance literature studies some relevant research topics. Ederington 
(1979) investigates how paper length, co-authorship, and top institutions affect the 
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number of citations for 345 papers published in the Journal of Finance and Journal of 
Financial Quantitative Analysis for the period 1968-1971. Schwert (1993) sheds light on 
the determinants of citations such as paper age, paper length, and paper order in the 
journal issue for the papers published in Journal of Financial Economics during 1974-
1991. Borokhovich, Bricker, and Simkins (2000) document evidence that the research 
impact of Journal of Finance, Journal of Financial Economics and Review of Financial 
Studies 
27does not depend on the “hot” topics or fads. Pinkowitz (2002) studies the 
number of downloads of online papers in the Journal of Finance website. Kim, Morse, 
and Zingales (2009) examine the effect of being affiliated with a top 25 university on 
citations for finance faculty and find that this positive effect weakens with time (from the 
1970s to the 1990s) because of the reduced importance of physical access to coauthors. 
Brogaard, Engelberg, and Parsons (2014) explore the role of editor rotations and show 
evidence that “connected” papers in the top three finance journals receive higher Web of 
Science citations, but this effect is less robust with school fixed effects or author fixed 
effects. They also find that editorial networks in one of the top three finance journals do 
not affect the number of publications in the other two competing journals. Michayluk and 
Zurbruegg (2014) highlight the importance of being the lead papers as a signal of higher 
quality in the top four finance journals.
 
 
However, all of these previous studies in citations in finance literature only cover 
a few independent variables, with the lack of a comprehensive construction of impact 
                                                 
27
 We denote Journal of Finance, Journal of Financial Economics, and Review of Financial Studies as the 
top three finance journals hereinafter. Similarly, we denote Journal of Finance, Journal of Financial 
Economics, Review of Financial Studies, and Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis as the top four 
finance journals hereinafter. Such journal rankings are consistent with Oltheten, Theoharakis, and Travlos 
(2005), Chen and Huang (2007), Currie and Pandher (2011), and Chan, Chang, and Chang (2013). 
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drivers of financial research. Following the framework of Stremersch, Verniers, and 
Verhoef (2007), who study the research impact in marketing literature, we use the most 
extensive set of paper characteristics as determinants of citations to explore the roles of 
three theoretical perspectives: the universalist perspective (what is said), the social 
constructivist perspective (who says it), and the presentation perspective (how it is said). 
For each theoretical perspective, we consider several dimensions - the universalist 
perspective includes quality and domain, the social construction perspective includes 
visibility and personal promotion, the presentation perspective includes first-page 
attention and expositional clarity.
28
  
We study the characteristics of all the published papers in the top three finance 
journals during 2000-2013 and how these paper characteristics affect the number of 
citations in Google Scholar and Web of Science. First, we find that most of the measures 
of paper characteristics in the social constructivist perspective (visibility and personal 
promotion) and the presentation perspective (first-page attention and expositional clarity) 
increase over time, while most of the paper characteristics in the universalist perspective 
(quality and domain) remain constant. Second, most of the paper characteristics are 
significantly different between the top 10% and the bottom 10% groups based on the 
number of citations per year. Third, the regression results by negative binomial models 
show that the universalist perspective, the social constructivist perspective, and the 
presentation perspective all provide impact drivers of published papers in the top three 
finance journals. Specifically, paper quality, research methods, journal placement, and 
                                                 
28
 We modify the dimensions of the three theoretical perspectives in Stremersch, Verniers, and Verhoef 
(2007) considering the distinctiveness of the financial research. The measures in these dimensions are 
defined in Appendix 1.  
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paper age are the most important (in economic significance) drivers for the number of 
citations. These results are robust to redefined citation measures, alternative econometric 
specifications, heteroskedasticity adjustment, and winsorized sample. Furthermore, the 
results of average marginal results document exact evidence in how many additional 
citations are increased with one more unit of a certain paper characteristics. 
Last, different drivers play different roles for the papers in Journal of Finance, 
Journal of Financial Economics, and Review of Financial Studies. For example, 
theoretical papers in Journal of Financial Economics and Review of Financial Studies  
receive significantly fewer citations than empirical papers but this relation is insignificant 
for papers in Journal of Finance; larger number of pages significantly contributes to the 
number of citations of papers in Journal of Finance, but not in Journal of Financial 
Economics or Review of Financial Studies (in Table 7 and 8).  
This paper provides empirical evidence for finance scholars, university 
administrators, and finance journal management who care about research impact. For 
example, the results are useful in assessing and supporting financial research. One 
possible application is that universities should put more emphasis on travelling 
awards/subsidies for conferences than direct research funding in terms of support 
according to our empirical analysis. 
This chapter is organized as follows: Section 4.2 presents the theory and 
hypothesis, Section 4.3 describes the data, Section 4.4 discusses the model and the main 
results, Section 4.5 provides robustness checks, Sections 4.6 shows the average marginal 
effects of the negative binomial models, and Section 4.7 concludes.  
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4.2 Theory and Hypothesis 
We follow the theoretical framework in Stremersch, Verniers, and Verhoef 
(2007). They highlight three theoretical perspectives for citations in marketing: the 
universalist perspective –quality and domain (what is said), the social constructivist 
perspective – visibility and personal promotion (who says it), and the presentation 
perspective – title length, attention grabbers, and expositional clarity (how it is said).  
Stremersch, Verniers, and Verhoef (2007) provide explanations for the three 
perspectives: The universalist perspective is that “what” the authors say drives the 
citations of papers. Baldi (1998) argues that the reward structure of research is 
determined by cognitive content. Therefore, paper characteristics such as the cognitive 
dimension should be strongly related to research impact (Van Dalen and Henkens 
(2001)). The social constructivist perspective is that “who” the authors are affect the 
citations of papers. For example, Matthew effect in science (Merton (1968)) can promote 
visibility and more references can improve reciprocity in citations (Ciadini, 1988). The 
presentation perspective claims that “how” the authors present their research also 
determines research impact, for instance, the title of a paper matters since it enhances the 
informativeness while perhaps it also increases the complexity thereby reducing 
attractiveness of the paper (Yitzhaki, 2002).  
We discern similar theoretical construction and modify the measures given the 
uniqueness of the finance field. The univeralist perspective denotes the influences of 
“what” the authors say on the number of citations, and Stremersch, Verniers, and Verhoef 
(2007) divide it into two dimensions: quality and domain. We also employ these two 
dimensions. Papers of high quality can capture the strength of the contributions, and thus 
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can receive larger number of citations. We use five measures to quantify quality: the 
number of authors from the top 20 finance departments
29
, the number of pages, paper 
order in a journal issue, whether a paper is the lead paper, and working-paper age. 
Authors from the top 20 finance departments on average have better publication records, 
better resources, and better training, which can represent paper quality to an extent. 
Although it is also related to the Matthew effect (Merton (1968)), we believe it is a good 
measure of paper quality. The number of pages are managed to be consistent with the 
magnitude of research contribution according to potential impact-to-page ratio.. Order 
placement and the lead article can be an indicator of contribution judged by an editor, and 
a signal of quality, even though electronic journal access may make paper order less 
relevant (Michayluk and Zurbruegg, 2014). We expect paper order has negative effect 
and lead paper has positive effect on the number of citations. Laband and Piette (1994) 
provide evidence that paper length and lead paper positively affect the number of 
citations to papers in 28 top economics journals. The working paper age is our novel 
measure, defined as the year difference between the first appearance on the web and 
publication. First, working paper age measures the quality improvement from R&R 
(Revise and Re-submit), which implies a positive effect on the number of citations. 
Second, large working paper age might be just the result of pecking order in journal 
submission. For example, it may capture the waiting time for the decisions by the top 
economics journals such as American Economics Review. Third, lower-quality papers 
                                                 
29
 We provide the top 20 world ranking of finance department in Appendix 4.1. Stremersch, Verniers, and 
Verhoef (2007) use the business school ranking as a measure of visibility (due to the Matthew effect) in the 
social constructivist perspective, while we think the research rankings of finance departments is more 
relevant to quality in the universalist perspective. 
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with large working paper age and several rejections from other journals may find lucky 
placement in one of the top three finance journals, and thus indicate a negative effect on 
the number of citations. Altogether, the net effect of working paper age is an empirical 
question. We are aware that many papers were not uploaded to SSRN or linked to 
conference/seminar websites until the authors think the papers are ready to be exposed to 
others, so the working paper age might not be exactly accurate, however, we can consider 
that working papers with very limited access are not finished papers to some degree. 
As for domain, we use only one measure: methods
30
. If the paper is purely 
theoretical, then the methods dummy equals 1; if the paper is purely empirical, then the 
methods dummy equals 0; if mixed methods are used, then the methods dummy is 0.5. 
Empirical papers may present better readability and may be more realistic and practical. 
Theoretical papers are more likely to be milestones as benchmarks and inspirations, and 
thus might receive broader citations. Therefore, the net effect of research methods is also 
an empirical question.  
Hypothesis 1A (The Universalist Perspective): As indicators of quality, the 
number of authors from the top 20 finance departments, the number of pages, and 
whether the paper is the lead paper positively affect the number of citations; paper order 
in a journal issue negatively affects the number of citations;  
                                                 
30
 We do not use the subject area in finance as a measure of domain because existing papers show that 
subfield topics in finance have no significant impact on the number of citations to the papers in the top 
three finance journals. For example, Table 8 in Schwert (1993) documents evidence that the papers in the 
capital markets area and the corporate finance and governance area are not significantly different in average 
citations per year. Borokhovich, Bricker, and Simkins (2000) find that the impact factors of the top three 
finance journals are not affected by the distribution of papers across subfields in finance. 
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Hypothesis 1B (The Universalist Perspective): Working paper age positively 
affects the number of citations due to improvement in quality during the R&R process. 
Hypothesis 1C (The Universalist Perspective): Working paper age negatively 
affects the number of citations due to lucky placement after rejections from other similar 
journals. 
Hypothesis 1D (The Universalist Perspective): Research methods positively 
affect the number of citations because theoretical papers are more likely to be milestones 
as benchmarks and inspiration. 
Hypothesis 1E (The Universalist Perspective): Research methods negatively 
affect the number of citations because empirical papers may present better readability 
and may be more realistic and practical. 
The second theoretical perspective - the social constructivist perspective refers to 
the fact that “who” the authors of the papers are has influence over the research impact. 
Following Stremersch, Verniers, and Verhoef (2007), we also explore two dimensions in 
this perspective: visibility and personal promotion. For visibility, we use seven measures: 
the number of authors; whether the authors are from the same school (internal 
collaboration); whether the paper has received financial support; the number of 
acknowledgements; the number of conferences; the number of seminars; and the number 
of research assistants (RAs). More authors may have different opportunities for paper 
presentations. Authors from different schools can promote the dissemination of the idea. 
Financial support indicates not only better resources, but also the visibility for expert 
reviewers during the evaluation process. The number of acknowledgements presents the 
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constructive feedback for the paper. The number of conferences and the number of 
seminars also imply the visibility of a working paper. The RAs can also increase 
visibility, as many RAs are doctorate students who are or will be research active in 
academia. The number of RAs reflects the author’s resources and networks. All measures 
should have positive effects on the number of citations except for internal collaboration 
(a variable that equals 1 if all of the authors are from the same school, 0 if none of the 
authors are from the same school, and 0.5 if some of the authors are from the same 
school). Thus, internal collaboration is a reverse-scored measure for which lower value is 
assigned to external collaboration. We postulate that external collaboration can expand 
external visibility in different schools and accelerate the marketing of the paper, and thus 
may increase the number of citations. 
We use the number of references
31
 to proxy for “personal promotion”. If one 
paper is unnoticed, a follow-up paper that cites the original paper can bring renewed 
interest in the original topic. In addition, researchers may feel indebted to others who cite 
their papers, and perhaps return the citation (Stremersch, Verniers, and Verhoef, 2007). 
This reciprocity implies “Others cite me, I cite others.” Thus, the number of references 
may have a positive effect on the number of citations.  
                                                 
31
 We do not use any measure for editorial networks as the dark side. Laband and Piette (1994) find that 
editorial networks serve to enhance efficiency (say identify a good paper as a lead paper) through 
professional connections rather than choose low-quality papers. This means the role of editorial networks in 
the number of citations can be substituted in the quality dimension. In addition, the authors from top 
finance departments are more likely to be selected as editors because of their good publication records: this 
effect can also be captured in the quality dimension. In a more recent paper, Brogaard, Engelberg, and 
Parsons (2014) show evidence that “connected” papers in the top three finance journals receive higher Web 
of Science citations, but this effect is not robust with school fixed effects. They also find that editorial 
networks in one of the top three finance journals do not affect the number of publications in the other two 
competing journals.  
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Hypothesis 2A (The Social Constructivist Perspective): As indicators of 
visibility, the number of authors, whether the paper has received financial support, the 
number of acknowledgements, the number of conferences, the number of seminars, and 
the number of RAs positively affect the number of citations; whether the authors are from 
the same school (internal collaboration) negatively affects the number of citations.  
Hypothesis 2B (The Social Constructivist Perspective): As an indicator of 
personal promotion, the number of references positively affects the number of citations.  
The last theoretical perspective - the presentation perspective is that published 
papers receive citations based on “how” the authors write the paper. Stremersch, 
Verniers, and Verhoef (2007) explore three dimensions for this perspective: title length, 
attention grabbers, and expositional clarity.  However, we believe some attention 
grabbers (for example, the word “new” in the title) might affect the readers’ interest and 
the number of downloads, but cannot affect the number of citations. Moreover, the 
hypothesis of attention grabbers is not confirmed by the empirical results in Stremersch, 
Verniers, and Verhoef (2007). Thus we extend the title-length dimension to construct the 
“first-page attention” dimension and omit the attention-grabbers dimension by 
incorporating the number of key words and the number of codes into the “first-page 
attention” dimension. We employ five measures to capture the “first-page attention”: the 
title length, whether the paper uses a subtitle, the length of abstract, the number of key 
words, and the number of codes (JEL classifications), where the number of key words 
and the number of codes are only available for papers in Journal of Financial Economics. 
The title length has both positive effect (more informative) and negative effect (more 
complex) on the number of citations (Yitzhaki, 2002). For current requirements of all of 
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the top three finance journals, an abstract should be 100 words or less. Similarly, whether 
the paper uses a subtitle and abstract length also exhibit such pros and cons, and therefore 
it is an empirical question. The number of key words and the number of codes are 
attention grabbers because they can increase the probability that the paper can be 
searched out in the databases through key words and JEL code classifications and can be 
cited by papers in different subject areas. Thus, the number of key words and the number 
of codes should have positive effects on the number of citations.  
In the expositional clarity dimension, we use four measures: the number of 
tables
32
, the number of pictures, the number of footnotes, and whether the paper has the 
appendix part. On the one hand, we think tables, pictures, footnotes, and appendix can 
improve the clarity of the paper, and thus we argue that these measures may have positive 
influences on the number of citations. On the other hand, too many of these components 
may negatively affect the clarity, which is similar to the issue of title length mentioned 
previously (Yitzhaki, 2002). For example, we believe too many footnotes may cause 
distraction. In addition, Stremersch, Verniers, and Verhoef (2007) argue that the number 
of equations or footnotes may be context dependent. For example, more equations may 
add more value for mathematicians’ research. So, the net effects of these four measures 
are theoretically ambiguous.  
                                                 
32
 The number of tables is positively related to the number of pages, and thus the number of tables can also 
capture the quality of a paper to some degree as more tables may be allocated in a long paper with 
potentially higher impact-to-page ratio. We are aware about this point but considering the presentational 
nature of tables, we categorize tables with pictures, footnotes, and appendix together in the expositional 
clarity dimension. 
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Hypothesis 3A (The Presentation Perspective): The title length, whether the 
paper uses a subtitle, abstract length, the number of tables, the number of pictures, the 
number of footnotes, and whether the paper has the appendix part positively affect the 
number of citations because these characteristics cause papers to be more informative 
with clarity. 
Hypothesis 3B (The Presentation Perspective): The title length, whether the 
paper uses a subtitle, abstract length, the number of tables, the number of pictures, the 
number of footnotes, and whether the paper has the appendix part negatively affect the 
number of citations because these characteristics cause papers to be more complex and 
scatted details may cause distraction. 
Hypothesis 3C (The Presentation Perspective): The number of key words and the 
number of codes positively affects the number of citations because they indicate the 
number of research areas and can increase the probability that the paper can be 
searched out. 
4.3 The Data 
In previous studies, Keloharju (2008) uses citation data from Google Scholar; 
Kim, Morse, and Zingales (2009), and Brogaard, Engelberg, and Parsons (2014) employ 
Thomson Reuters’ ISI Web of Science as the data source. While the citations in Web of 
Science are more concentrated in peer-reviewed journals and thus are more 
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professional
33
, Google Scholar expanded the citation sources to working papers and 
forthcoming papers. Since both Google Scholar and Web of Science have pros and cons, 
we use both data sources. The citation data were collected in the last quarter of 2014 for 
all the published papers in the top three finance journals during 2000-2013. We have 
3,365 papers in our sample, of which 1,108 papers are in Journal of Finance, 1,284 
papers in Journal of Financial Economics, and 973 papers in Review of Financial 
Studies. We manually collected all the characteristics of these papers. All variables are 
defined in Appendix 4.2 with detailed descriptions.   
To identify the most influential papers in our sample, we generate the ranking for 
top 50 most-cited papers in Google Scholar in Table 4.1. In Panel A, we provide the 
ranking based on the total number of citations. This ranking is not corrected for time as 
we want to find out the influential papers based on cumulative impact. Among these 50 
papers, 28 papers (56%) are in Journal of Finance, 17 (34%) papers are Journal of 
Financial Economics, and 5 papers (10%) are in Review of Financial Studies. It is 
interesting that only 3 papers (6%) in this ranking were published after 2008 in our 2000-
2013 sample period, and all of these three papers are in Review of Financial Studies. 42 
papers (84%) in this ranking are also in the ranking of the top 50 most-cited papers in 
Web of Science (also shown in Table 4.1 Panel A), and this comparison justifies the 
objectiveness and accuracy of the cumulative research impact of “star” papers.  
                                                 
33
 The ISI Web of Science database covers more than 12,000 journals. The number of citations is based on 
all these journals.  
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Table 4.1 Panel B provides the ranking based on the annualized number of 
citations (total number of citations divided by paper age). This can partially remove the 
cumulative effects. 22 (44% of 50) papers are in Journal of Finance, 20 Papers (40%) are 
in Journal of Financial Economics, and 8 papers (16%) are in Review of Financial 
Studies. 36 papers (72%) in this ranking also appear in the comparable ranking for Web of 
Science. This proportion is smaller than that in Table 4.1 Panel A because Google 
Scholar has broader citation sources; therefore, the total number of citations in Web of 
Science to newer papers is much smaller than in Google Scholar. The calculation for 
annualized number of citations is more sensitive for Web of Science. 
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Table 4.1: The Top 50 Most-Cited Papers in the Top Three Finance Journals: 2000-2013 
Panel A: Ranking Based on the Total Number of Citations 
GS 
Rank  
WOS 
Rank  
Authors Title Year Journal 
1 2 La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, 
F., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. 
Investor protection and corporate governance 2000 JFE 
2 1 Petersen, M.A. Estimating standard errors in finance panel data sets: comparing 
approaches 
2009 RFS 
3 3 Claessens, S., Djankov, S. and 
Lang, L.H. 
The separation of ownership and control in East Asian corporations 2000 JFE 
4 7 Graham, J.R. and Harvey, C.R. The theory and practice of corporate finance: evidence from the field  2001 JFE 
5 4 La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, 
F., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. 
Investor protection and corporate valuation 2002 JF 
6 5 Claessens, S., Djankov, S., Fan, 
J.P. and Lang, L.H. 
Disentangling the incentive and entrenchment effects of large 
shareholdings 
2002 JF 
7 8 Anderson, R.C. and Reeb, D.M. Founding-family ownership and firm performance: evidence from the 
S&P 500 
2003 JF 
8 11 Beck, T., Levine, R. and Loayza, 
N. 
Finance and the sources of growth 2000 JFE 
9 9 Forbes, K.J. and Rigobon, R. No contagion, only Interdependence: measuring stock market 
comovements 
2002 JF 
10 10 Faccio, M. and Lang, L.H. The ultimate ownership of Western European corporations 2002 JFE 
11 13 Dyck, A. and Zingales, L. Private benefits of control: an international comparison 2004 JF 
12 6 Longstaff, F.A. and Schwartz, 
E.S. 
Valuing American options by simulation: a simple least-squares 
approach 
2001 RFS 
13 29 Baker, M. and Wurgler, J. Market timing and capital structure 2002 JF 
14 14 Leuz, C., Nanda, D. and Wysocki, 
P.D. 
Earnings management and investor protection: an international 
comparison 
2003 JFE 
15 22 La Porta, R., Lopez‐de‐Silanes, 
F., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R.W. 
Agency problems and dividend policies around the world 2000 JF 
16 33 Fama, E.F. and French, K.R. Testing trade‐off and pecking order predictions about dividends and 
debt 
2002 RFS 
17 12 Rajan, R.G. and Zingales, L. The great reversals: the politics of financial development in the 
twentieth century 
2003 JFE 
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18 40 Brunnermeier, M.K. and 
Pedersen, L.H. 
Market liquidity and funding liquidity 2009 RFS 
19 15 Barber, B.M. and Odean, T. Trading is hazardous to your wealth: the common stock investment 
performance of individual investors 
2000 JF 
20 30 Ritter, J.R. and Welch, I. A review of IPO activity, pricing, and allocations 2002 JF 
21 38 Fama, E.F. and French, K.R. Disappearing dividends: changing firm characteristics or lower 
propensity to pay?  
2001 JFE 
22 16 Campbell, J.Y., Lettau, M., 
Malkiel, B.G. and Xu, Y. 
Have individual stocks become more volatile? An empirical exploration 
of idiosyncratic risk 
2001 JF 
23 73 Acharya, V.V. and Pedersen, L.H. Asset pricing with liquidity risk 2005 JFE 
24 24 Bansal, R. and Yaron, A. Risks for the long run: a potential resolution of asset pricing puzzles 2004 JF 
25 81 Bebchuk, L., Cohen, A. and 
Ferrell, A. 
What matters in corporate governance? 2009 RFS 
26 25 Longin, F. and Solnik, B. Extreme correlation of international equity markets 2001 JF 
27 21 Easley, D. and O'hara, M. Information and the cost of capital 2004 JF 
28 20 Dai, Q. and Singleton, K.J. Specification analysis of affine term structure models 2000 JF 
29 34 La Porta, R., Lopez‐de‐Silanes, F. 
and Shleifer, A. 
Government ownership of banks 2002 JF 
30 50 Allen, F., Qian, J. and Qian, M. Law, finance, and economic growth in China 2005 JFE 
31 37 Jegadeesh, N. and Titman, S. Profitability of momentum strategies: an evaluation of alternative 
explanations 
2001 JF 
32 19 Villalonga, B. and Amit, R. How do family ownership, control and management affect firm value? 2006 JFE 
33 71 Booth, L., Aivazian, V., 
Demirguc‐Kunt, A. and 
Maksimovic, V. 
Capital structures in developing countries 2001 JF 
34 41 Hirshleifer, D. Investor psychology and asset pricing 2001 JF 
35 26 Porta, R., Lopez‐de‐Silanes, F. 
and Shleifer, A. 
What works in securities laws? 2006 JF 
36 31 Hong, H., Lim, T. and Stein, J.C. Bad news travels slowly: size, analyst coverage, and the profitability of 
momentum strategies 
2000 JF 
37 23 Andersen, T.G., Bollerslev, T., 
Diebold, F.X. and Ebens, H. 
The distribution of realized stock return volatility 2001 JFE 
38 52 Malmendier, U. and Tate, G. CEO overconfidence and corporate investment 2005 JF 
39 36 Bekaert, G. and Harvey, C.R. Foreign speculators and emerging equity markets 2000 JF 
40 42 Ang, A., Hodrick, R.J., Xing, Y. The cross‐section of volatility and expected returns 2006 JF 
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and Zhang, X. 
41 51 Baker, M. and Wurgler, J. Investor sentiment and the cross-section of stock returns 2006 JF 
42 48 Hellmann, T. and Puri, M. Venture capital and the professionalization of start-up firms: empirical 
evidence 
2002 JF 
43 17 Morck, R., Yeung, B. and Yu, W. The information content of stock markets: why do emerging markets 
have synchronous stock price movements? 
2000 JFE 
44 39 Djankov, S., La Porta, R., Lopez-
de-Silanes, F. and Shleifer, A. 
The law and economics of self-dealing 2008 JFE 
45 18 Khanna, T. and Palepu, K. Is group affiliation profitable in emerging markets? An analysis of 
diversified Indian business groups 
2000 JF 
46 43 Wurgler, J. Financial markets and the allocation of capital 2000 JFE 
47 62 Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R.W. Stock market driven acquisitions 2003 JFE 
48 57 Almeida, H., Campello, M. and 
Weisbach, M.S. 
The cash flow sensitivity of cash 2004 JF 
49 74 Bekaert, G., Harvey, C.R. and 
Lundblad, C. 
Does financial liberalization spur growth? 2005 JFE 
50 45 Harvey, C.R. and Siddique, A. Conditional skewness in asset pricing tests 2000 JF 
Table 4.1 Panel A provides the list of the top 50 most-cited published papers in the top 3 finance journals during 2000-2013 based on the total number of 
citations in Google Scholar. The GS Rank represents the Google Scholar rank; we also provide the Web of Science rank as WOS Rank for comparison. Year 
denotes the Publication Year. 
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Panel B: Ranking Based on the Number of Citations per Year 
GS 
p.a. 
Rank 
WOS 
p.a. 
Rank 
Authors Title Year Journal 
1 1 Petersen, M.A. Estimating standard errors in finance panel data sets: comparing 
approaches 2009 RFS 
2 2 La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, 
F., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. Investor protection and corporate governance 2000 JFE 
3 3 Brunnermeier, M.K. and 
Pedersen, L.H. Market liquidity and funding liquidity 2009 RFS 
4 19 Bebchuk, L., Cohen, A. and 
Ferrell, A. What matters in corporate governance? 2009 RFS 
5 4 Claessens, S., Djankov, S. and 
Lang, L.H. The separation of ownership and control in East Asian Corporations 2000 JFE 
6 6 La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, 
F., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. Investor protection and corporate valuation 2002 JF 
7 14 Graham, J.R. and Harvey, C.R. 
The theory and practice of corporate finance: evidence from the field 2001 JFE 
8 109 Gorton, G. and Metrick, A. 
Securitized banking and the run on repo 2012 JFE 
9 8 Anderson, R.C. and Reeb, D.M. Founding-family ownership and firm performance: evidence from the 
S&P 500 2003 JF 
10 9 Djankov, S., La Porta, R., Lopez-
de-Silanes, F. and Shleifer, A. The law and economics of self-dealing 2008 JFE 
11 11 Dyck, A. and Zingales, L. 
Private benefits of control: an international comparison 2004 JF 
12 7 Claessens, S., Djankov, S., Fan, 
J.P. and Lang, L.H. 
Disentangling the incentive and entrenchment effects of large 
shareholdings  2002 JF 
13 83 Asness, C.S., Moskowitz, T.J. and 
Pedersen, L.H. Value and momentum everywhere 2013 JF 
14 16 Forbes, K.J. and Rigobon, R. No contagion, only Interdependence: measuring stock market 
comovements  2002 JF 
15 124 Demyanyk, Y. and Van Hemert, 
O. Understanding the subprime mortgage crisis 2011 RFS 
16 18 Faccio, M. and Lang, L.H. 
The ultimate ownership of Western European corporations 2002 JFE 
17 17 Leuz, C., Nanda, D. and Wysocki, 
P.D. 
Earnings management and investor protection: an international 
comparison 2003 JFE 
18 36 Barber, B.M. and Odean, T. All that glitters: the effect of attention and news on the buying behavior 
of individual and institutional investors 2008 RFS 
19 10 Villalonga, B. and Amit, R. 
How do family ownership, control and management affect firm value? 2006 JFE 
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20 12 Porta, R., Lopez‐de‐Silanes, F. 
and Shleifer, A. What works in securities laws? 2006 JF 
21 59 Acharya, V.V. and Pedersen, L.H. 
Asset pricing with liquidity risk 2005 JFE 
22 15 Rajan, R.G. and Zingales, L. The great reversals: the politics of financial development in the 
twentieth century 2003 JFE 
23 33 Baker, M. and Wurgler, J. 
Market timing and capital structure 2002 JF 
24 25 Beck, T., Levine, R. and Loayza, 
N. Finance and the sources of growth 2000 JFE 
25 20 Ang, A., Hodrick, R.J., Xing, Y. 
and Zhang, X. The cross‐section of volatility and expected returns 2006 JF 
26 24 Baker, M. and Wurgler, J. 
Investor sentiment and the cross-section of stock returns 2006 JF 
27 27 Allen, F., Qian, J. and Qian, M. 
Law, finance, and economic growth in China 2005 JFE 
28 44 Fama, E.F. and French, K.R. Testing trade‐off and pecking order predictions about dividends and 
debt 2002 RFS 
29 13 Longstaff, F.A. and Schwartz, 
E.S. 
Valuing American options by simulation: a simple least-squares 
approach 2001 RFS 
30 23 Djankov, S., McLiesh, C. and 
Shleifer, A. Private credit in 129 countries 2007 JFE 
31 30 Coles, J.L., Daniel, N.D. and 
Naveen, L. Boards: Does one size fit all? 2008 JFE 
32 22 Bansal, R. and Yaron, A. 
Risks for the long run: a potential resolution of asset pricing puzzles 2004 JF 
33 29 Malmendier, U. and Tate, G. 
CEO overconfidence and corporate investment 2005 JF 
34 68 Ivashina, V. and Scharfstein, D. 
Bank lending during the financial crisis of 2008 2010 JFE 
35 21 Easley, D. and O'hara, M. 
Information and the cost of capital 2004 JF 
36 568 Acharya, V.V., Schnabl, P. and 
Suarez, G. Securitization without risk transfer 2013 JFE 
37 46 La Porta, R., Lopez‐de‐Silanes, 
F., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R.W. Agency problems and dividend policies around the world 2000 JF 
38 61 Bekaert, G., Harvey, C.R. and 
Lundblad, C. Does financial liberalization spur growth? 2005 JFE 
39 34 Ritter, J.R. and Welch, I. 
A Review of IPO activity, pricing, and allocations 2002 JF 
40 76 Bates, T.W., Kahle, K.M. and 
Stulz, R.M. Why do U.S. firms hold so much more cash than they used to? 2009 JF 
41 125 Hendershott, T., Jones, C.M. and 
Menkveld, A.J. Does algorithmic trading improve liquidity? 2011 JF 
42 85 Malmendier, U. and Tate, G. 
Who makes acquisitions? CEO overconfidence and the market's 2008 JFE 
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reaction 
43 48 Almeida, H., Campello, M. and 
Weisbach, M.S. The cash flow sensitivity of cash 2004 JF 
44 66 Adams, R.B. and Ferreira, D. 
A theory of friendly boards 2007 JF 
45 58 Welch, I. and Goyal, A. A comprehensive look at the empirical performance of equity premium 
prediction 2008 RFS 
46 45 La Porta, R., Lopez‐de‐Silanes, F. 
and Shleifer, A. Government ownership of banks 2002 JF 
47 26 Barber, B.M. and Odean, T. Trading is hazardous to your wealth: the common stock investment 
performance of individual investors 2000 JF 
48 55 Campbell, J.Y. 
Household finance 2006 JF 
49 64 Fama, E.F. and French, K.R. Disappearing dividends: changing firm characteristics or lower 
propensity to pay?  2001 JFE 
50 50 Laeven, L. and Levine, R. 
Bank governance, regulation and risk taking 2009 JFE 
Table 4.1 Panel B provides the list of the top 50 most-cited published papers in the top 3 finance journals during 2000-2013 based on the number of citations per year in Google 
Scholar. The number of citations per year is the total number of citations divided by Paper Age. The GS p.a. Rank represents the Google Scholar rank; we also provide the Web of 
Science rank as WOS p.a. Rank for comparison. Year denotes the Publication Year. 
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We present the paper characteristics for the total sample in Table 4.2 and Figure 
4.1. The summary statistics in Table 4.2 Panel A show that, on average, lead paper 
accounts for 10% of our sample,  the paper order is 5.87, the number of authors is 2.27,  
internal collaboration is 0.32 (1 if no external collaboration), 0.77 authors are from the 
top 20 finance departments, the abstract includes 107.52 words, title length is 8.67 words, 
29% of the papers have subtitles, the number of pages is 31.75, the number of footnotes 
is 18.63, 42% of the papers have received financial support, the authors acknowledge 
11.90 peer scholars, presentations occur at 2.99 conferences and 4.80 seminars, 0.67 RAs 
provide research assistance, research methods is 0.49 (1 if purely theoretical), the number 
of references is 42.08, the number of tables is 6.73, the number of pictures is 2.52, 59% 
of the papers have at least one appendix, and the working paper age is 1.65 years. We 
also notice that the standard deviations of all measures of the number of citations are 
larger than their means, and this implies the over-dispersion of the citation data and thus 
non-normal properties. 
   In Table 4.2 Panel B, we investigate the trends of paper characteristics over the 
recent 14 years during 2000-2013. We find that in the universalist perspective, most of 
the measures remain constant except that the working paper age is increasing from 0.79 
to 2.06. It takes more time to publish a paper now than before.  
In the social constructivist perspective, all measures increase with time: the 
number of authors increases from 2.00 to 2.43, internal collaboration increases from 0.18 
to 0.33, financial support increases from 0.37 to 0.48, the number of acknowledgements 
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increases from 9.34 to 13.23, the number of conferences
34
 increases from 1.51 to 4.09, 
the number of seminars increases from 2.98 to 5.63, the number of RAs increases from 
0.58 to 0.80, the number of references increases from 35.25 to 47.92. These numbers 
suggest that finance researchers care more and more about the exposure of their papers to 
their peers in recent years. The finance academia seems more and more “liquid” in terms 
of opportunities of presentations, co-authorship, and resources.  
In the presentation perspective, the abstract length increases from 101.26 to 
107.68, the number of tables increases from 5.01 to 7.74, the number of pictures 
(graphs/figures) increases from 2.22 to 3.17, the number of footnotes increases from 
13.40 to 21.40, the appendix dummy increases from 0.44 to 0.70. These trends may 
suggest that the recent papers contain more information or try to do more things in one 
project. However, the title length and subtitle dummy does not exhibit stable increase. 
We depict the time trends of normalized paper characteristics in Figure 4.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
34
 The number of conferences is a measure in the presentation perspective rather than in the universalist 
perspective, so we do not measure conference quality here. 
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Table 4.2: Summary Statistics for the Whole Sample 
Panel A: Summary Statistics 
Variables Mean Median Std Dev N Min Max Q1 Q3 
Citation_GS 207.61 106 318.02 3365 0 4956 44 240 
Citation_WOS 42.04 20 67.60 3365 0 987 7 49 
Citation_GS_Annual 24.63 15.86 30.34 3365 0 657.83 7.80 30.33 
Citation_WOS_Annual 4.59 2.79 6.27 3365 0 164.50 1.25 5.75 
Citation_GS_Annual2 19.60 12.17 24.20 3365 0 358.82 6.00 23.83 
Citation_WOS_Annual2 3.79 2.22 5.10 3365 0 89.73 1.00 4.75 
Lead 0.10 0 0.31 3365 0 1 0 0 
Order 5.87 5 3.61 3365 1 18 3 8 
Authors 2.27 2 0.84 3365 0 5 2 3 
Internal Collaboration 0.32 0 0.43 3365 0 2 0 1 
Top Schools 0.77 1 0.89 3365 0 4 0 1 
Abstract Length 107.52 100 25.33 3365 0 344 97 111 
Title Length 8.67 8 3.34 3365 1 23 6 11 
Subtitle 0.29 0 0.45 3365 0 1 0 1 
Pages 31.75 32 9.61 3365 2 81 25 38 
Footnotes 18.63 18 10.39 3365 0 90 11 25 
Financial Support 0.42 0 0.49 3365 0 1 0 1 
Acknowledgement 11.90 11 7.71 3365 0 101 7 16 
Conferences 2.99 2 3.04 3365 0 36 1 4 
Seminars 4.80 4 4.60 3365 0 32 1 7 
RAs 0.67 0 1.52 3365 0 23 0 1 
Methods 0.49 0.5 0.30 3365 0 1 0.5 0.5 
References 42.08 40 20.61 3365 0 598 30 50 
Tables 6.73 7 3.81 3365 0 26 5 9 
Pictures 2.52 2 2.81 3365 0 21 0 4 
Appendix 0.59 1 0.49 3365 0 1 0 1 
Publication Year 2007.26 2008 3.96 3365 2000 2013 2004 2011 
Appearance Year 2005.62 2006 3.92 3365 1996 2013 2002 2009 
Paper Age 7.74 7 3.96 3365 2 15 4 11 
Total  Paper Age 9.38 9 3.92 3365 2 19 6 13 
Working Paper Age 1.65 1 1.52 3365 0 11 0 3 
Table 4.2 Panel A presents the summary statistics for the whole sample which includes 3365 published papers in 
Journal of Finance, Journal of Financial Economics, and Review of Financial Studies from 2010 to 2013. All variables 
in Table 4.2 are defined in Appendix 4.2.  
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Panel B: Trends for the Means of Paper Characteristic 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Top Schools 0.73 0.82 0.86 0.63 0.66 0.79 0.77 0.82 0.69 0.85 0.83 0.74 0.74 0.76 
Pages  31.70 31.49 31.11 31.50 32.09 35.07 34.20 34.82 30.95 31.31 31.21 30.17 30.60 30.07 
Order 6.07 5.56 6.05 6.10 5.88 5.84 5.91 5.95 6.37 6.11 5.56 5.67 5.30 5.94 
Lead Paper 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.10 
Methods 0.50 0.46 0.47 0.46 0.50 0.49 0.49 0.51 0.47 0.53 0.49 0.47 0.50 0.51 
Authors 2.00 2.02 2.10 2.09 2.12 2.14 2.15 2.35 2.32 2.33 2.44 2.42 2.39 2.43 
Internal Collaboration 0.18 0.28 0.29 0.30 0.32 0.30 0.42 0.36 0.35 0.37 0.32 0.32 0.30 0.33 
Financial Support 0.37 0.37 0.36 0.37 0.43 0.39 0.40 0.36 0.48 0.46 0.47 0.43 0.44 0.48 
Acknowledgement 9.34 10.36 10.31 10.54 10.33 11.86 11.57 11.37 11.38 13.65 13.37 13.25 12.52 13.23 
Conferences 1.51 1.92 2.17 1.99 2.24 2.80 2.41 2.54 3.09 3.31 3.29 4.06 4.27 4.09 
Seminars 2.98 3.66 4.28 3.47 4.12 4.74 4.73 4.33 4.48 5.60 5.83 5.17 5.99 5.63 
RAs 0.58 0.64 0.66 0.56 0.53 0.59 0.65 0.56 0.65 0.77 0.82 0.58 0.79 0.80 
References 35.25 35.69 35.80 38.83 36.76 39.95 40.10 40.92 43.85 42.56 45.39 48.23 46.49 47.92 
Title Length 9.10 8.89 8.83 8.83 8.63 8.88 8.32 8.61 8.84 8.38 8.67 8.55 8.61 8.54 
Subtitle 0.27 0.34 0.36 0.42 0.34 0.32 0.23 0.26 0.33 0.27 0.28 0.22 0.27 0.26 
Abstract Length 101.26 105.60 102.59 103.11 103.61 108.39 105.87 104.70 106.24 114.26 113.03 114.07 105.77 107.68 
Tables 5.01 5.62 5.84 5.89 5.87 6.76 6.63 6.69 7.17 7.11 7.14 7.42 7.35 7.74 
Pictures 2.22 2.32 2.25 1.76 2.36 2.46 2.27 2.87 2.46 2.23 2.74 2.62 2.95 3.17 
Footnotes 13.40 14.42 15.55 15.37 15.56 16.85 17.17 19.63 18.01 21.02 21.81 21.84 20.88 21.40 
Appendices 0.44 0.54 0.58 0.52 0.56 0.62 0.60 0.67 0.54 0.57 0.58 0.63 0.63 0.70 
Working Paper  Age 0.79 1.01 1.14 1.19 1.29 1.57 1.91 1.83 1.78 2.06 1.89 1.78 1.81 2.06 
Table 4.2 Panel B shows the time-series trends for the means of key independent variables (paper characteristics) over 2010-2013.
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Figure 4.1: Trends of Paper Characteristics: 2000-2013 
Figure 4.1A: Trends of Paper Characteristics-Universalism 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2B: Trends of Paper Characteristics-Social Constructivism 
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Figure 4.1A: Trends of Paper Charateristics-Universalism 
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Figure 4.2C: Trends of Paper Characteristics-Presentation 
 
 
Figure 4.2 depicts the time-series trends of the means of paper characteristics from 2000 to 2013 based on the total 
sample of 3365 published papers in Journal of Finance, Journal of Financial Economics, and Review of Financial 
Studies. The numbers are normalized at 100 in year 2000 for all variables. Figure 4.2A, Figure4.2B, and Figure 4.2C 
refer to the variables in Universalism, Social Constructivism, and Presentation respectively.  
 
Considering the difference among the top three finance journals, we compare the 
means, the medians, and the standard deviations of the variables in Table 4.3. The papers 
in Journal of Finance receive more citations on average than the papers in Journal of 
Financial Economics and Review of Financial Studies. 
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Table 4.3: Comparison of Summary Statistics for JF, JFE, and RFS 
  Mean Median Std Dev 
  
  
JFE RFS JF JFE RFS JF JFE RFS JF 
N=1284 N=973 N=1108 N=1284 N=973 N=1108 N=1284 N=973 N=1108 
Citation_GS 182.85 147.21 289.34 83.5 79 162 319.53 238.07 358.67 
Citation_WOS 36.79 28.45 60.07 16 14 33 64.51 51.77 78.69 
Citation_GS_Annual 22.12 20.67 31.02 13.5 13.22 21.82 28.37 31.64 30.40 
Citation_WOS_Annual 4.08 3.66 5.98 2.43 2.33 4 5.47 6.68 6.52 
Citation_GS_Annual2 17.89 14.82 25.78 10.67 9.75 17.47 23.87 19.67 26.81 
Citation_WOS_Annual2 3.43 2.75 5.14 2 1.75 3.22 4.80 4.23 5.80 
Lead 0.13 0.10 0.08 0 0 0 0.33 0.31 0.26 
Order 4.85 5.57 7.32 4 5 7 2.96 3.20 4.15 
Authors 2.30 2.26 2.23 2 2 2 0.84 0.84 0.85 
Internal Collaboration 0.35 0.36 0.25 0 0 0 0.44 0.44 0.40 
Top Schools 0.77 0.86 0.68 0 1 1 0.93 0.93 0.79 
Abstract Length 114.31 110.39 97.13 104 101 98 30.68 25.76 10.37 
Title Length 8.71 8.55 8.71 8 8 8 3.29 3.26 3.47 
Subtitle 0.26 0.26 0.36 0 0 0 0.44 0.44 0.48 
Pages 26.54 36.37 33.72 25 36 34 8.97 8.14 8.65 
Footnotes 15.37 21.31 20.05 13 21 20 10.35 10.00 9.77 
Financial Support 0.43 0.48 0.37 0 0 0 0.50 0.50 0.48 
Acknowledgement 11.60 12.96 11.31 10 12 10 7.82 8.12 7.11 
Conferences 2.65 3.31 3.11 2 3 2 2.73 2.98 3.39 
Seminars 4.27 5.28 4.98 3 4 4 4.53 4.66 4.58 
RAs 0.66 0.59 0.75 0 0 0 1.44 1.46 1.65 
Methods 0.45 0.55 0.48 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.32 0.28 0.28 
References 42.31 43.64 40.44 40 42 38 17.74 17.00 25.83 
Tables 7.54 6.34 6.13 8 7 6 3.73 4.01 3.56 
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Pictures 2.45 2.92 2.26 2 2 1 2.80 2.89 2.71 
Appendix 0.60 0.68 0.50 1 1 1 0.49 0.47 0.50 
Publication Year 2007.72 2008.08 2006.02 2008 2009 2006 3.94 3.68 3.92 
Appearance Year 2006.19 2006.04 2004.58 2007 2006 2004 3.95 3.85 3.73 
Paper Age 7.28 6.92 8.98 7 6 9 3.94 3.68 3.92 
Total  Paper Age 8.81 8.96 10.42 8 9 11 3.95 3.85 3.73 
Working Paper Age 1.52 2.05 1.45 1 2 1 1.43 1.67 1.41 
Table 4.3 compares the summary statistics for the variables that are defined in Appendix 4.2 for published papers in Journal of Finance, Journal of Financial Economics, and 
Review of Financial Studies from 2010 to 2013.  
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We investigate the distribution of the number of citations in Table 4.4. We find 
for 76.23% of the papers in the total sample, the number of citations in Google Scholar is 
in the range between 0 and 250, and for 75.72% of the papers in the total sample, the 
number of citations in Web of Science ranges between 0 and 50. In addition, in the 
citation groups for most-cited papers, Journal of Finance has more influential papers 
(and higher corresponding percentage of the total sample size) than Journal of Financial 
Economics and Review of Financial Studies.  
Table 4.4: Frequency of Citations 
Panel A: The Frequency of Google Scholar Citations (Citation_GS) 
  0-250 250-500 500-750 750-1000 1000-1250 1250-5000 Total 
JF 715 216 85 34 24 34 1108 
Percentage 21.25 6.42 2.53 1.01 0.71 1.01 32.93 
JFE 1026 159 51 20 8 20 1284 
Percentage 30.49 4.73 1.52 0.59 0.24 0.59 38.16 
RFS 824 104 24 10 5 6 973 
Percentage 24.49 3.09 0.71 0.3 0.15 0.18 28.92 
Total 2565 479 160 64 37 60 3365 
Percentage 76.23 14.23 4.75 1.9 1.1 1.78 100 
Panel B: The Frequency of Web of Science Citations (Citation_WOS) 
  0-50 50-100 100-150 150-200 200-250 250-1000 Total 
JF 
699 219 83 43 24 40 1108 
Percentage 
20.77 6.51 2.47 1.28 0.71 1.19 32.93 
JFE 
1019 158 57 21 10 19 1284 
Percentage 
30.28 4.7 1.69 0.62 0.3 0.56 38.16 
RFS 
830 100 18 13 8 4 973 
Percentage 
24.67 2.97 0.53 0.39 0.24 0.12 28.92 
Total 
2548 477 158 77 42 63 3365 
Percentage 
75.72 14.18 4.7 2.29 1.25 1.87 100 
Table 4.4 counts the frequency of the number of citations of the papers in the whole sample. The columns show the 
groups of frequency, the rows show the frequency for each of the top three finance journal. For each journal, the second 
line below the frequency is the corresponding percentage of the total sample size. Panel A refers to the Google Scholar 
citations; Panel B refers to the Web of Science citations. In both Panel A and Panel B, the p-values of Chi-Square, 
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Likelihood Ratio Chi-Square, and Mantel-Haenszel Chi-Square are all smaller than 0.001 (not reported in Table 4), 
which means the distribution of citation groups are significantly different among the top 3 finance journals. 
In order to identify how paper characteristics differ between more influential 
papers and less influential papers, we compare the means of the paper characteristics 
between the top 10% and the bottom 10% annual citations in Table 4.5. For annual 
citations in Google Scholar (Citation_GS_Annual1), almost all measures in the three 
perspectives are significantly different, with the exceptions of subtitle dummy, abstract 
length, and the number of pictures. By large, more influential papers in our sample have 
larger number of authors from the top 20 finance departments, larger number of pages, 
smaller paper order and higher proportion of lead papers, larger paper age, total paper age 
and working paper age, higher empirical orientation, larger number of authors, higher 
level of external collaboration and financial support, larger numbers of 
acknowledgements, conferences, seminars, and RAs, more references, shorter title length, 
larger number of tables and footnotes, and less appendix setting. As for annual citations 
in Web of Science (Citation_WOS_Annual1), all the measures in the universalist 
perspective, paper age, and total paper age are still significant. Some paper characteristics 
in the social constructivist perspective (internal collaboration, financial support, the 
number of conferences, seminars, and RAs) and in the presentation perspective (title 
length, abstract length, and the number of pictures) become insignificant, but the signs of 
the differences are the same as those of Citation_GS_Annual1 except the number of 
footnotes. It is not surprising that more measures become insignificant for 
Citation_WOS_Annual1 because Citation_WOS is more sensitive for annualized quantile 
calculation given the number of citations in Web of Science is always much smaller than 
that in Google Scholar. Again, these results highlight the importance of paper quality, 
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research methods, and paper age for citations in both Google Scholar and Web of Science. 
Overall, the results in Table 4.5 indicate that the “star papers” (most-cited papers) exhibit 
certain paper characteristics that are consistent with common sense and the hypotheses 
developed above. 
Table 4.5: Comparison of Averages between Top 10% and Bottom 10% Citations 
 Ranking by 
Citation_GS_Annual1 
Ranking by 
Citation_WOS_Annual1 
Variables Top  
10% 
Bottom 
10% 
Difference Top  
10% 
Bottom 
 10% 
Difference 
Annual Citation 91.191 2.355 88.836*** 17.989 0.149 17.840*** 
Top Schools 1.030 0.496 0.534*** 0.988 0.626 0.362*** 
Pages 34.858 28.463 6.395*** 35.237 29.202 6.036*** 
Order 4.350 6.181 -1.831*** 4.181 6.220 -2.039*** 
Lead Paper 0.199 0.062 0.136*** 0.178 0.083 0.095*** 
Working Paper Age 2.024 1.119 0.905*** 1.727 1.493 0.234* 
Methods 0.418 0.597 -0.178*** 0.407 0.566 -0.159*** 
Authors 2.335 2.065 0.270*** 2.332 2.178 0.154** 
Internal Collaboration 0.276 0.365 -0.089*** 0.282 0.332 -0.050 
Financial Support 0.469 0.401 0.068* 0.454 0.436 0.018 
Acknowledgement 13.783 10.323 3.460*** 13.068 10.908 2.160*** 
Conferences 3.365 2.015 1.350*** 3.166 2.920 0.246 
Seminars 5.154 3.534 1.620*** 4.828 4.733 0.095 
RAs 0.914 0.424 0.490*** 0.819 0.644 0.175 
References 47.131 36.810 10.320*** 46.623 40.955 5.668** 
Title Length 8.116 8.964 -0.849*** 8.386 8.576 -0.190 
Subtitle 0.279 0.252 0.027 0.318 0.249 0.068* 
Abstract Length 104.217 106.282 -2.06 103.697 106.614 -2.917 
Tables 7.098 5.570 1.528*** 7.172 6.095 1.077*** 
Pictures 2.392 2.564 -0.172 2.522 2.792 -0.270 
Footnotes 17.861 16.555 1.306* 17.021 18.955 -1.935** 
Appendices 0.573 0.694 -0.122*** 0.564 0.671 -0.107*** 
Paper Age 9.252 6.864 2.389*** 10.282 4.970 5.312*** 
Total paper Age 11.276 7.982 3.294*** 12.009 6.463 5.546*** 
Table 4.5 compares the means and corresponding differences of the variables between top 10% and bottom 10% 
citations in the total sample. The rankings are based on Citation_GS_Annual and Citation_WOS_Annual respectively. 
All variables are defined in Appendix 1. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.  
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Last but not least, we provide the correlation coefficients in Table 4.6. We find all 
the dependent variables (the four citation measures) are highly correlated-the correlation 
coefficients are between 0.82 and 0.97. However, the independent variables (paper 
characteristics) are usually not highly correlated, which indicates we do not suffer from a 
multicollinearity problem in the regressions. For the significant correlation coefficients, 
the citation measures are positively correlated to Lead, Authors, Top Schools, Subtitle, 
Pages, Financial Support, Acknowledgement, Conferences, Seminars, RAs, References, 
Tables, Paper Age and Total Paper Age; the citation measures are negatively correlated 
with Order, Internal Collaboration, Abstract Length, Title Length, Methods, Appendices. 
One exception is that Pictures is not significantly correlated with any of the citation 
measures. 
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Table 4.6: Pearson Correlation Coefficients for the Whole Sample 
  V1 V2 V3 V4 V5 V6 V7 V8 V9 V10 V11 V12 V13 V14 V15 V16 V17 V18 V19 V20 V21 V22 V23 V24 V25 V26 
Citation_GS 1.00 
                         Citation_WOS 0.97 1.00 
                        Citation_GS_Annual 0.88 0.82 1.00 
                       Citation_WOS_Annual 0.89 0.92 0.92 1.00 
                      Lead 0.09 0.08 0.10 0.08 1.00 
                     Order -0.07 -0.06 -0.09 -0.06 -0.46 1.00 
                    Authors 0.01 0.00 0.05 0.04 0.04 -0.02 1.00 
                   Internal Collaboration -0.06 -0.06 -0.05 -0.04 -0.01 -0.05 -0.30 1.00 
                  Top Schools 0.11 0.10 0.14 0.12 0.13 -0.18 0.23 0.01 1.00 
                 Abstract Length -0.07 -0.08 -0.03 -0.05 0.01 -0.07 0.04 0.03 0.04 1.00 
                Title Length -0.05 -0.02 -0.07 -0.03 -0.05 0.06 0.04 0.00 -0.06 0.05 1.00 
               Subtitle 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.03 -0.01 0.08 -0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.44 1.00 
              Pages 0.13 0.13 0.14 0.15 0.03 -0.09 0.02 -0.02 0.08 0.03 0.00 -0.02 1.00 
             Footnotes -0.09 -0.10 -0.01 -0.04 -0.05 0.06 0.08 -0.02 0.06 0.09 0.00 0.03 0.30 1.00 
            Financial Support 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.01 -0.04 0.12 -0.03 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.06 0.03 1.00 
           Acknowledgement 0.03 0.02 0.10 0.07 0.02 -0.03 -0.02 0.03 0.09 0.02 -0.01 -0.03 0.11 0.18 0.09 1.00 
          Conferences 0.03 0.04 0.09 0.04 -0.04 -0.01 0.16 -0.06 0.08 0.03 -0.02 -0.02 0.16 0.19 0.10 0.30 1.00 
         Seminars 0.00 -0.01 0.08 0.05 0.02 -0.08 0.07 -0.02 0.13 0.00 -0.06 -0.02 0.14 0.16 0.09 0.29 0.37 1.00 
        RAs 0.05 0.04 0.11 0.08 0.03 -0.04 0.08 -0.03 0.10 0.00 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.09 0.07 0.08 0.06 1.00 
       Methods -0.12 -0.12 -0.12 -0.12 -0.01 -0.01 -0.12 0.07 0.04 0.01 -0.12 -0.09 0.06 0.05 -0.03 -0.05 0.00 0.05 -0.18 1.00 
      References 0.06 0.04 0.11 0.08 0.02 -0.05 0.02 0.00 0.05 0.06 -0.01 -0.02 0.25 0.31 0.08 0.25 0.14 0.10 0.06 -0.02 1.00 
     Tables 0.02 0.01 0.08 0.06 -0.02 -0.01 0.15 -0.01 -0.03 0.10 0.13 0.10 0.12 0.07 0.05 0.10 0.06 0.00 0.12 -0.48 0.11 1.00 
    Pictures -0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.04 -0.03 0.06 0.10 0.05 -0.03 -0.08 0.23 0.08 0.02 0.01 0.07 0.04 -0.05 0.17 0.06 -0.14 1.00 
   Appendices -0.05 -0.05 -0.03 -0.04 0.03 -0.03 -0.03 0.00 0.06 0.05 -0.08 -0.06 0.17 0.10 0.02 0.08 0.09 0.09 -0.06 0.26 0.08 -0.11 0.16 1.00 
  Paper Age 0.42 0.45 0.14 0.26 0.02 0.02 -0.17 -0.05 -0.01 -0.10 0.04 0.07 0.07 -0.26 -0.07 -0.15 -0.27 -0.17 -0.04 -0.03 -0.21 -0.19 -0.09 -0.09 1.00 
 Total Paper Age 0.43 0.45 0.20 0.29 0.02 0.00 -0.14 -0.06 0.04 -0.09 0.00 0.04 0.11 -0.22 -0.05 -0.11 -0.20 -0.11 -0.03 0.00 -0.18 -0.19 -0.06 -0.07 0.93 1.00 
 
Table 4.6 presents the Pearson correlation coefficients for the whole sample, where V1= Citation_GS, V2=Citation_WOS, V3=Citation_GS_Annual, V4=Citation_WOS_Annual, 
V5=Lead, V6=Order, V7=Authors, V8=Internal Collaboration, V9=Top Schools, V10=Abstract Length, V11=Title Length, V12=Subtitle, V13=Pages, V14=Footnotes, 
V15=Financial Support, V16=Acknowledgement, V17=Conferences, V18=Seminars, V19=RAs, V20=Methods, V21=References, V22=Tables, V23=Pictures, V24=Appendices, 
V25=Paper Age, V26=Total Paper Age. All of these variables are defined in Appendix 4.2. Numbers in grey denotes statistically insignificant correlation coefficients at 10% or 
higher level.  
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4.4 Multivariate Analysis and Results 
We use the following specification to explore the effects of paper characteristics 
on the number of citations: 
 𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑗 = 𝛼 + ∑ 𝛽𝑗
2
𝑗=1 𝐽𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑗 + 𝛾𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑗 + 𝛿𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑗
2 + ∑ 𝜃𝑢
6
𝑢=1 𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑢𝑖𝑗 +
+ ∑ 𝜇𝑠
8
𝑠=1 𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑗+ ∑ 𝜑𝑝
9
𝑝=1 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑝𝑖𝑗 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗                                                 (4.1)       
Where  𝐶𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑗 is the number of citations for paper 𝑖 in journal j. 𝐽𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙𝑗 is a 
dummy that equals 1 if paper 𝑖 is in journal j, and 0 otherwise. 𝐴𝑔𝑒 denotes paper age, 
i.e. the number of years since publication. We include the quadratic terms of paper age in 
the regressions because Alexander and Mabry (1994) find that for published papers the 
curve of cumulative percent of total citations by paper age is concave. 
𝑈𝑛𝑖𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑢𝑖𝑗 , 𝑆𝑜𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑗 , and 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑝𝑖𝑗  are measures in the universalist 
perspective, the social constructivist perspective, and the presentation perspective 
respectively. 
Following Stremersch, Verniers, and Verhoef (2007) and Brogaard, Engelberg, 
and Parsons (2014), we estimate the model using negative binomial regressions. The 
advantage of negative binomial regression is that it can deal with over-dispersed count 
data (the conditional variances of dependent variables are bigger than the conditional 
means). It is superior to Poisson regression since it has an extra parameter to capture the 
over-dispersion.   
We provide the results in Table 4.7 for the regressions on the total number of 
citations per paper in Google Scholar (Citation_GS). In Column 1, we find that all of the 
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three perspectives have significant effects on the number of citations based on our total 
sample. The signs of the coefficients in the universalist perspective (quality and domain) 
are consistent with Hypothesis 1. In the quality dimension, the results show that the 
number of authors from top departments, the number of pages, and lead paper dummy 
(confirmation of Michayluk and Zurbruegg (2014)) positively affect the number of 
citations; the paper order negatively affects the number of citations. The net effect of 
working paper age is positive, which implies an indicator of quality improvement. In the 
domain dimension, we find empirical papers can attract more citations. Half of the 
measures in the social constructivist measure are insignificant, but all of the signs of the 
coefficients are consistent with Hypothesis 2. In the visibility dimension, the number of 
acknowledgements, the number of conferences, and the number of RAs all positively 
affect the number of citations. In the personal promotion dimension, the number of 
references has significant positive effect on the number of citations.  As for the 
presentation perspective, all of the results support Hypothesis 3. In the first-page attention 
dimension, the negative coefficient of title length indicates the complexity of title can 
destroy citations, and the positive coefficient of abstract length means the 
informativeness of the abstract can boost citations. In the expositional dimension, the 
number of tables has positive influence on citations, while the numbers of footnotes and 
appendices have negative effects on citations, and the latter implies that the complexity in 
details may harm research impact. 
 For independent variables other than the measures for the three perspectives, we 
find papers in Journal of Finance receive more citations on average than the papers in the 
other two top finance journals. In addition, the number of citations is concave in paper 
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age, consistent with Alexander and Mabry (1994). Papers are generally losing the 
momentum of impact over time. 
It is worth noting that if we compare the magnitude of the coefficients, the 
measures of the universalist perspective, journal dummy, and paper age have bigger 
influences compared to the measures in the social constructivist perspective and the 
presentation perspective. Paper quality, research methods, journal placement, and paper 
age appear to be the most important drivers (based on economic significance) for 
research impact.  
The evidence in Columns 2, 3, and 4 for the three journals respectively suggests 
that the impact drivers play different roles in different journals. For example, lead paper 
has no significant effect on citations for papers in Journal of Finance, paper order has no 
significant impact in Review of Financial Studies, and the number of authors loses its 
effect in Journal of Financial Economics. 
When it comes to the goodness of fit
35
, we use the Value/DF ratio, where Value is 
the doubled difference between the log likelihood of the maximum achievable model and 
the log likelihood of the fitted model, and DF is the number of observations minus the 
number of parameters. If the model fits the data well, then Value/DF should be around 1. 
In our results, this number is also about 1, implying good model fit. We also report the 
dispersion parameter. If the dispersion is 0, then the model reduces to a Poisson model 
                                                 
35
 Refer to this website for more technical and programming details: 
http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/sas/output/sas_negbin_output.htm 
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which assumes that the expected value of the dependent variable is equal to its variance; 
if the dispersion is bigger than zero the dependent variable is over-dispersed. It is not 
surprising that in our model the dispersion is significantly bigger than 0: the small 
variance of dispersion implies the lower bound of the Wald 95% confidence limits is 
above 0. Thus, our model is more appropriate to the Poisson model.  
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Table 4.7: The Impact Drivers of Google Scholar Citations 
Variable All Journals JF JFE RFS 
Intercept 1.813***(0.138) 2.588***(0.315) 2.016***(0.235) 1.462***(0.252) 
Universalism     
Quality     
Top Schools 0.118***(0.018) 0.082**(0.034) 0.128***(0.029) 0.145***(0.031) 
Pages  0.005**(0.002) 0.008*(0.004) -0.005(0.004) 0.006(0.004) 
Order -0.026***(0.005) -0.035***(0.007) -0.052***(0.010) 0.007(0.010) 
Lead Paper 0.175***(0.053) 0.043(0.103) 0.189**(0.083) 0.263***(0.100) 
Working Paper Age 0.129***(0.010) 0.096***(0.019) 0.080***(0.018) 0.172***(0.017) 
Domain     
Methods -0.317***(0.059) -0.164(0.105) -0.378***(0.088) -0.271**(0.125) 
Social Constructivism     
Visibility     
Authors 0.018(0.020) 0.081***(0.031) 0.018(0.033) -0.083**(0.037) 
Internal Collaboration -0.059(0.036) 0.047(0.063) -0.114*(0.061) -0.131**(0.065) 
Financial Support 0.016(0.030) -0.035(0.051) 0.022(0.049) -0.004(0.054) 
Acknowledgement 0.008***(0.002) 0.007*(0.004) 0.011***(0.004) 0.004(0.004) 
Conferences 0.028***(0.005) 0.005(0.008) 0.027***(0.010) 0.057***(0.009) 
Seminars 0.005(0.003) 0.009(0.006) 0.001(0.006) 0.004(0.006) 
RAs 0.040***(0.010) 0.017(0.015) 0.013(0.017) 0.067***(0.019) 
Personal Promotion     
References 0.006***(0.001) 0.005***(0.001) 0.007***(0.002) 0.005***(0.002) 
Presentation     
First-Page Attention     
Title Length -0.023***(0.005) -0.022***(0.008) -0.028***(0.008) -0.022**(0.009) 
Subtitle 0.027(0.036) -0.003(0.059) -0.006(0.06) 0.094(0.070) 
Abstract Length 0.001**(0.001) -0.001(0.002) 0.002***(0.001) 0.000(0.001) 
Key Words   -0.017(0.022)  
Codes   0.029*(0.018)  
Expositional Clarity     
Tables 0.026***(0.005) 0.025***(0.009) 0.030***(0.008) 0.038***(0.009) 
Pictures 0.007(0.006) -0.007(0.010) 0.009(0.009) 0.017*(0.010) 
Footnotes -0.006***(0.002) -0.003(0.003) -0.007***(0.003) -0.005*(0.003) 
Appendices -0.065*(0.031) 0.049(0.051) -0.044(0.054) -0.199***(0.063) 
Other Variables     
JF 0.426***(0.044)    
RFS36 -0.086**(0.043)    
Paper Age 0.454***(0.018) 0.363***(0.032) 0.471***(0.031) 0.511***(0.037) 
(𝑃𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝐴𝑔𝑒)2 -0.015***(0.001) -0.010***(0.002) -0.015***(0.002) -0.019***(0.063) 
Dispersion 0.684(0.016) 0.621(0.025) 0.695(0.026) 0.655(0.028) 
Value/DF for Deviance 1.114 1.121 1.129 1.129 
Value/DF for Pearson 𝜒2 1.617 1.321 1.611 1.302 
Number of Observations 3365 1108 1284 973 
Table 4.7 shows empirical results for the impact drivers of Google Scholar citations. The dependent variable is 
Citation_GS. All variables are defined in Appendix 4.2. The results are estimated by negative binomial models. ***, 
**, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. The standard errors are given in parenthesis. 
                                                 
36
 The effect of JFE is incorporated into the intercept. If we use JFE rather than RFS, the coefficient of JFE 
is 0.086** (0.043), and correspondingly, the coefficient of JF becomes 0.512*** (0.040), the intercept 
becomes 1.727*** (0.144). If we use JFE and RFS in the model, the coefficient of JFE is -0.426*** 
(0.044), the coefficient of RFS is -0.512*** (0.040), and the intercept is 2.239*** (0.139).  
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We conduct similar regressions for the total number of citations per paper in Web 
of Science (Citation_WOS) in Table 4.8. We find Web of Science citations generate 
congruent results to Google Scholar citations for our total data sample. Some exceptions 
reside in the changes of statistical significance of the number of authors, the number of 
seminars, and the appendices dummy. Again, paper quality, research methods, journal 
placement, and paper age are the most important drivers (in economic significance) of the 
number of citations.  
As for the regressions for the three different journals, the impact drivers also play 
different roles based on the results in Table 4.8. In both of Table 4.7 and Table 4.8, 
theoretical papers in Journal of Financial Economics and Review of Financial Studies 
significantly receive fewer citations than empirical papers but this relation is insignificant 
for papers in Journal of Finance; larger number of pages significantly contributes to the 
number of citations of papers in Journal of Finance, but not in Journal of Financial 
Economics or Review of Financial Studies. However, the significance changes for several 
visibility measures (the number of authors, internal collaboration, the number of 
acknowledgements, and the number of conferences) and one first-page attention measure 
(title length) if we compare Columns 2-4 between Table 4.7 and Table 4.8.  
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Table 4.8: The Impact Drivers of Web of Science Citations 
Variable All Journals JF JFE RFS 
Intercept -1.104***(0.153) -0.534(0.357) -1.017***(0.253) -1.411***(0.279) 
Universalism     
Quality     
Top Schools 0.112***(0.019) 0.070*(0.038) 0.118***(0.030) 0.153***(0.033) 
Pages  0.005**(0.002) 0.011**(0.005) -0.006(0.004) 0.007(0.005) 
Order -0.019***(0.005) -0.031***(0.008) -0.045***(0.011) 0.014(0.010) 
Lead Paper 0.148**(0.057) 0.1049(0.116) 0.190**(0.086) 0.139(0.106) 
Working Paper Age 0.083***(0.011) 0.072***(0.022) 0.036*(0.019) 0.107***(0.018) 
Domain     
Methods -0.333***(0.064) -0.170(0.121) -0.353***(0.091) -0.319**(0.133) 
Social Constructivism     
Visibility     
Authors 0.050**(0.021) 0.099***(0.035) 0.073**(0.035) -0.047(0.040) 
Internal Collaboration -0.052(0.039) 0.012(0.071) -0.100(0.065) -0.097(0.069) 
Financial Support 0.018(0.032) -0.070(0.058) 0.030(0.052) 0.023(0.058) 
Acknowledgement 0.008***(0.002) 0.006(0.004) 0.013***(0.004) 0.006(0.004) 
Conferences 0.026***(0.006) 0.015(0.010) 0.017(0.011) 0.054***(0.010) 
Seminars 0.007*(0.004) 0.011(0.007) -0.002(0.006) 0.006(0.006) 
RAs 0.040***(0.011) 0.009(0.018) 0.014(0.018) 0.070***(0.020) 
Personal Promotion     
References 0.006***(0.001) 0.004***(0.002) 0.007***(0.002) 0.006***(0.002) 
Presentation     
First-Page Attention     
Title Length -0.015***(0.005) -0.013(0.009) -0.019**(0.009) -0.014(0.010) 
Subtitle 0.027(0.039) -0.014(0.066) -0.026(0.064) 0.104(0.074) 
Abstract Length 0.001**(0.001) 0.000(0.003) 0.002**(0.001) 0.001(0.001) 
Key Words   -0.006(0.023)  
Codes   0.024(0.019)  
Expositional Clarity     
Tables 0.026***(0.005) 0.029***(0.011) 0.033***(0.009) 0.031***(0.010) 
Pictures 0.013**(0.006) 0.001(0.011) 0.015(0.010) 0.018*(0.011) 
Footnotes -0.006***(0.002) -0.005(0.003) -0.006**(0.003) -0.008**90.003) 
Appendices -0.052(0.034) 0.039(0.058) -0.028(0.057) -0.181***(0.067) 
Other Variables     
JF 0.376***(0.047)    
RFS -0.051(0.047)    
Paper Age 0.696***(0.020) 0.608***(0.037) 0.741***(0.035) 0.754***(0.041) 
(𝑃𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝐴𝑔𝑒)2 -0.026***(0.001) -0.021***(0.002) -0.028***(0.002) -0.030***(0.002) 
     
Dispersion 0.743(0.019) 0.766(0.033) 0.696(0.029) 0.676(0.033) 
Value/DF for Deviance 1.137 1.180 1.135 1.142 
Value/DF for Pearson 𝜒2 1.542 1.356 1.468 1.343 
Number of Observations 3365 1108 1284 973 
Table 4.8 shows empirical results for the impact drivers of Web of Science citations. The dependent variable is 
Citation_WOS. All variables are defined in Appendix 4.2. The results are estimated by negative binomial models. ***, 
**, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. The standard errors are given in parenthesis. 
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4.5 Robustness 
We examine the robustness of our empirical results for the whole sample in five 
ways. 
 First, we use redefined dependent variables for citations. In previous studies, 
Keloharju (2009) uses the ratio of the number of Google Scholar citations to the number 
of years since publication; Kim, Morse, and Zingales (2009) study Web of Science 
citations adjusted for age. We employ both annualized Google Scholar citations 
(Citation_GS_Annual1) and annualized Web of Science citations 
(Citation_WOS_Annual1) in Table 4.9. Both measures are defined as the total number of 
citations scaled by paper age (the age since publication). The sign, significance, and 
magnitude (economic significance) of the coefficients are quite similar between Table 4.7 
Column 1 (Citation_GS_Annual1) and Table 4.9 Column 1 (Citation_GS). The only 
difference is that the magnitude of paper age becomes smaller for annual citations since 
citations are partially (given the nonlinear relation) normalized for annual calculation.  As 
for Web of Science citations, the results are also similar between Table 4.8 Column 1 and 
Table 4.9 Column 3, except for the significance of abstract length and the magnitude for 
paper age. Alternatively, we use total paper age to rescale the number of citations in 
Table 4.9 (Citation_GS_Annual2 in Column 2 and Citation_WOS_Annual2 in Column 4). 
Both Citation_GS_Annual2 and Citation_WOS_Annual2 are defined as the total number 
of citations divided by total paper age (the age since appearance on the web as a working 
paper). Since we consider working paper age in the denominator of annual-citation 
calculation of Citation_GS_Annual2 and Citation_WOS_Annual2, the coefficients change 
for working paper age and paper age, while all other coefficients remain almost the same.  
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Table 4.9: Robustness Check-Redefined Citations (per Year) 
Variable 
Citation_GS_ 
Annual1 
Citation_GS_ 
Annual2 
Citation_WOS_ 
Annual1 
Citation_WOS_ 
Annual2 
Intercept 1.618***(0.136) 1.111***(0.137) -1.282***(0.150) -1.665***(0.155) 
Universalism     
Quality     
Top Schools 0.117***(0.018) 0.115***(0.018) 0.109***(0.019) 0.108***(0.019) 
Pages  0.005***(0.002) 0.005**(0.002) 0.006***(0.002) 0.006***(0.002) 
Order -0.026***(0.005) -0.026***(0.005) -0.019***(0.005) -0.020***(0.005) 
Lead Paper 0.173***(0.053) 0.173***(0.053) 0.132**(0.055) 0.129**(0.056) 
Working Paper Age 0.131***(0.010) 0.002(0.010) 0.083***(0.011) -0.028**(0.011) 
Domain     
Methods -0.311***(0.059) -0.317***(0.059) -0.331***(0.062) -0.338***(0.063) 
Social Constructivism     
Visibility     
Authors 0.017(0.019) 0.021(0.019) 0.050**(0.021) 0.054***(0.021) 
Internal Collaboration -0.057(0.036) -0.055(0.036) -0.047(0.038) -0.046(0.039) 
Financial Support 0.016(0.030) 0.017(0.030) 0.023(0.032) 0.021(0.032) 
Acknowledgement 0.008***(0.002) 0.008***(0.002) 0.008***(0.002) 0.009***(0.002) 
Conferences 0.028***(0.005) 0.026***(0.005) 0.026***(0.006) 0.024***(0.006) 
Seminars 0.004(0.003) 0.004(0.003) 0.007**(0.004) 0.007**(0.004) 
RAs 0.040***(0.010) 0.041***(0.010) 0.038***(0.010) 0.035***(0.010) 
Personal Promotion     
References 0.006***(0.001) 0.006***(0.001) 0.006***(0.001) 
 
0.006***(0.001) 
Presentation     
First-Page Attention     
Title Length -0.024***(0.005) -0.023***(0.005) -0.018***(0.005) -0.018***(0.005) 
Subtitle 0.037(0.036) 0.035(0.036) 0.046(0.038) 0.048(0.039) 
Abstract Length 0.001**(0.001) 0.001**(0.001) 0.001(0.001) 0.001(0.001) 
Expositional Clarity     
Tables 0.026***(0.005) 0.026***(0.005) 0.025***(0.005) 0.026***(0.005) 
Pictures 0.007(0.006) 0.008(0.006) 0.015**(0.006) 0.015***(0.006) 
Footnotes -0.006***(0.002) -0.006***(0.002) -0.007***(0.002) -0.007***(0.002) 
Appendices -0.059*(0.031) -0.057*(0.031) -0.046(0.033) -0.040(0.034) 
Other Variables     
JF 0.423***(0.043) 0.415***(0.044) 0.365***(0.046) 0.360***(0.046) 
RFS -0.107**(0.043) -0.088**(0.043) -0.072(0.046) -0.067(0.047) 
Paper Age 0.133***(0.018) 0.240***(0.018) 0.374***(0.020) 0.450***(0.021) 
(𝑃𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝐴𝑔𝑒)2 -0.004***(0.001) -0.009***(0.001) -0.015***(0.001) -0.018***(0.001) 
     
Dispersion 0.629(0.016) 0.617(0.016) 0.502(0.018) 0.467(0.018) 
Value/DF for Deviance 1.086 1.076 1.004 0.954 
Value/DF for Pearson 𝜒2 1.597 1.637 1.526 1.492 
Number of Observations 3365 3365 3365 3365 
Table 4.9 shows empirical results for the impact drivers of citations per year based on the total sample. The dependent 
variables in the four columns are Citation_GS_Annual1, Citation_GS_Annual2, Citation_WOS_Annual1, and 
Citation_WOS_Annual2 respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix 4.2. The results are estimated by negative 
binomial models. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. The standard errors are given 
in parenthesis. 
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Second, we show the empirical results of log-transformed OLS models in Table 
4.10 as the comparison with those of negative binomial models. Since neither total 
citations nor annual citations are normally distributed, log-transformed number of 
citations is widely used as the dependent variables in the literature (e.g., Ederington, 
1974; Laband and Piette, 1994; Brogaard, Engelberg, and Parsons, 2014). However, log-
transformed OLS models have disadvantages such as the lack of capability of modeling 
the dispersion, as well as the loss of data of uncited articles
37
.  Given the fact that we use 
the log form as the default link function for the negative binomial regressions and the fact 
that log-transformed OLS models are popular in previous studies, we still show the 
results of log OLS models in Table 4.10. We find that among the 25 independent 
variables, 4 variables change significance for Google Scholar citations (for both 
log(Citation_GS) and log (Citation_GS_Annual1)), 5 variables change significance for 
Web of Science citations (for both log(Citation_WOS) and log (Citation_WOS_Annual1)), 
and all other variables have similar results. We allow for such difference to distinguish 
between log-transformed OLS model and negative binomial models.   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
37
 To deal with papers without any citations, we also tried log (1+citations) and found similar results.  
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Table 4.10: Robustness Check-The Log-Transformed OLS Results 
Variable 
Log 
(Citation_GS) 
Log(Citation_ 
GS_Annual1) 
Log  
(Citation_WOS) 
Log(Citation_ 
WOS_Annual1) 
Intercept 1.211***(0.159) 1.023***(0.158) -1.050***(0.153) -1.280***(0.152) 
Universalism     
Quality     
Top Schools 0.127***(0.019) 0.126***(0.019) 0.110***(0.019) 0.110***(0.019) 
Pages  0.006***(0.002) 0.007***(0.002) 0.006***(0.002) 0.007***(0.002) 
Order -0.032***(0.005) -0.031***(0.005) -0.028***(0.005) -0.027***(0.005) 
Lead Paper 0.126**(0.058) 0.128**(0.057) 0.092(0.059) 0.094(0.059) 
Working Paper Age 0.127***(0.011) 0.128***(0.011) 0.066***(0.011) 0.068***(0.011) 
Domain     
Methods -0.288***(0.068) -0.288***(0.067) -0.273***(0.067) -0.276***(0.067) 
Social Constructivism     
Visibility     
Authors 0.040*(0.021) 0.039*(0.021) 0.068***(0.021) 0.068***(0.021) 
Internal Collaboration -0.060(0.039) -0.055(0.039) -0.076*(0.039) -0.070*(0.039) 
Financial Support -0.003(0.032) -0.002(0.032) 0.011(0.032) 0.012(0.032) 
Acknowledgement 0.008***(0.002) 0.008***(0.002) 0.009***(0.002) 0.008***(0.002) 
Conferences 0.030***(0.006) 0.030***(0.006) 0.027***(0.006) 0.027***(0.006) 
Seminars 0.009**(0.004) 0.009**(0.004) 0.006(0.004) 0.006(0.004) 
RAs 0.024**(0.011) 0.024**(0.011) 0.019*(0.011) 0.019*(0.011) 
Personal Promotion     
References 0.006***(0.001) 0.006***(0.001) 0.006***(0.001) 0.005***(0.001) 
Presentation     
First-Page Attention     
Title Length -0.028***(0.005) -0.029***(0.005) -0.018***(0.005) -0.018***(0.005) 
Subtitle 0.023*(0.039) 0.029*(0.039) 0.000(0.039) 0.005(0.039) 
Abstract Length 0.002**(0.001) 0.001**(0.001) 0.001(0.001) 0.001(0.001) 
Expositional Clarity     
Tables 0.034***(0.005) 0.034***(0.005) 0.031***(0.005) 0.031***(0.005) 
Pictures 0.005(0.006) 0.004(0.006) 0.010*(0.006) 0.010(0.006) 
Footnotes -0.002(0.002) -0.002(0.002) -0.004**(0.002) -0.004**(0.002) 
Appendices -0.114***(0.035) -0.107***(0.034) -0.079**(0.034) -0.075**(0.034) 
Other Variables     
JF 0.462***(0.047) 0.457***(0.047) 0.417***(0.047) 0.415***(0.047) 
RFS -0.106**(0.045) -0.127***(0.045) -0.070(0.044) -0.091**(0.044) 
Paper Age 0.473***(0.020) 0.149***(0.020) 0.629***(0.020) 0.314***(0.019) 
(𝑃𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝐴𝑔𝑒)2 -0.016***(0.001) -0.005***(0.001) -0.023***(0.001) -0.013***(0.001) 
     
R2 0.510 0.259 0.563 0.283 
Adjusted R2 0.506 0.253 0.560 0.277 
Number of 
Observations 
3363 3363 3177 3177 
Table 4.10 shows empirical results for the impact drivers of citations based on log-transformed OLS models for the 
total sample. The dependent variables in the four columns are log (Citation_GS), log (Citation_GS_Annual1), log 
(Citation_WOS), and log (Citation_WOS_Annual1) respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix 4.2. ***, **, * 
denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. The White’s standard errors are given in parenthesis. The 
standard errors, t values, and p values are all heteroscedasticity consistent.  
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Third, we conduct adjustment for heterogeneity by reporting robust standard 
errors in Table 4.11. The results for Citation_GS in Table 4.11 Column 1 are quite similar 
with those in Table 4.7 Column 1, except that the coefficient of the number of authors 
becomes significant at 10% level after adjustment of heteroskedasticity. The results for 
Citation_WOS in Table 4.11 Column 3 are very similar with those in Table 4.8 Column 
1, with the exceptions of the number of seminars, the number of RAs, and the number of 
pictures. These three variables become insignificant after the heteroskedasticity 
adjustment. The annual numbers of citations (Citation_GS_Annual1 and 
Citation_WOS_Annual1) do not exhibit more changes than total number of citations.  
Considering the complexity of the research question and the number of independent 
variables (25 independent variables), we conclude that heteroskedasticity is not a serious 
problem for our empirical examinations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
213 
 
Table 4.11: Robustness Check-Adjustment for Heteroskedasticity 
Variable 
Citation_GS Citation_ 
GS_Annual1 
Citation_WOS Citation_ 
WOS_Annual1 
Intercept 1.813***(0.168) 1.618***(0.164) -1.104***(0.187) -1.282***(0.183) 
Universalism     
Quality     
Top Schools 0.118***(0.020) 0.117***(0.020) 0.112***(0.021) 0.109***(0.021) 
Pages  0.005*(0.002) 0.005**(0.002) 0.005**(0.003) 0.006**(0.002) 
Order -0.026***(0.008) -0.026***(0.008) -0.019**(0.010) -0.019*(0.010) 
Lead Paper 0.175**(0.081) 0.173**(0.076) 0.148*(0.078) 0.132*(0.070) 
Working Paper Age 0.129***(0.013) 0.131***(0.013) 0.083***(0.014) 0.083***(0.015) 
Domain     
Methods -0.317***(0.073) -0.311***(0.071) -0.333***(0.073) -0.331***(0.070) 
Social 
Constructivism 
    
Visibility     
Authors 0.018*(0.025) 0.017(0.024) 0.050*(0.028) 0.050*(0.028) 
Internal 
Collaboration 
-0.059(0.045) -0.057(0.045) -0.052(0.048) -0.047(0.048) 
Financial Support 0.016(0.035) 0.016(0.035) 0.018(0.036) 0.023(0.036) 
Acknowledgement 0.008***(0.002) 0.008***(0.002) 0.008***(0.002) 0.008***(0.002) 
Conferences 0.028***(0.008) 0.028***(0.008) 0.026***(0.008) 0.026***(0.008) 
Seminars 0.005(0.006) 0.004(0.006) 0.007(0.008) 0.007(0.008) 
RAs 0.040**(0.018) 0.040**(0.018) 0.040(0.025) 0.038(0.024) 
Personal Promotion     
References 0.006***(0.001) 0.006***(0.001) 0.006***(0.001) 0.006***(0.001) 
Presentation     
First-Page Attention     
Title Length -0.023***(0.006) -0.024***(0.006) -0.015**(0.006) -0.018***(0.006) 
Subtitle 0.027(0.046) 0.037(0.045) 0.027(0.050) 0.046*(0.050) 
Abstract Length 0.001*(0.001) 0.001(0.001) 0.001*(0.001) 0.001(0.001) 
Expositional Clarity     
Tables 0.026***(0.005) 0.026***(0.005) 0.026***(0.005) 0.025***(0.005) 
Pictures 0.007(0.008) 0.007(0.008) 0.013(0.010) 0.015(0.011) 
Footnotes -0.006***(0.002) -0.006***(0.002) -0.006***(0.002) -0.007***(0.002) 
Appendices -0.065*(0.039) -0.059(0.038) -0.052(0.039) -0.046(0.038) 
Other Variables     
JF 0.426***(0.054) 0.423***(0.053) 0.376***(0.060) 0.365***(0.060) 
RFS -0.086*(0.044) -0.107**(0.044) -0.051(0.045) -0.072(0.045) 
Paper Age 0.454***(0.021) 0.133***(0.021) 0.696***(0.022) 0.374***(0.022) 
(𝑃𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝐴𝑔𝑒)2 -0.015***(0.001) -0.004***(0.001) -0.026***(0.001) -0.015***(0.001) 
     
     
Robust Std. Errors Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of 
Observations 
3365 3365 3365 3365 
Table 4.11 shows empirical results for the impact drivers of citations based on negative binomial models with robust 
standard errors for the total sample. The dependent variables in the four columns are Citation_GS, 
Citation_GS_Annual1, Citation_WOS, and Citation_WOS_Annual1 respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix 
4.2. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. The robust standard errors are given in 
parenthesis. 
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Fourth, we conduct regressions on winsorized citations by removing the top 1% 
highly cited papers. We follow Brogaard, Engelberg, and Parsons (2014) by using 
winsorized data to see whether our empirical results are driven by outliers (i.e., those 
super star papers). Specifically we remove the 34 most-cited papers from the total 
sample. In Table 4.12 Column 1, the results are robust for Citation_GS as most of the 
independent variables exhibit consistent sign, significance, and magnitude compared with 
those of the total sample. Only the coefficients of number of pages and internal 
collaboration change statistical significance. In Table 4.12 Column 2 for 
Citation_GS_Annual1, the results are quite similar with those in Table 4.9 Column 1, 
except that internal collaboration and abstract length change significance. As for 
Citation_WOS and Citation_WOS_Annual1, the common significance changes reside in 
internal collaboration, the number of seminars, pictures, and appendices. Overall, based 
on the winsorized sample with the most-cited papers ignored, the results in Table 4.12 are 
similar with previous results, especially for Google Scholar citations.  
Fifth, we examine the non-linear effects of non-dummy independent variables by 
adding the quadratic forms. By and large, we find these quadratic forms generate 
insignificant results and extremely small magnitude. We do not report the results of 
quadratic terms to make this chapter concise. 
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Table 4.12: Robustness Check-Winsorized Citations 
Variable 
Citation_GS Citation_ 
GS_Annual1 
Citation_WOS Citation_ 
WOS_Annual1 
Intercept 1.936***(0.134) 1.794***(0.130) -0.942***(0.147) -1.037***(0.141) 
Universalism     
Quality     
Top Schools 0.110***(0.018) 0.109***(0.017) 0.114***(0.019) 0.101***(0.018) 
Pages  0.003(0.002) 0.005**(0.002) 0.004*(0.002) 0.005**(0.002) 
Order -0.033***(0.005) -0.031***(0.005) -0.030***(0.005) -0.028***(0.005) 
Lead Paper 0.131**(0.052) 0.170***(0.051) 0.088(0.056) 0.113**(0.010) 
Working Paper Age 0.113***(0.010) 0.114***(0.010) 0.063***(0.011) 0.065***(0.059) 
Domain     
Methods -0.268***(0.058) -0.218***(0.056) -0.254***(0.061) -0.251***(0.059) 
Social Constructivism     
Visibility     
Authors 0.009(0.019) 0.010(0.019) 0.035*(0.020) 0.031(0.020) 
Internal Collaboration -0.081**(0.035) -0.074**(0.034) -0.087**(0.038) -0.078**(0.036) 
Financial Support 0.000(0.029) 0.006(0.028) -0.008(0.031) 0.001(0.030) 
Acknowledgement 0.008***(0.002) 0.008***(0.002) 0.008***(0.002) 0.008***(0.002) 
Conferences 0.027***(0.005) 0.021***(0.005) 0.030***(0.006) 0.024***(0.006) 
Seminars 0.002(0.003) 0.002(0.003) 0.002(0.004) 0.002(0.004) 
RAs 0.027***(0.010) 0.022**(0.009) 0.020*(0.010) 0.018*(0.010) 
Personal Promotion     
References 0.005***(0.001) 0.005***(0.001) 0.005***(0.001) 0.005***(0.001) 
Presentation     
First-Page Attention     
Title Length -0.019***(0.005) -0.019***(0.005) -0.014***(0.005) -0.011**(0.005) 
Subtitle -0.001(0.035) 0.005(0.034) -0.008(0.038) -0.014(0.036) 
Abstract Length 0.002***(0.001) 0.001(0.001) 0.002***(0.001) 0.001*(0.001) 
Expositional Clarity     
Tables 0.025***(0.005) 0.026***(0.005) 0.027***(0.005) 0.026***(0.005) 
Pictures 0.003(0.005) -0.003(0.005) 0.007(0.006) 0.007(0.006) 
Footnotes -0.004***(0.002) -0.004***(0.002) -0.005***(0.002) -0.005***(0.002) 
Appendices -0.086***(0.030) -0.077***(0.023) -0.065**(0.033) -0.062**(0.031) 
Other Variables     
JF 0.444***(0.043) 0.451***(0.042) 0.397***(0.046) 0.392***(0.043) 
RFS -0.077(0.042) -0.093**(0.041) -0.030(0.045) -0.061(0.043) 
Paper Age 0.460***(0.018) 0.124***(0.017) 0.709***(0.020) 0.358***(0.019) 
(𝑃𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝐴𝑔𝑒)2 -0.016***(0.001) -0.004***(0.001) -0.028***(0.001) -0.015***(0.001) 
     
     
Dispersion 0.642(0.015) 0.571(0.015) 0.690(0.018) 0.414(0.016) 
Value/DF for Deviance 1.109 1.083 1.138 1.015 
Value/DF for Pearson 𝜒2 1.362 1.298 1.232 1.201 
Number of Observations 3331 3331 3330 3331 
Table 4.12 shows empirical results for the impact drivers of citations based on negative binomial models 
for the total sample that is winsorized at 1% level (top 1% highly cited papers are removed). The dependent 
variables in the four columns are Citation_GS, Citation_GS_Annual1, Citation_WOS, and 
Citation_WOS_Annual1 respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix 4.2. ***, **, * denote 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. The standard errors are given in parenthesis. 
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4.6 The Marginal Effects of Negative Binomial Models 
In previous sections, it is not straightforward to quantify the effects of different 
drivers of research impact as the models are non-linear, so we provide the average 
marginal effects in Table 4.13. The dependent variables are Citation_GS, 
Citation_GS_Annual, Citation_WOS, Citation_WOS_Annual respectively in the four 
columns. The sign and significance of the coefficients of paper characteristics are 
consistent with the results in previous sections. Among the three perspectives, the 
universalist perspective has the largest influences on citations. For example, one more 
author from the top 20 finance department in the world is associated with 24.9 additional 
total citations and 2.91 additional annual citations in Google Scholar, 4.85 additional 
total citations and 0.51 additional annual citations in Web of Science; if a paper is placed 
as the lead paper in a journal issue, it is associated with 39.54 additional total citations 
and 4.60 additional annual citations in Google Scholar, 6.76 additional total citations and 
0.64 additional annual citations in Web of Science. Compared with the universalist 
perspective, the other two perspectives have smaller influences in economic significance. 
In the constructivist perspective, the number of conferences has the largest magnitude 
among the paper characteristics that are statistically significant for all of the four 
dependent variables; in the presentation perspective, the number of tables has the largest 
magnitude for statistically significant results. For the effects of other variables, journal 
placement in Journal of Finance and paper age (i.e. the numbers of years since 
publication) have stronger effects than any paper characteristics in all of the three 
perspectives. These results provide direct evidence for those who are concerned with the 
number of citations of their papers in the top three finance journals. 
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Table 4.13: Average Marginal Effects 
Variable 
Citation_GS Citation_ 
GS_Annual1 
Citation_WOS Citation_ 
WOS_Annual1 
Universalism     
Quality     
Top Schools 24.941***(4.488) 2.908***(0.521) 4.854***(0.934) 0.508***(0.098) 
Pages  0.963*(0.500) 0.136**(0.058) 0.217**(0.105) 0.029**(0.011) 
Order -5.498***(1.420) -0.644***(0.166) -0.827**(0.337) -0.086*(0.038) 
Lead Paper 39.537**(18.578) 4.601**(2.088) 6.757*(3.652) 0.642*(0.352) 
Working Paper Age 27.317***(2.916) 3.261***(0.335) 3.613***(0.627) 0.386***(0.067) 
Domain     
Methods -67.325***(15.928) -7.769***(1.812) -14.427***(3.320) -1.538***(0.338) 
Social 
Constructivism 
    
Visibility     
Authors 3.730(4.918) 0.420(0.572) 2.146*(1.050) 0.231*(0.115) 
Internal 
Collaboration 
-12.508(9.492) -1.415(1.099) -2.233(2.027) -0.219(0.215) 
Financial Support 3.429(7.412) 0.399(0.864) 0.789(1.567) 0.108(0.168) 
Acknowledgement 1.633***(0.456) 0.188***(0.053) 0.366***(0.094) 0.039***(0.010) 
Conferences 5.863***(1.557) 0.694***(0.183) 1.122***(0.320) 0.119***(0.036) 
Seminars 0.946(1.077) 0.104(0.126) 0.291(0.262) 0.033(0.030) 
RAs 8.468**(3.549) 0.999**(0.413) 1.738*(0.902) 0.177(0.974) 
Personal Promotion     
References 1.241***(0.274) 0.144***(0.031) 0.265***(0.059) 0.027***(0.006) 
Presentation     
First-Page 
Attention 
    
Title Length -4.850***(1.268) -0.596***(0.145) -0.668**(0.260) -0.082***(0.027) 
Subtitle 5.812(9.357) 0.925(1.095) 1.191(1.946) 0.215(0.212) 
Abstract Length 0.305*(0.166) 0.031(0.019) 0.061*(0.033) 0.005(0.004) 
Expositional Clarity     
Tables 5.516***(1.124) 0.638***(0.131) 1.124***(0.232) 0.118***(0.024) 
Pictures 1.450(1.569) 0.165(0.183) 0.554(0.349) 0.067*(0.040) 
Footnotes -1.246***(0.386) -0.153***(0.045) -0.276***(0.081) -0.031***(0.009) 
Appendices -13.739*(7.923) -1.489(0.920) -2.279(1.625) -0.213(0.172) 
Other Variables     
JF 94.210***(12.017) 11.187***(1.446) 16.834***(2.536) 1.773***(0.279) 
RFS -17.828*(9.265) -2.601**(1.076) -2.195(1.942) -0.326(0.205) 
Paper Age 96.349***(5.353) 3.327***(0.528) 30.175***(1.389) 1.739***(0.117) 
(𝑃𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝐴𝑔𝑒)2 -3.165***(0.272) -0.108***(0.031) -1.123***(0.064) 0.071***(0.006) 
     
Number of 
Observations 
3365 3365 3365 3365 
Table 4.13 shows empirical results for average marginal effects (dy/dx) of the impact drivers of citations based on 
negative binomial models with robust standard errors for the total sample. The dependent variables in the four columns 
are Citation_GS, Citation_GS_Annual1, Citation_WOS, and Citation_WOS_Annual1 respectively. All variables are 
defined in Appendix 4.2. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. The robust standard 
errors are given in parenthesis. 
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4.7 Conclusion 
Little is known about how paper characteristics change over time, how paper 
characteristics differ between more influential papers and less influential papers, and 
what are the factors that affect the citations of the published papers in finance literature. 
In this chapter, we try to answer these questions based on the hand-collected data for the 
published papers in the top three finance journals over the period 2000-2013. We employ 
three different theoretical perspectives: the universalist perspective (what is said), the 
social constructivist perspective (who says it), and the presentation perspective (how it is 
said), and have four main findings: 
First, most of the paper characteristics in the social constructivist perspective 
(visibility and personal promotion) and the presentation perspective (fist-page attention 
and expositional clarity) increase over time, while most of the paper characteristics in the 
universalist perspective (quality and domain) remain constant. 
Second, most of the paper characteristics are significantly different between the 
top 10% and the bottom 10% papers based on the number of citations per year. Generally 
speaking, the more influential papers have larger number of authors from the top 20 
finance departments, larger number of pages, smaller paper order and higher proportion 
of lead papers, longer paper age, working paper age, and total paper age, higher empirical 
orientation, larger number of authors, higher level of external collaboration and financial 
support, larger numbers of acknowledgements, conferences, seminars, and RAs, more 
references, shorter title length, larger number of tables and footnotes, and less appendix 
setting. 
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Third, the regression results by negative binomial models show that the 
universalist perspective, the social constructivist perspective, and the presentation 
perspective all provide drivers of research impact. Specifically, paper quality, research 
methods, journal placement, and paper age are the most important (in economic 
significance) drivers for the number of citations. In our analysis, Web of Science citations 
generate congruent results to Google Scholar citations. Additionally, our results are 
robust to redefined citation measures, alternative econometric specifications, 
heteroskedasticity adjustment, and winsorized sample. The results of average marginal 
results document exact evidence in how many additional citations are increased with one 
more unit of a certain paper characteristics. 
Last but not least, different drivers play different roles for the papers in Journal of 
Finance, Journal of Financial Economics, and Review of Financial Studies. For example, 
theoretical papers in Journal of Financial Economics and Review of Financial Studies 
receive significantly fewer citations than empirical papers but this relation is insignificant 
for papers in Journal of Finance; larger number of pages significantly contributes to the 
number of citations of papers in Journal of Finance, but not in Journal of Financial 
Economics or Review of Financial Studies (in Table 4.7 and 4.8). 
Our main contributions are five-fold. First, we track the characteristics dynamics 
for papers in the top three finance journals. Second, we characterize how star papers 
differ from less influential papers. Third, we find multiple drivers (and their effects and 
relative importance) of research impact in the finance area. Fourth, we justify that both 
Web of Science and Google Scholar are objective sources of citations and that they 
generate congruent empirical results. Fifth, our results contribute to the literature of 
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scientometrics by documenting evidence in financial research for comparison with other 
knowledge areas.  
Our results can provide empirical evidence for finance scholars, university 
administrators, and finance journal management who care about research impact. For 
example, the results are useful in assessing and supporting financial research for 
university departments. One possible application is that universities should put more 
emphasis on travelling awards/subsidies for conferences than direct research funding in 
terms of support according to our analysis. Research impact is not only about career path 
for the scholars, the school rankings for the deans, or the journal impact factors for the 
editors, but also, much more importantly, about the dissemination and advancement of 
knowledge. 
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Appendices for Chapter 4 
Appendix 4.1: Top 20 World Ranking of Finance Departments: 2009-2013
38
  
Rank University (Business School) Articles Score Country 
1 University of Pennsylvania   (The Wharton School) 82 38.47 USA 
2 University of Chicago   (Booth School of Business) 88 38.25 USA 
3 Harvard University   (Harvard Business School) 78 34.23 USA 
4 New York University   (Leonard N. Stern School of Business) 90 33.54 USA 
5 Columbia University   (Graduate School of Business) 72 27.79 USA 
6 University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill    
(Kenan-Flagler Business School) 
47 26.30 USA 
7 University of California at Los Angeles    
(Anderson School of Management) 
47 21.39 USA 
8 Duke University   (The Fuqua School of Business) 51 21.08 USA 
9 University of California at Berkeley   
(Walter A. Haas School of Business) 
44 20.33 USA 
10 Ohio State University   (Fisher College of Business) 55 19.73 USA 
11 Stanford University   (Graduate School of Business) 43 18.95 USA 
12 Northwestern University   (Kellogg School of Management) 45 18.86 USA 
13 University of Maryland at College Park    
(Robert H. Smith School of Business) 
37 18.35 USA 
14 University of Texas at Austin   (McCombs School of Business) 44 18.26 USA 
15 University of Michigan at Ann Arbor   (Ross School of Business) 39 18.24 USA 
16 University of Southern California   (Marshall School of Business) 33 16.83 USA 
17 Massachusetts Institute of Technology   
 (Sloan School of Management) 
47 16.78 USA 
18 London Business School   49 16.58 UK 
19 University of Notre Dame   (Mendoza College of Business) 23 15.66 USA 
20 Boston College   (Carroll School of Management) 34 14.84 USA 
Appendix 4.1 is provided by UT Dallas:  The UTD Research Rankings of the Top 100 Finance 
Departments (Web link: http://jindal.utdallas.edu/the-utd-top-100-business-school-research-rankings/). The 
database was still in the process of updating the 2014 articles in our writing period, so we chose the most 
recent five years (from 2009 to 2013) for investigation. We only keep the top 20 schools in the list which is 
based on research contribution in Journal of Finance, Journal of Financial Economics, and Review of 
Financial Studies.  
                                                 
38
 We also check other UTD rankings based on different year ranges and the finance rankings provided by 
ASU (http://legacy.wpcarey.asu.edu/fin-rankings/rankings/results.cfm). We find that 90% of the schools in 
the list in Appendix 4.1 never drop out of the top 20 in any rankings. Also, 80% of the schools in the list in 
Appendix 2 are consistent with the rankings based on financial research in Chan, Chen, and Steiner (2002) 
and Xu, Chan and Chang (2015). 
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Appendix 4.2: Descriptions of Variables 
Variable  Definition and Measurement 
Dependent Variables  
Citation_GS The number of Google Scholar (GS) citations the paper has 
received until the last quarter of 2014.  
Citation_WOS The number of Web of Science (WOS) citations the paper has 
received until the last quarter of 2014. 
Citation_GS_Annual Citation_GS divided by Paper Age. 
Citation_WOS_Annual Citation_WOS divided by Paper Age. 
Citation_GS_Annual2 Citation_GS divided by Total Paper Age. 
Citation_WOS_Annual2 Citation_WOS divided by Total Paper Age. 
  
  
Independent Variables  
Universalism  
Quality  
Top Schools The number of authors who are in the top 20 finance departments 
of business schools. The top finance department list provided by 
UT Dallas includes top 20 world ranking of finance departments 
based on research contribution in Journal of Finance, Journal of 
Financial Economics and Review of Financial Studies during 
2009-2013. Please refer to Appendix 4.1 for details. 
Pages  The total number of pages of the paper. 
Order Paper order in a journal issue.  
Lead Paper A dummy that equals 1 if Order=1 for the paper; Otherwise 0.  
Domain  
Methods If the paper is purely theoretical, then Methods=1; If the paper is 
purely empirical, then Methods=0; If mixed methods are used, 
then Methods=0.5. 
Social Constructivism  
Visibility  
Authors The number of authors of the paper. 
Internal Collaboration If all of the authors are from the same school, then Internal 
Collaboration=1; If some (but not all) of the authors from the 
same school, then Internal Collaboration=0.5; if none of the 
authors are from the same school, then Internal Collaboration=0. 
Financial Support A dummy variable that equals 1 if the paper has received financial 
support; Otherwise Financial Support=0. 
Acknowledgement The number of persons being acknowledged in the 
acknowledgement part in the paper. 
Conferences The number of conferences where the paper has been presented. 
Seminars The number of department seminars where the paper 
has been presented. 
RAs The number of research assistants for the paper. 
Personal Promotion  
References The number of references in the reference part of the paper. 
Presentation  
First-Page Attention  
Title Length The number of words in the title of the paper. 
Subtitle If there is a subtitle (separated by: or --) in the paper, then 
Subtitle=1; otherwise Subtitle=0. 
Abstract Length The number of words in the abstract of the paper. 
Key Words The number of key words. This variable is only available for 
papers in Journal of Financial Economics. 
Codes The number of codes in JEL classification. This variable is only 
available for papers in Journal of Financial Economics. 
Expositional Clarity  
Tables The number of tables in the paper. 
Pictures The number of pictures in the paper. 
Footnotes The number of footnotes in the paper. 
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Appendices If there is at least one appendix in the paper, then Appendices 
dummy=1; otherwise Appendices=0. 
Other Variables  
Publication Year The year when the paper was published. 
Appearance Year The year when the paper first appeared on the web (mostly likely a 
working paper). 
Paper Age Paper Age=2014-Publication Year+1. 
Total Paper Age Total Paper Age=2014-AppearanceYear+1. 
Working Paper Age39 Working Paper Age=Total Paper Age-Paper Age 
                                =Publication Year-Appearance Year. 
JF A dummy equals 1 if the paper was published in JF and 0 
otherwise. 
JFE A dummy equals 1 if the paper was published in JFE and 0 
otherwise. 
RFS A dummy equals 1 if the paper was published in RFS and 0 
otherwise. 
 
                                                 
39
 Working Paper Age is used as a measure of quality in the regressions. 
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Chapter 5  
 
5 Conclusions 
This thesis contributes to the finance literature in three main aspects.  
Chapter 2 employs a novel measure of sell-side financial analysts’ innate ability 
or natural talent and explores its effects on reported corporate insider trading. We 
postulate that analysts with high innate ability can reduce information asymmetry 
between corporate insiders and outside investors through earnings forecasts, thereby 
restricting insider trading. The results show that analysts with higher innate ability are 
associated with lower level of net buys when insiders have “good” inside information 
about earnings, but this relation does not hold for net sells when insiders have “bad” 
inside information. The effects of analysts’ ability mostly reside in opportunistic trading 
rather than routine trading. The tests of analysts’ initial coverage provide stronger effects 
of analysts’ ability and these effects are much stronger for high-ability analysts in the 
sample of initial coverage. We also examine the time-series of mean post-trading CARs 
and find mixed evidence that also depends on information type. Overall, this study 
suggests a negative relation between analyst ability and insider trading intensity and 
informativeness. This study suggests that high-ability analysts may serve in restricting 
excessive corporate insider trading. Additionally, our study sheds light on the nature of 
analyst information. Our results imply that the degree of firm-specific information an 
analyst can provide may be determined by her innate ability. Compared with market-
specific and industry-specific information, firm-specific information is more difficult to 
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collect and analyze; thus, analysts with low ability may not be able to include firm-
specific information in their forecasts.  
In empirical corporate finance, firm size is commonly used as an important, 
fundamental firm characteristic. However, no research comprehensively assesses the 
sensitivity of empirical results in corporate finance to different measures of firm size. 
Chapter 3 fills this hole by providing empirical evidence for “measurement effect” in 
“size effect”. In particular, we examine the influences of employing different proxies 
(total assets, total sales, and market capitalization) of firm size in 20 prominent areas in 
empirical corporate finance research. We highlight several empirical implications. First, 
in most areas of corporate finance, the coefficients of firm size measures are robust in 
sign and statistical significance. Second, however, the coefficients on regressors other 
than firm size often change sign and significance when we use different size measures. 
This may suggest that some previous studies are not robust to different firm size proxies. 
Third, the goodness of fit measured by R-squared also varies with different size 
measures, suggesting that some measures are more relevant than others in different 
situations. Fourth, different proxies capture different aspects of “firm size”, and thus have 
different implications in corporate finance. Therefore, the choice of size measures needs 
both theoretical and empirical justification. Our empirical assessment provides general 
guidance to empirical corporate finance researchers who must use firm size measures in 
their work.  
In Chapter 4, we explore the factors that affect the impact of financial research. 
Specifically, we study the characteristics of all the published papers in the top three 
finance journals (JF, JFE, and RFS) during 2000-2013 and how these paper 
228 
 
characteristics affect the number of citations in Google Scholar and the ISI Web of 
Science database. We investigate three theoretical perspectives: the universalist 
perspective (what is said), the social constructivist perspective (who says it), and the 
presentation perspective (how it is said). First, we find that most of the paper 
characteristics in the social constructivist perspective (visibility and personal promotion) 
and the presentation perspective (first-page attention and expositional clarity) increase 
over time, while the characteristics in the universalist perspective (quality and domain) 
remain constant. Second, most of the paper characteristics are significantly different 
between the top 10% (high impact) and the bottom 10% (low impact) groups based on 
the number of citations per year. Third, the regression results by negative binomial 
models show that the universalist perspective, the social constructivist perspective, and 
the presentation perspective all provide explanatory power for the impact of published 
papers in the top three finance journals. Specifically, paper quality, research methods, 
journal placement, and paper age are the most important (in economic significance) 
drivers for the number of citations Last, different drivers play different roles for the 
papers in JF, JFE, and RFS. Chapter 4 provides evidence for finance scholars, university 
administrators, and finance journal management who care about research impact. 
Research impact is not only about career path for the scholars, the school rankings for the 
deans, or the journal impact factors for the editors, but also, much more importantly, 
about the dissemination and advancement of knowledge.  
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